Bangladesh | Interim government’s unclear roadmap

The euphoria of revolution does not last very long. In Bangladesh, the exhilaration generated by a peoples’ movement successfully overthrowing an unpopular government will also soon wear off.

For the moment, the interim government’s reform agenda remains unclear as the revolution seems to degenerate into plain retribution. Confusion prevails about the future of the Bangladesh polity. The ostensibly non-political chief adviser to the interim government, Muhammad Yunus is yet to present his plans to the nation even after two weeks of Sheikh Hasina fleeing the country.

Some student leaders have announced their intention to form a new political party to ‘break the binary’ of being ruled by the Awami League (AL) and the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Claiming that, “People are really tired of the two political parties. They have trust in us,” they say the new party would be rooted in secularism and free speech.

The history of such motherhood-and-apple-pie adventures in South Asia gives little room for hope. Founded on similar political naïveté, the Aam Adami Party (AAP) in India and the Rashtriya Swatantra Party (RSP) in Nepal, have floundered in the rough and tumble of electoral democracy having no clear political ideology or programme.

Meanwhile, student leader Nahid Islam, appointed in the interim government as the Post and Telecommunication Adviser has denied reports of party formation. The agenda for the Anti-Discrimination Student Movement according to Nahid Islam is “to formulate the outline of the future Bangladesh through discussions and dialogues with the people. We have no plans to form a political party at this moment. The students will act as a socio-political force to preserve the spirit of the revolution and the government will work towards restructuring the state according to the aspirations of people."

Were students to indeed form a new political party, they would need time to put together an electoral machinery to contest elections. The longer they delay however their chances of their cashing in on the euphoria of the movement will diminish.

Nor will the political parties at the receiving end of Hasina’s excesses view kindly, an attempt to snatch away the political prize. The students bore the brunt of the Hasina government’s coercive actions for just two months. The Opposition has suffered for 15 long years with many incarcerated repeatedly and others forced to flee abroad.

The student demonstrators have openly rejected the call of the political parties to hold elections soon. Earlier they had even said that the interim government could last from three to six years. Yunus himself seems in no hurry to hold elections.

Although prioritising institutional reform neither the students nor the interim government, have made public a reform agenda and deadlines for implementing them. Nor is there evidence of an assessment exercise to ascertain the extent of institutional damage.

So far ‘reform’ has only meant changing personnel at the helm of state institutions. This includes forced resignations of judges of the Supreme Court, vice chancellors of universities, chiefs of police and other security agencies and even school headmasters. Media outlets are being attacked and purged of those considered close to the Awami League. Such vengeful reprisals can be no substitute for structural reform of the institutions of state.

Perhaps the Yunus government is still trying to find its feet. His Cabinet ministers have little or no experience in governance. He has not yet put together a full Cabinet and each minister/adviser holds three or more portfolios.

The shape of the interim government will have to change quickly, both in terms of the quality of the ministers and their number. The executive will need to develop this muscle to counter the pushback from within the system, set the agenda for reforming it and prevent a system breakdown.

The rejection of the Hasina government seems to have led to distrust of all politics and politicians. The Yunus government is yet to begin consultation with the political parties of the Opposition, which have the invaluable experience of running a government. The interim government is only a transitional mechanism to usher in an elected government.

With the lifting of the ban on political activity, the political parties of Bangladesh should be setting the limits on what the interim government can do and define what lies outside its remit. However, the BNP, by all present accounts a ruling party in waiting, and seems missing in action. If it has an agenda for institutional reform, it should share, discuss, and modify it in consultation with the interim government.

Brave talk within the Interim government that it must redraft the Constitution before holding elections means little. Constitutional changes cannot be made through a decree. The existing Constitution of Bangladesh has not been abrogated. It can neither be rewritten nor amended without convening a new Constituent Assembly or an elected legislative assembly.

Like the previous caretaker governments in the period of crisis from 2006 to 2008, the Yunus government cannot pass any laws. It can only rule through ordinances. Laws imposed through ordinances would eventually have to be ratified by an elected legislature.

Two previous caretaker governments in Bangladesh — in 2006 and 2007 — passed 122 ordinances, many unrelated to their main task of holding elections. When an elected government was formed in January 2009, it appointed a 15-member parliamentary committee to examine them. The committee chose only 44 of the ordinances to be considered for ratification by parliament after due legislative process.

Although it has the tacit support of the Bangladesh Army, the Yunus government has no legal or constitutional mandate to govern although each of the Cabinet members took oath of office on the Constitution. It may claim revolutionary legality or invoke the ‘doctrine of necessity’ — much abused in South Asia, especially by dictators in Pakistan — but the interim government still needs to forge a social contract with the people of Bangladesh. It needs to acquire their informed consent.

That can only happen if Yunus reveals his agenda to the public. Consultations with the political parties, legal experts, and civil society groups will create public consent for his reform agenda. He must quickly find the modalities of doing this to face the onerous responsibility placed on him.

No communication with the people for two whole weeks is unfair to those who gave up their lives for political change.

(Bharat Bhushan is a Delhi-based journalist.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.