Hydropolitics a new reality for Pakistan

Islamabad’s recent willingness to negotiate the terms of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) highlights how India’s decision to place the IWT in abeyance has struck Pakistan’s vital water resources. Pakistan now faces potentially severe long-term consequences that warrant immediate action to address its prior antagonistic approach toward India as this massive surface water dependency cannot be realistically replaced in the foreseeable future.

The Jhelum and Chenab rivers, where Pakistan previously enjoyed greater rights under the treaty, represent over 45,000 sq km of basin area with mean annual flows exceeding 45 million acre-feet. Pakistan must recognise that its past policies have led to this precarious position, leaving improved relations with India as the best viable path forward.

Recently, the Indian government released water by opening the gates of the Baglihar and Salal dams on the Chenab river, announcing that the sediment-flushing will be carried out as a monthly exercise – both the dams are situated on the Chenab river, a major tributary of Indus. This incident marks a significant development in the ongoing water-based tensions between India and Pakistan.

More than 90% of Pakistan’s agricultural production comes from irrigated lands. Due to its arid to semi-arid climate, farming without irrigation is implausible in most of the Indus basin. The Chenab, with a basin area of 22,500 sq km, serves as a significant source of surface water for the most populous Punjab province in Pakistan.

The criticality of this action lies not in the release of the water itself but in the unpredictable nature of India’s decisions in reservoir and dam management. Under the current circumstances, Pakistan faces a major information gap, as it no longer receives real-time data about when these dam gates might be opened. This leaves the downstream regions inadequately prepared for sudden water releases or shortages. While sudden water release can cause enhanced siltation or flash floods due to the overflow, restricted water flow during crucial sowing periods can potentially disrupt the entire agricultural cycle for the region. This is particularly consequential because following extensive canal networks, farmers have become increasingly reliant on data from the water authorities regarding scheduled water releases. With diminished control over this river discharge data, crop planning and hence food security become significantly more challenging. The infrastructural capacity of hydropower projects and barrages will be difficult to gauge without sufficient hydrological data from upstream.

As the monsoon season approaches, similar incidents are likely to become more frequent, potentially extending beyond the Baglihar dam to other projects such as the Kishanganga or Ratle and the challenges for Pakistan could intensify, creating cascading disruptions across multiple sectors and threatening food security and basic livelihood.

Strategic implications

The IWT has long been criticised within India, particularly by the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. Many argue that the treaty has hindered development in Kashmir due to the excessive restrictions it entails on hydropower management and development projects. Pakistan has consistently refused or overlooked India’s repeated calls for reforms, unfairly constraining economic growth in the region.

While India’s actions regarding the Baglihar dam do not constitute an act of war, they undoubtedly place Pakistan in a precarious position. Pakistan currently faces a convergence of challenges: economic struggles evidenced by the recent IMF loan assistance, military pressure from India, and now, a lack of control over critical rivers and the associated hydrological data from its upstream neighbour.

The evolution of the IWT remains uncertain. Several potential outcomes exist: the treaty could be completely abandoned, Pakistan might be forced to accept revised terms dictated by India, or the status quo might persist despite ongoing tensions. What is clear, however, is that this situation represents a strategic realignment of water resource leverage in the region.

This juncture presents a critical moment for Pakistan to acknowledge its increased vulnerability and recognise the need to engage constructively with India to protect the lives and livelihoods of its citizens. Post-Pahalgam, the situation cannot be seen solely through a lens of victimhood.

The sustainable management of shared water resources ultimately requires cooperation between riparian nations. While India has taken measures that intensify pressure on Pakistan, lasting solutions will necessitate diplomatic engagement and mutual recognition of legitimate concerns on both sides. However, the primary responsibility now rests with Pakistan to adapt to this new hydropolitical reality while pursuing diplomatic channels to restore more predictable water arrangements.

(The writer is a geospatial research analyst at the Takshashila Institution)