<p>The recent registration of a case under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against actor Vijay Deverakonda for remarks made during a film promotion event has once again brought into sharp focus the legal and moral boundaries of speech in India. The controversy, which arose from his comments likening tribal warfare to a terrorist act, has ignited a debate on whether metaphorical or historically framed expressions amount to caste-based insult under the Act.</p>.<p>At the heart of this debate lies the interpretation of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which criminalise the “intentional insult” or intimidation of a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within "public view". The law is unambiguous in its objective: to deter caste-based humiliation and systemic oppression. Yet, the jurisprudence around its application demands a close reading of context, intent and the identity of the affected person.</p>.<p>Courts have consistently clarified that not every offensive or inappropriate remark is punishable under the Act. In Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court affirmed that misuse of the Act cannot be ruled out and emphasised the need for safeguards against frivolous or motivated accusations. Earlier rulings have also insisted that the insult must be targeted at the individual's caste identity and must be made in a space accessible to the public, not in private or abstract discourse.</p>.<p>Deverakonda’s remarks, made in the glare of cameras and amplified across media platforms, clearly meet the "public view" requirement. But does that automatically make those a violation of the SC/ST Act? The answer depends on whether his words were motivated by the intention to humiliate or degrade tribal communities because of their identity.</p>.<p>Courts have insisted on proof in such cases of the accused being aware of the complainant’s caste and that the humiliation was due to that identity. Where general remarks lack this intent, courts have been reluctant to uphold criminal liability under the Act. </p>.<p>The point now to consider is whether there was a direct insult to a known tribal individual or community. The complaint alleges hurt sentiments, but not personal targeting. Courts are likely to examine whether the metaphor used was intended to humiliate tribal identity or was a case of ill-judged analogy.</p>.<p>The Act is not a tool to criminalise speech per se, particularly when the alleged insult is not rooted in the victim’s caste identity or is not made in public. This legal nuance is essential to preserving the Act’s objective.</p>.<p>The incident further reveals the precarious space that public figures occupy in a deeply diverse and plural society. Celebrities face more public scrutiny in a digital age where remarks once considered casual are now parsed for caste, gender or regional insensitivity.</p>.<p>While Deverakonda’s apology suggests an absence of malicious intent, it also illustrates the accountability that accompanies influence. Speech is never entirely free in a democracy that values dignity as much as it values liberty. It highlights the tension between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the reasonable restrictions placed on it in the interest of decency, morality, defamation and public order.</p>.<p>There is a need for clearer guidelines on what constitutes caste-based insult in different contexts, especially in media, satire and entertainment. Training law enforcement in the correct application of the SC/ST Act is essential to prevent frivolous and motivated FIRs and ensure the Act’s credibility is not diluted. The judiciary should not shy away from imposing costs or recommending disciplinary action where the law is invoked in bad faith.</p>.<p>For non-malicious, first-time infractions by people, restorative justice mechanisms such as public apologies, sensitisation workshops or community dialogues could be considered instead of immediate criminal prosecution. </p>.<p>At stake is not just one actor’s freedom of speech, but the legal credibility of a vital social justice legislation. Overbroad interpretation dilutes its force; under-enforcement defeats its purpose. A cavalier dismissal of community outrage risks trivialising the structural violence that the members of SC/ST communities have faced for ages, while an unrestricted application of the Act would undermine justice for those who didn’t intend to humiliate an SC/ST person.</p>.<p>While Deverakonda’s remarks lacked sensitivity, invoking criminal law, especially under a stringent statute like the SC/ST Act, must be done with caution. The Act is a moral and legal commitment to equality and dignity, not a tool for penal populism. This case, therefore, is not just about one statement. It is a test of how we apply special laws in a democracy — firmly where warranted, but never lightly.</p>.<p><em>(Mrinalini is an advocate practising in the Supreme Court; Arpan is an assistant professor of law at Manipal University, Jaipur)</em></p>
<p>The recent registration of a case under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, against actor Vijay Deverakonda for remarks made during a film promotion event has once again brought into sharp focus the legal and moral boundaries of speech in India. The controversy, which arose from his comments likening tribal warfare to a terrorist act, has ignited a debate on whether metaphorical or historically framed expressions amount to caste-based insult under the Act.</p>.<p>At the heart of this debate lies the interpretation of Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST Act, which criminalise the “intentional insult” or intimidation of a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled Tribe in any place within "public view". The law is unambiguous in its objective: to deter caste-based humiliation and systemic oppression. Yet, the jurisprudence around its application demands a close reading of context, intent and the identity of the affected person.</p>.<p>Courts have consistently clarified that not every offensive or inappropriate remark is punishable under the Act. In Prathvi Raj Chauhan vs Union of India (2020), the Supreme Court affirmed that misuse of the Act cannot be ruled out and emphasised the need for safeguards against frivolous or motivated accusations. Earlier rulings have also insisted that the insult must be targeted at the individual's caste identity and must be made in a space accessible to the public, not in private or abstract discourse.</p>.<p>Deverakonda’s remarks, made in the glare of cameras and amplified across media platforms, clearly meet the "public view" requirement. But does that automatically make those a violation of the SC/ST Act? The answer depends on whether his words were motivated by the intention to humiliate or degrade tribal communities because of their identity.</p>.<p>Courts have insisted on proof in such cases of the accused being aware of the complainant’s caste and that the humiliation was due to that identity. Where general remarks lack this intent, courts have been reluctant to uphold criminal liability under the Act. </p>.<p>The point now to consider is whether there was a direct insult to a known tribal individual or community. The complaint alleges hurt sentiments, but not personal targeting. Courts are likely to examine whether the metaphor used was intended to humiliate tribal identity or was a case of ill-judged analogy.</p>.<p>The Act is not a tool to criminalise speech per se, particularly when the alleged insult is not rooted in the victim’s caste identity or is not made in public. This legal nuance is essential to preserving the Act’s objective.</p>.<p>The incident further reveals the precarious space that public figures occupy in a deeply diverse and plural society. Celebrities face more public scrutiny in a digital age where remarks once considered casual are now parsed for caste, gender or regional insensitivity.</p>.<p>While Deverakonda’s apology suggests an absence of malicious intent, it also illustrates the accountability that accompanies influence. Speech is never entirely free in a democracy that values dignity as much as it values liberty. It highlights the tension between freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) and the reasonable restrictions placed on it in the interest of decency, morality, defamation and public order.</p>.<p>There is a need for clearer guidelines on what constitutes caste-based insult in different contexts, especially in media, satire and entertainment. Training law enforcement in the correct application of the SC/ST Act is essential to prevent frivolous and motivated FIRs and ensure the Act’s credibility is not diluted. The judiciary should not shy away from imposing costs or recommending disciplinary action where the law is invoked in bad faith.</p>.<p>For non-malicious, first-time infractions by people, restorative justice mechanisms such as public apologies, sensitisation workshops or community dialogues could be considered instead of immediate criminal prosecution. </p>.<p>At stake is not just one actor’s freedom of speech, but the legal credibility of a vital social justice legislation. Overbroad interpretation dilutes its force; under-enforcement defeats its purpose. A cavalier dismissal of community outrage risks trivialising the structural violence that the members of SC/ST communities have faced for ages, while an unrestricted application of the Act would undermine justice for those who didn’t intend to humiliate an SC/ST person.</p>.<p>While Deverakonda’s remarks lacked sensitivity, invoking criminal law, especially under a stringent statute like the SC/ST Act, must be done with caution. The Act is a moral and legal commitment to equality and dignity, not a tool for penal populism. This case, therefore, is not just about one statement. It is a test of how we apply special laws in a democracy — firmly where warranted, but never lightly.</p>.<p><em>(Mrinalini is an advocate practising in the Supreme Court; Arpan is an assistant professor of law at Manipal University, Jaipur)</em></p>
