<p>In five hours of testimony to the British commission investigating the Iraq war, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair satisfied very few people. Even the commission, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, a retired senior civil servant, has expressed its dissatisfaction by asking Blair, who is set to discuss classified material in coming weeks, to return for a second public session.<br /><br />During his initial appearance on January 29, Blair admitted no mistakes and expressed no regrets. He revealed that he was George W Bush’s all too willing partner in the war. Blair insisted that the ‘calculus of risk’ changed when the US was attacked on September 11, 2001. After that event, the US and UK had to take into account the possibility that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might develop ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) and hand them over to ‘terrorists’. On the critical WMD issue, Blair was being less than forthright.<br /><br />As he was giving his testimony, a classified document was declassified. This document, entitled ‘Iraq: New Policy Framework’, was dated March 7, 2001. Paragraph 10 called for ‘regime change’, argued that the Iraqi regime will not change of its own accord and stated that the US and UK would take “practical steps to restore Iraq to its proper place in the region”. These steps involved ‘regime change’.<br /><br />This seminal document revealed that Blair and Bush, who were in close consultation, committed to ‘regime change’ at least six months before September 11.<br /><br />An alliance<br /><br />Blair explained his willingness to join Bush in this risky enterprise when he stated, “This is an alliance we have with the Americans... an alliance I believe in passionately”. The document lays down the steps they followed, including an effort to ‘re-make the case’ against Saddam Hussein. The means they used to do this was false claims that he possessed WMD and was tied to al-Qaeda, the group that attacked New York and Washington.<br /><br />But Blair admitted the WMD claim was false when he stated, “This inquiry isn’t about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a deception. It’s about a decision. And the decision I had to take was .. could we take the risk of this man reconstituting his weapons programme..?” The key word is ‘reconstituting’. This word makes it clear that in the run-up to the war, Blair knew that Saddam Hussein did not have WMD. In fact, he never had such weapons. Iraq never built a nuclear bomb and did not manage to weaponise biological material. Iraq had crude tactical battlefield chemical shells and sprays.<br /><br />Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of the biological and chemical agents during the summer of 1991. He was not in contact with al-Qaeda; he considered it an enemy.<br />During her testimony on February 2, former minister for international development Claire Short revealed that Blair kept war plans secret from the cabinet and lied to colleagues and parliament. She said Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, initially said war was illegal but changed his mind and did not inform cabinet members of his doubts. When, on March 17, 2003, three days before the invasion of Iraq, she called for discussion in cabinet, she was ‘jeered’ at and told to be quiet by Blair.<br /><br />Two striking aspects of the proceedings was the ignorance of Iraq exhibited by Blair and his gentle interrogators and their lack of concern for the Iraqi people. Short expressed distress over the impact of the war on Iraqis. “Not only did we cause enormous suffering and loss of life, we made Iraq more dangerous.” She accused Blair of failing to provide for post-war security and the humanitarian needs of Iraqis. Her ministry could not carry out its aid and reconstruction mission due to the lack of security. She resigned on May 12, 2003, one month after the fall of Baghdad to US forces.<br /><br />Before the Iraq war, Blair was an admired figure on the British political scene. He had introduced the minimum wage and granted Wales and Scotland considerable autonomy within the United Kingdom. He had negotiated the Good Friday agreement which brought an end to the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and deployed British troops in peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. But Blair was prepared to resort to deceit at all levels in order to join Bush in a disastrous war on Iraq. Today Blair is vilified and hated. The trajectory of his career followed that of Lyndon Johnson, US president from 1963-69. He was an effective operator on the US domestic scene who secured the enactment of major social legislation which transformed the country but was then reviled for deepening US involvement in the Vietnam war. <br />Blair, like Johnson, is doomed to be remembered for war rather than major domestic <br />accomplishments.</p>
<p>In five hours of testimony to the British commission investigating the Iraq war, former British Prime Minister Tony Blair satisfied very few people. Even the commission, chaired by Sir John Chilcot, a retired senior civil servant, has expressed its dissatisfaction by asking Blair, who is set to discuss classified material in coming weeks, to return for a second public session.<br /><br />During his initial appearance on January 29, Blair admitted no mistakes and expressed no regrets. He revealed that he was George W Bush’s all too willing partner in the war. Blair insisted that the ‘calculus of risk’ changed when the US was attacked on September 11, 2001. After that event, the US and UK had to take into account the possibility that Iraqi President Saddam Hussein might develop ‘weapons of mass destruction’ (WMD) and hand them over to ‘terrorists’. On the critical WMD issue, Blair was being less than forthright.<br /><br />As he was giving his testimony, a classified document was declassified. This document, entitled ‘Iraq: New Policy Framework’, was dated March 7, 2001. Paragraph 10 called for ‘regime change’, argued that the Iraqi regime will not change of its own accord and stated that the US and UK would take “practical steps to restore Iraq to its proper place in the region”. These steps involved ‘regime change’.<br /><br />This seminal document revealed that Blair and Bush, who were in close consultation, committed to ‘regime change’ at least six months before September 11.<br /><br />An alliance<br /><br />Blair explained his willingness to join Bush in this risky enterprise when he stated, “This is an alliance we have with the Americans... an alliance I believe in passionately”. The document lays down the steps they followed, including an effort to ‘re-make the case’ against Saddam Hussein. The means they used to do this was false claims that he possessed WMD and was tied to al-Qaeda, the group that attacked New York and Washington.<br /><br />But Blair admitted the WMD claim was false when he stated, “This inquiry isn’t about a lie or a conspiracy or a deceit or a deception. It’s about a decision. And the decision I had to take was .. could we take the risk of this man reconstituting his weapons programme..?” The key word is ‘reconstituting’. This word makes it clear that in the run-up to the war, Blair knew that Saddam Hussein did not have WMD. In fact, he never had such weapons. Iraq never built a nuclear bomb and did not manage to weaponise biological material. Iraq had crude tactical battlefield chemical shells and sprays.<br /><br />Saddam Hussein ordered the destruction of the biological and chemical agents during the summer of 1991. He was not in contact with al-Qaeda; he considered it an enemy.<br />During her testimony on February 2, former minister for international development Claire Short revealed that Blair kept war plans secret from the cabinet and lied to colleagues and parliament. She said Lord Goldsmith, the attorney general, initially said war was illegal but changed his mind and did not inform cabinet members of his doubts. When, on March 17, 2003, three days before the invasion of Iraq, she called for discussion in cabinet, she was ‘jeered’ at and told to be quiet by Blair.<br /><br />Two striking aspects of the proceedings was the ignorance of Iraq exhibited by Blair and his gentle interrogators and their lack of concern for the Iraqi people. Short expressed distress over the impact of the war on Iraqis. “Not only did we cause enormous suffering and loss of life, we made Iraq more dangerous.” She accused Blair of failing to provide for post-war security and the humanitarian needs of Iraqis. Her ministry could not carry out its aid and reconstruction mission due to the lack of security. She resigned on May 12, 2003, one month after the fall of Baghdad to US forces.<br /><br />Before the Iraq war, Blair was an admired figure on the British political scene. He had introduced the minimum wage and granted Wales and Scotland considerable autonomy within the United Kingdom. He had negotiated the Good Friday agreement which brought an end to the conflict between Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland and deployed British troops in peacekeeping forces in Kosovo. But Blair was prepared to resort to deceit at all levels in order to join Bush in a disastrous war on Iraq. Today Blair is vilified and hated. The trajectory of his career followed that of Lyndon Johnson, US president from 1963-69. He was an effective operator on the US domestic scene who secured the enactment of major social legislation which transformed the country but was then reviled for deepening US involvement in the Vietnam war. <br />Blair, like Johnson, is doomed to be remembered for war rather than major domestic <br />accomplishments.</p>