Certainty of retaliation has altered India-Pak equation

With Operation Sindoor, India has scored strategic points while setting tougher terms of military engagement

There has been an extensive, animated debate as to why India “prematurely” reached an understanding with Pakistan to stop firing, on May 10, and halt all actions in the domains of land, sea, and air that were launched as part of Operation Sindoor. Even maximalist phrases like “snatching defeat from the jaws of victory” have been used to describe this decision. The sequence of events given out in the official briefing establishes that this temporary cessation of firing was proposed directly by Pakistan to India though the US has also claimed credit for mediation.

What did we do differently in the military application of force from previous occasions post-Uri and Pulwama? First, this time, we have been able to break the “J&K trap” by striking sufficiently deep targets all along the Pakistan border rather than restricting our retaliatory actions to J&K in general and the LoC in particular. This has unintentionally aided Pakistan in the past by advancing the argument of J&K being a disputed territory. Second, while the operation commenced with strikes on nine terrorist camps and training areas, it graduated to attacks on vital military infrastructure including airfields, radars, command and control sites, and missile/ammunition storage sites complemented by the destruction of posts on the LoC.

To arrive at a reasonable assessment of the soundness of this decision, we need to understand the national objectives of Operation Sindoor. The DGMO, in his media briefing on May 11, outlined the military objective – “Operation Sindoor was conceptualised with a clear military aim to punish the perpetrators and planners of terror and to destroy their terror infrastructure”. Therefore, our retaliatory strikes were at the mid-level spectrum of conflict, below an all-out war. The military action was integrated with other elements such as economic, political, and diplomatic measures including holding the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance.

While the strategic political objectives were not given out in definitive terms, these can be logically culled out. Based on the limited application of military force, our strategic aims were to demonstrate resolve, raise costs, impose caution on Pakistan, and thus restore deterrence which had waned since the Balakot air strikes, six years ago.

What would have happened if we had continued to press Pakistan for a few more days/weeks or expanded the scope of Operation Sindoor by launching an all-out war? In this case, our objective would have been to force Pakistan to assure the dismantling of terror infrastructure, by discrediting the Pakistan Army. In the India-Pak context, war can change the status quo but may not resolve the political issue which is J&K. India capturing large parts of Pakistan’s territory as leverage for post-conflict bargaining may also not change Pakistan’s mindset. Pakistan did not stop supporting the Afghan Taliban despite the sustained use of drones by the US and the killing of its civilians over many years.

Breaches and deterrents

Getting Pakistan to give and adhere to an assurance to stop using terrorism as an instrument of its state policy is, perhaps, unachievable. It had made such promises in 2002. Pakistan has been routinely reneging on various agreements as it relies on outright deniability and obfuscation. Recently, this was evident in its Prime Minister claiming victory and the press briefings by service officers during Operation Sindoor. A sustained military campaign at this stage with Pakistan will undoubtedly be detrimental to our aim of being a developed country by 2047. Pakistan has little to lose being a basket case already. Moreover, the initiative to escalate is with India – escalation dominance is the key to orchestrating such operations. Too severe a response can also lead to counter-productive escalation.

How can we be future-ready? Even if the J&K issue is settled to Pakistan’s satisfaction, peace between the two neighbours is unlikely to prevail as it is not a territorial dispute but an ideological jihad. We need to recognise the inevitability of terrorist attacks by Pakistan in the foreseeable future. Low response like resorting to firing on the LoC or no response to acts of terrorism is taken by Pakistan as a sign of weakness; this meets its cost-benefit threshold and does not deter future escalation. We need to develop the capability to hit Pakistan routinely and cause destruction of military infrastructure without large-scale posturing and deployment on the borders. Retaliation to high-profile terrorist acts by Pakistan should not have the narrative of a retributive punishment but impose high costs for the breach of red lines and influence its decision calculus to deter future attacks. India’s narrative of attacking terrorist infrastructure also needs calibration as these targets may be vacated, will move deeper over time, and the extent of targetable infrastructure will come down. To maintain deterrence against the deep state in Pakistan, we should not differentiate between the terrorists and the Pakistan Army. This leads to advancing the alibi that the non-State actors are not under the State’s control.

India has also adopted a declaratory policy that any future act of terror will be considered an act of war against the country and will be responded to accordingly. With this, the India-Pakistan equation has permanently changed because this brings in the element of certainty of retaliation to every attack. This will stop belligerent behaviour by Pakistan for as long as possible. Retaliation by Pakistan, especially on the LoC is not a complete loss of deterrence. At the strategic level, victory means achieving political goals. That is what Operation Sindoor, an inflection point, has done decisively and unequivocally.

(The writer is a former Vice Chief of Army Staff)