Time again for regular diplomacy

When the current dispensation took over in 2014, it spelled a grand vision for Indian diplomacy, amongst other promises. Obviously, ‘undoing’ the ostensible mistakes of the past was inherent in all rhetoric. The first Presidential address to Parliament bore the government’s “determination to work towards building a peaceful, stable and economically inter-linked neighbourhood which is essential for the collective development and prosperity”. The strategy soon included a “neighbourhood first” approach, which was to bear fruit unseen before. Supposed inaction, neglect, and missteps of the past were to be replaced with a new diplomatic tenor, out
reach and efficacy that would usher in unprecedented respect, engagement, and bilateral trust with India.

After well over 10 years of the current dispensation’s diplomatic actions and reactions, the neighbourhood has not looked more wounded, distrustful, and unengaged with India since independence. While the traditional nemesis like China and Pakistan could not have realistically been expected to have conventionally warm relations with India, certainly an element of improvement or ‘containment’ was a fair expectation. On the contrary, there has been a grave worsening and violent escalation of border tensions with China, which has ruptured the status quo ante along the Line of Actual Control (LAC) that existed till the summer of 2020. Worryingly, after four years of the flare-up, there is no official confirmation of the restoration of status quo ante, either. Whereas, relations with Pakistan have hardly been worse in recent memory, with the same officially downgraded since 2019.

However, it is not just the worsening of relations with China and Pakistan, but unprecedentedly so, with almost all other neighbours that warrants serious introspection of the approach adopted since 2014. While certain ups-and-downs with regime changes in the neighbourhood are normal, to lose people-to-people connect and with unheard ‘India Out’ campaigns on the streets of Male, Kathmandu, Dhaka, or even subliminally in Colombo, is disconcerting. Even a historically pro-India Bhutan has started talking the language of ‘equality’ vis-à-vis China. Last year, Bhutanese Prime Minister Lotay Tshering’s mealy-mouthed statement that “There are three equal countries” whilst trying to parry questions on Chinese belligerence and settlement of the Doklam issue was shockingly lenient towards Beijing. In Myanmar, Delhi was found lead-footed in reacting to the Junta takeover. In all, the neighbourhood is almost disengaged and a revaluation of Delhi’s preferred diplomatic instinct over the last decade is required.

So where has Delhi faltered to reach this point? Like in some other spheres like social polarisation, rural stress, persisting economic inequities, or even handling disaffection in places like Manipur or Kashmir Valley, the supremacy of partisan politics above everything is omnipresent. It is almost as if the country has been in a perennial stage of ‘electioneering’ with the senior leadership busy in winning elections at all costs. Usually in a democracy, the opposition tends to be combative, accusative, or even fault-finding to bring back their lost relevance, but here, the ruling dispensation has outshouted them in all slinging matches. Relentless ‘othering’ has been the most deployed tactic with ‘nationalism’ thrown in to contextualise every action. Something like ‘demonetisation’ with all its debilitating impact was subjected to multiple goalpost extensions, including ending insurgency in Kashmir Valley.

A collateral outcome of ‘othering’ is the belittling of some, leading to optics of majoritarianism and supremacism. In a diverse country like India, which shares cultural-civilisational ties with many neighbours (including religious), we even managed to ‘push’ Nepal into the willing arms of the Chinese. The pliant media demonised many of our own by suggesting their loyalties to neighbours in the bargain painting entire ethnicities and communities with a convenient paintbrush of make-believe ‘anti-nationalism’. Brouhaha of ‘sorting out issues once for all’ justified all vitriol and excesses. In the new normal, Kukis could become ‘foreigners’ from Myanmar; people of a certain community became Pakistanis, Bangladeshis or Rohingyas, just as any dissent in Pakistan was subjected to Khalistan reminders. Where religion could not be flexed, eg., in the once-‘Hindu Rashtra’ of Nepal, murmurs of Delhi interfering in the Hills-versus-Madhesis were rife. Nepalese accusations of an economic ‘blockade’ may have been decoded as decisive and ‘muscular’ step by some, but they were deciphered as a symptom of ‘Big Brother’ syndrome. The entire neighbourhood was painted as thankless: Bangladesh for 1971, the Maldives, Nepal and Sri Lanka for economic support, and Bhutan for recalibrating relations with China. However, Indian air of partisan triumphalism
and collateral villainising was alienating the neighbourhood.

While the cadres of the ruling dispensation remained mesmerised with what they thought were the winning ‘masterstrokes’ and ‘first-time-evers’, only that the neighbours were switching off slowly but surely. The past was aggressively projected as emasculating and surrendering, when it wasn’t necessarily so. This is not to suggest that there have been no vested interests (read, China) at play, unforeseen circumstances, or even malintent by many in the neighbouring countries — but that has been the case for eons, but such collective ‘switch-off’ towards India is unprecedented. Somewhere, our diplomacy or approach failed, plain and simple.

After years of disengagement, the External Affairs Minister goes to Pakistan, albeit not for bilateral talks but towards a multilateral commitment, ie., a Shanghai Cooperation Organisation meeting. While he has expectedly downplayed expectations, the visit must be welcomed for accepting the importance of ‘dialogue’ in diplomacy. Beyond his earlier and mandatory partisan thunder that the days of ‘uninterrupted dialogue’ are over (keeping with the ‘muscularity’ template), as a seasoned professional he would know better. The government must not take the inevitable bait of counter-biryani accusations after having dished the same to previous governments, as that too is domestic politics, not mature diplomacy. He could take the leaf out of his co-partisan Vajpayee government, which could win the Kargil War, conduct nuclear tests and yet engage as the high temple of moral diplomacy. Delhi does not need to offend any of its own, or neighbours, to be strong. It is time
for old-fashioned diplomacy, true strength, and professional maturity, as opposed to bluster, headline management, and isolation.

The writer is former Lt Governor of Andaman & Nicobar Islands and Puducherry

(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH).