We need to secure India’s geospatial data

With national security at stake, adequate regulations should be imposed on private companies that sell high-resolution imagery.

The Pahalgam terror attack on April 22, 2025, which resulted in the tragic loss of 26 civilian lives, highlighted significant lapses in geospatial intelligence and security infrastructure.

Geospatial data is a seemingly dormant volcano; the potential of such data is relatively underexplored. Geospatial data, encompassing imagery and location-based information about the Earth’s surface, has emerged as one of the most powerful tools in modern governance, defence, infrastructure planning and disaster management.

Geospatial invasion is a fuzzy problem that lacks adequate governance and surveillance over geospatial data. Maxar Technologies, a private US satellite company until the recent Pahalgam terrorist attack, has serviced high-resolution geospatial data of Kashmir.

As a matter of fact, Maxar Technologies had enlisted Business Systems International Pvt Ltd (BSI), Pakistan, as one of its partners on their official website. However, after an exposé from The Print, the company abruptly removed Pak’s BSI mention from its website.

The association between Maxar Technologies and BSI raises certain critical questions pertaining to India’s security: What was the US’ involvement in the Pahalgam attack? Is there an involvement of agencies that work closely with the US government? What was the role and involvement of Pak’s BSI with Maxar Technologies? Was Pak’s BSI a shell company for ISI?

These critical operational questions require investigation at the micro level; however, at the macro level, they raise larger concerns for policy and governance.

The Government of India introduced the National Geospatial policy in 2021. The policy makes provisions for private players to collect, process and distribute high-resolution geospatial data.

This transformation offers enormous potential but also demands robust policy frameworks, ethical oversight and national security safeguards.

The privatisation of geospatial technologies and the rapid proliferation of private satellite companies, the handling and dissemination of data have become increasingly sensitive and controversial, particularly from a national security perspective. This article ventures into understanding the policy and the institutional robustness in governing and monitoring the geospatial data.

Traditionally, high-resolution satellite imagery and detailed terrain mapping were the domain of national space and defence agencies. Given the strategic relevance in military operations, border surveillance and infrastructure protection, these datasets were heavily guarded.

Today, however, private players operate fleets of satellites, handle high resolution geospatial informatics and offer real-time data. These private players are largely driven by commercial motives. Lack of regulatory mechanisms further reduces transparency and accountability.

Countries like India and the United States have regulations governing the resolution and dissemination of geospatial data, while the governance is limited to the service providers within their territory.

Several service provider companies operate across jurisdictions to circumvent restrictions due to the absence
of global standards and regulations. This regulatory vacuum creates an environment where national security is increasingly compromised by the pursuit of profit.

The core concern lies in the unregulated sale of geospatial data across borders. Commercial satellite operators often sell high-resolution imagery and analytic products to the highest bidder, bypassing national regulations.

When sensitive sites such as military bases, missile launch facilities, energy infrastructure, or critical transport corridors are mapped in high detail and made available without restriction, the potential for misuse rises dramatically. Adversarial states or non-state actors can exploit such data to plan attacks, conduct espionage, or sabotage key national assets.

Moreover, the growing capabilities of AI-powered image analysis, combined with frequent satellite revisit times, allow for near real-time monitoring of sensitive data, which includes troop movements, construction of strategic assets, or emergency mobilisations. With outer space being weaponised, there is a requirement of collective policy action to secure the interests of nations, especially with the increasing involvement of non-state actors in hybrid and technology-driven warfare.

Going forward, both public and private agencies will be involved in geospatial informatics. This is in the best interest for the development of humankind. However, to maintain data sovereignty, which further links to national security, it is essential that there are adequate regulations on private companies.

It becomes crucial that a global regulation framework is formalised through a treaty. At the global level of engagement, there must be an agency similar to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to set international standards and regulations for high-resolution satellite imaging.

This must include the provision of member countries providing a broad list of sensitive areas that require high-level approval of national-level regulators.

Such a policy solution is complex in terms of negotiations involved and due to the differences in the national-level regulations of different countries. There are advantages and disadvantages to such a global regulatory framework, which can be studied in detail.

Alternatively, there is a need for India to pursue bilateral and multilateral agreements that regulate the sale of sensitive geospatial data across borders. Such agreements can mandate transparency and disclosure protocols for all satellite imagery purchases made over Indian territory by foreign or multinational entities.

Better international regulatory frameworks and better oversight of private satellite operators are the need of the hour to balance innovation and development with sovereignty and security imperatives. The case of high-resolution geospatial orders over Kashmir is not a mere coincidence and must be further probed.

In conclusion, while geospatial data is vital for human development and advancement in science, its underregulated commercialisation with insufficiently responsible private companies presents a global threat.

(Chetan is professor and dean, School of Law, and Gowri is a doctoral scholar, School of Law, Governance and Public Policy at Chanakya University, Bengaluru)