Fair Myanmar polls remain a distant dream despite end of emergency

Military regime rebrands itself ahead of December general election.

On 31 July 2025, in a move that fulfils a legal requirement to prepare for a controversial general election now tentatively scheduled for December, Myanmar’s military regime officially ended its self-proclaimed state of emergency, in force since the coup of 1 February 2021, which overthrew the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi. The emergency period had been extended multiple times beyond the letter of its own military-drafted Constitution.

It simultaneously rebranded the State Administration Committee (SAC), its earlier ‘interim’ government, as the National Security and Peace Commission, with Senior General and Chief of Defence Forces Min Aung Hlaing as its Chairman, retired Lieutenant General Nyo Saw, formerly Quartermaster General, as ‘Prime Minister’, and seven other members – all but one, the Foreign Minister, from the military.

Although the emergency has been formally lifted, it remains unclear what difference this will make to the ongoing civil war, now in its fifth year, or to daily life for ordinary citizens. While the junta portrays the step as a return to normalcy and a pathway to ‘civilian’ rule, the opposition and sections of the international community have denounced it as a political manoeuvre to legitimise its unpopular rule – a ‘show’ and a ‘ritual’ to entrench authoritarianism. Many opposition leaders remain imprisoned, in exile, or underground. Several political prisoners have died in jail under questionable circumstances, including some just days ago. Aung San Suu Kyi herself remains incarcerated, serving multiple sentences on politically motivated charges.

With much of the country gripped by civil war, key opposition parties sidelined or banned, and new electoral laws heavily stacked in the military’s favour, few expect the elections to be credible, free or fair, or to reflect the will of the people. Major opposition groups, including Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD), have pledged to boycott the polls.

Junta’s calculations

There could be several reasons why the regime has taken this long-planned step. First, it has introduced sweeping electoral reforms, changing the system from first-past-the-post to proportional representation – a shift that dilutes the influence of any single dominant party, notably the NLD, which secured landslide victories in 1990, 2015 and 2020.

These changes, combined with provisions in the 2008 Constitution heavily weighted in favour of the military – notably the direct nomination of serving military officers to 25% of Parliament by the military chief – along with new laws criminalising dissent, tighter registration requirements, and outright bans on key parties, have further compromised electoral integrity in an already skewed system.

The regime’s calculation is that, together with the propping up of newer political parties drawn from anti-NLD elements willing to collaborate, the military’s own party, the Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP), consisting predominantly of ex-military personnel, will be able to cobble together the required majority in Parliament – as in 2010, when the NLD boycotted – to claim domestic and international legitimacy.

Second, the military may have been encouraged by recent battlefield gains and signs of fraying in the opposition. In April this year, under intense Chinese pressure, the ethnic Chinese Kokang MNDAA relinquished control of the Regional Military Command in Lashio – until then the biggest victory for the armed opposition grouped under the Three Brotherhood Alliance in August 2024.

More recently, the military recaptured the strategic Shan town of Nawnghkio from the Palaung TNLA, relieving pressure on the garrison town of Pyin Oo Lwin, home to most Armed Forces training institutions, and partially reopening the highway to northern Shan State and China. It also regained the ruby-mining town of Mogok and pushed back Mandalay-based PDFs to retake the gold-mining town of Thabekkyin. Kachin Independence Army advances further north and Arakan Army offensives east of the Arakan Yoma have also been stalled for now.

Third, signs of disarray have emerged in the opposition. The National Unity Government (NUG) has failed to unify or consolidate the hundreds of PDFs nominally under its authority, losing some allies and failing to establish credible governance inside the country. Divisions and clashes between and within Ethnic Revolutionary Organisations (EROs) have surfaced, notably in Chin State and northern Shan. Reports of lawlessness and criminality in some ERO-controlled areas have further eroded public sympathy.

Together, these developments have frustrated earlier hopes, particularly after the Arakan Army’s capture of the Ann Regional Military Command in late 2024, that the opposition could advance into Myanmar’s heartland, major cities, and defence industrial centres.

Perhaps the most important factors are international. Russian and Chinese military supplies, Chinese pressure on northern EAOs, and US disengagement have been the regime’s ‘Trump’ cards.

China, adept at playing both sides, has unusually thrown its weight behind the junta this year, pressuring EAOs like the Wa, MNDAA, TNLA and KIA to ease operations against the regime. Meanwhile, with the return of President Trump and his erratic foreign policy, the United States has scaled back its already limited engagement in Myanmar, cutting funding for civil society, humanitarian aid, pro-democracy programmes, and discreet logistical support for the armed opposition.

Washington recently lifted sanctions on three junta cronies, amid reports of US interest in rare earths and critical minerals from Kachin areas. Min Aung Hlaing has even written flattering letters to President Trump, seeking tariff reductions on Myanmar exports to the US. The appointment of Gen. Nyo Saw as Prime Minister, known for his role in privatising state assets in favour of military-linked conglomerates, may signal a strategy to entice Trump with business deals – though China will resist this.

Min Aung Hlaing may see Trump’s strategic disengagement from foreign wars, his transactional approach, Chinese pressure on EAOs, Russia’s defiance of Washington, Israel’s impunity in Gaza, ASEAN divisions, India’s indifference, and Bangladeshi confusion as a geopolitical window to push through elections, restore military dominance, and reclaim legitimacy, much as the junta did in the 1990s.

Prospects

The key questions are whether the rejigged government will succeed where the SAC failed, whether it can hold a credible election, and whether it can win legitimacy at home and abroad.

Although the regime has scored recent military and diplomatic points, the odds remain against it. The junta has lost unprecedented amounts of territory – well over 60% by most estimates – despite still holding major cities and key infrastructure. The army is degraded, demoralised, and reliant on forced recruitment and heavy firepower to maintain control, facing a determined opposition intent on ending military rule.

Even if China can pressure some EAOs into ceasefires, the junta will still face a nationalist Bamar heartland, fragmented but resilient. One major opposition victory or a coordinated alliance could quickly shift the battlefield balance.

The junta may hope to hold elections in the towns and populous areas it still controls, using a stacked electoral system to form a civilian façade accepted by Russia, China, neighbouring states and parts of ASEAN. But such a government will lack domestic legitimacy, and civil war will continue.

The military’s past miscalculations in 1990, 2015 and 2020 suggest history will repeat itself. Even a limited, rigged election recognised abroad will not bring internal peace. Myanmar risks sliding deeper into endless conflict until it fragments into warlord-controlled territories or a new leadership emerges.

India, despite its democratic credentials, is likely to maintain the status quo in pursuit of ‘stability’, tacitly aligning with China. Meanwhile, the significant Chinese presence in Kyaukphyu – with its deep-sea port, SEZ, and energy terminals – remains largely ignored by India’s strategic establishment, despite its long-term implications.

(The writer is a former Indian ambassador to Syria, Afghanistan and Myanmar)