<p>Seldom does the discussion on Gulf-Asia relations focus beyond the expanding economic ties between the oil-rich producers and some of the biggest energy consumers.<br /></p>.<p> Exploring the ‘what next’ dimension of this engagement reveals tentative, but interesting, attempts to diversify towards ‘strategic’ cooperation that offer alternative possibilities for Gulf security and stability in the long term.<br /><br />While the ‘rediscovery’ of Gulf-Asia ties is linked to the growth of Chinese and Indian economies, it is becoming clear that the progress of their strategic role in the region’s affairs impinges on several regional and external players having crucial interests and concerns of their own. Hence, it is important that rather than China- and India-centric approaches, a ‘pan-Asian’ cooperative approach would serve the purpose better.<br /><br />This emerges from the realisation that Asia’s long-term interests cannot allow it to remain dependent on the United States for the security of its energy supply chain. Simultaneously, the US economic decline is adversely impacting its political and military influence, both regionally and globally.<br /><br />There is also evidence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries thinking out of the box and exploring strategic engagement beyond the exclusive arrangement they have had with Washington for decades. The US failure to effectively deal with the Iran, Iraq and Syrian crises hastened the search for alternative arrangements.<br /><br />Such a milieu opens doors for other players to pursue a broader cooperative approach. Influential Asian countries like China, India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Pakistan, among others, committed to Gulf security, must develop an arrangement that encourages not <br /><br />only economic and political cooperation, but also explore an alternative and broad-based security architecture in the Gulf. The expanding defence capabilities, especially the navies of some Asian countries, are particularly relevant to the region.<br /><br />An approach of this kind is equally relevant because of Gulf-Asia ties being politically complex and sensitive. Just as many Asian countries have developed a special relationship with the GCC countries, they are also robustly engaged with Iran. Given the ongoing GCC-Iran conflictually-competitive relations, pursuing an Asian approach to achieve Gulf security could serve twin purposes: one, enhance the security of the energy-rich region, from the perspective of the both the Asian suppliers and buyers; and two, reduce regional tension by exploring a conflict resolution and security framework that incorporates the principal Asian countries.<br /><br />However, it is also true that despite the utility of existing arrangements wearing thin, a new security architecture is unlikely any time soon. While Asian cooperation on soft security issues is easy to realise in the short and medium terms, joint efforts on hard security issues are bound to be beset with challenges in the long term. This is due to a lack of consensus on shared strategic perceptions and mutual confidence and trust, both between the principal Asian and GCC countries, as well as among several Asian countries.<br /><br />For example, the GCC countries continue to be averse to China’s and India’s close ties with Iran, just as South Korea and Japan are concerned about the rise of China and its implications for their own sovereignty. The lack of clarity in US foreign policy, despite its 'pivot' to Asia, is adding to the confusion.<br /><br />In such a scenario and in the wake of Asia becoming the main driver of the global economy, which thrusts it to play a proactive role in global affairs, including the Gulf region, the only viable long-term policy plan for Asia is to incrementally pursue and realise a broader ‘cooperative security approach’. This new security architecture could also include the United States and other Western powers.<br /><br />Dependence on US<br />The fact that there are clear indications that the GCC countries are unlikely to depend exclusively on the United States for security in the long run is both a necessity and an incentive for the Asian countries to overcome their differences and participate in the regional security scenarios.<br /><br />Since its formation in 1981, the GCC has been preoccupied with security concerns. Yet, its security is no better or worse than it was three decades ago. Amid this security obsession, the GCC countries have no ideological preference when it comes to choosing security guarantors. Irrespective of the cost – political, economic or ideological – whoever can provide the best security is the GCC’s best ally.<br /><br />Currently, the United States fits this bill. With its multiple power centres, fault lines, rivalries and conflicts, Asia offers Washington a perfect stage to remain relevant. But this does not <br />rule out the possibility of a change of security guarantor in the future, including the evolution of a collective security architecture, the seeds of which are being sown. The fact that Britain opened a permanent naval base in Bahrain in December 2014, as part of its commitment to tackle security threats in the region, confirms the changing security dynamics.<br /><br />What kind of fruit is borne, however, depends on not just how GCC-Asia cooperation pans out, but more importantly on how the Asian competitors view cooperation in a “post-US world”.<br /><em>(The writer is a Dubai-based political analyst, author and honorary fellow of the University of Exeter, UK)</em></p>
<p>Seldom does the discussion on Gulf-Asia relations focus beyond the expanding economic ties between the oil-rich producers and some of the biggest energy consumers.<br /></p>.<p> Exploring the ‘what next’ dimension of this engagement reveals tentative, but interesting, attempts to diversify towards ‘strategic’ cooperation that offer alternative possibilities for Gulf security and stability in the long term.<br /><br />While the ‘rediscovery’ of Gulf-Asia ties is linked to the growth of Chinese and Indian economies, it is becoming clear that the progress of their strategic role in the region’s affairs impinges on several regional and external players having crucial interests and concerns of their own. Hence, it is important that rather than China- and India-centric approaches, a ‘pan-Asian’ cooperative approach would serve the purpose better.<br /><br />This emerges from the realisation that Asia’s long-term interests cannot allow it to remain dependent on the United States for the security of its energy supply chain. Simultaneously, the US economic decline is adversely impacting its political and military influence, both regionally and globally.<br /><br />There is also evidence of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries thinking out of the box and exploring strategic engagement beyond the exclusive arrangement they have had with Washington for decades. The US failure to effectively deal with the Iran, Iraq and Syrian crises hastened the search for alternative arrangements.<br /><br />Such a milieu opens doors for other players to pursue a broader cooperative approach. Influential Asian countries like China, India, South Korea, Japan, Turkey, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and Pakistan, among others, committed to Gulf security, must develop an arrangement that encourages not <br /><br />only economic and political cooperation, but also explore an alternative and broad-based security architecture in the Gulf. The expanding defence capabilities, especially the navies of some Asian countries, are particularly relevant to the region.<br /><br />An approach of this kind is equally relevant because of Gulf-Asia ties being politically complex and sensitive. Just as many Asian countries have developed a special relationship with the GCC countries, they are also robustly engaged with Iran. Given the ongoing GCC-Iran conflictually-competitive relations, pursuing an Asian approach to achieve Gulf security could serve twin purposes: one, enhance the security of the energy-rich region, from the perspective of the both the Asian suppliers and buyers; and two, reduce regional tension by exploring a conflict resolution and security framework that incorporates the principal Asian countries.<br /><br />However, it is also true that despite the utility of existing arrangements wearing thin, a new security architecture is unlikely any time soon. While Asian cooperation on soft security issues is easy to realise in the short and medium terms, joint efforts on hard security issues are bound to be beset with challenges in the long term. This is due to a lack of consensus on shared strategic perceptions and mutual confidence and trust, both between the principal Asian and GCC countries, as well as among several Asian countries.<br /><br />For example, the GCC countries continue to be averse to China’s and India’s close ties with Iran, just as South Korea and Japan are concerned about the rise of China and its implications for their own sovereignty. The lack of clarity in US foreign policy, despite its 'pivot' to Asia, is adding to the confusion.<br /><br />In such a scenario and in the wake of Asia becoming the main driver of the global economy, which thrusts it to play a proactive role in global affairs, including the Gulf region, the only viable long-term policy plan for Asia is to incrementally pursue and realise a broader ‘cooperative security approach’. This new security architecture could also include the United States and other Western powers.<br /><br />Dependence on US<br />The fact that there are clear indications that the GCC countries are unlikely to depend exclusively on the United States for security in the long run is both a necessity and an incentive for the Asian countries to overcome their differences and participate in the regional security scenarios.<br /><br />Since its formation in 1981, the GCC has been preoccupied with security concerns. Yet, its security is no better or worse than it was three decades ago. Amid this security obsession, the GCC countries have no ideological preference when it comes to choosing security guarantors. Irrespective of the cost – political, economic or ideological – whoever can provide the best security is the GCC’s best ally.<br /><br />Currently, the United States fits this bill. With its multiple power centres, fault lines, rivalries and conflicts, Asia offers Washington a perfect stage to remain relevant. But this does not <br />rule out the possibility of a change of security guarantor in the future, including the evolution of a collective security architecture, the seeds of which are being sown. The fact that Britain opened a permanent naval base in Bahrain in December 2014, as part of its commitment to tackle security threats in the region, confirms the changing security dynamics.<br /><br />What kind of fruit is borne, however, depends on not just how GCC-Asia cooperation pans out, but more importantly on how the Asian competitors view cooperation in a “post-US world”.<br /><em>(The writer is a Dubai-based political analyst, author and honorary fellow of the University of Exeter, UK)</em></p>
