Can FIR be quashed under Section 528 of BNSS? Allahabad HC refers matter to 9-judge bench

Prayagraj: The Allahabad High Court has referred to a nine-judge bench legal questions concerning the high court's power to quash an FIR under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CrPC), which is now Section 528 of Bharatiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita.

A seven-judge bench in the case of Ramlal Yadav and others vs State of UP and others (1989) had held that for quashing the FIR, a plea under Section 482 CrPC would not be maintainable and an appropriate remedy would be to file a plea under Article 226 (writ jurisdiction) of the Constitution.

The single bench of Justice Arun Kumar Singh Deshwal, while respectfully disagreeing with the seven-judge bench ruling, referred the matter to a nine-judge bench invoking the spirit of "judicial discipline" and the need to uphold the doctrine of stare decisis.

The court found the seven-judge bench ruling "obsolete" in light of the Supreme Court's decisions in State of Haryana & others vs Bhajan Lal & others (1990) and Neeharika Infrastructure Pvt Ltd vs State of Maharashtra and others (2021).

"This court respectfully acknowledges that the legal principles established in the full bench decision of Ramlal Yadav may no longer be applicable due to recent developments in the law as interpreted by the apex court.

"Nevertheless, in the spirit of judicial discipline and to uphold the doctrine of stare decisis as emphasised in the cases of Shanker Raju and Mishri Lal, the court is inclined to refer this matter to a larger bench comprising nine judges," Justice Deshwal noted in its 43-page order passed on May 27.

The court added that this referral was necessary as the judgement in Ramlal Yadav, which though not explicitly reversed or overruled but had become "obsolete", was rendered by a bench of seven judges.

The court was essentially dealing with a plea under Section 528 of BNSS (inherent powers of high court) challenging the order passed by CJM, Chitrakoot, under section 175(3) of BNSS (Section 156 (3) CrPC) by which the police were directed to register an FIR against the petitioners. The petitioners also sought quashing of the FIR under section 498A (harassment), 323, 504, 506, 342 of IPC read with Section 3/4 of Dowry Prohibition Act.

The additional government advocate raised a preliminary objection that in view of the full bench judgement in the case of Ramlal Yadav, the instant plea (corresponding to Section 482 CrPC) for quashing the FIR is not maintainable as the same could be challenged under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

Though the single judge noted that in the judgement of Bhajan Lal, the apex court considered almost all the judgements considered by the full bench in the case of Ramlal Yadav and had expanded the scope of interference by the high court during the investigation, he deemed it appropriate to refer the above-mentioned questions to a nine-judge bench.

The court noted that in the exercise of its power under section 482 CrPC, the high court can interfere with the investigation, in the case seeking quashing of FIR, where not only cases where FIR does not disclose cognizable offence but also on fulfilment of other conditions as mentioned in Bhajan Lal and Neeharika Infrastructure.

In this regard, the court also referred to the apex court's recent judgment in the case of Imran Pratapgadhi vs State of Gujarat (2025), wherein it was held that there is no absolute rule preventing a high court from quashing an FIR by exercising its power under section 482 of CrPC (or Section 528 BNSS), merely because the investigation is at a nascent stage.