Can Trump break Russia-China dyad?

US’ expected policy shift favouring Moscow aligns with its renewed focus on the Indo-Pacific.

There has been considerable discussion about the possibility of a new US administration seeking to disrupt the maturing Russia-China and a blooming Russia-Iran partnership. However, the specifics of this ambitious strategy remain unclear. What is evident from President-elect Donald Trump’s initial campaign speeches and statements, along with his cabinet picks, is a potential shift in US foreign policy towards Moscow.

This shift seems to favour a security architecture in Europe that could benefit Russia, as the incoming administration aims to focus on countering China’s rise by increasing Washington’s attention to the Indo-Pacific. However, Trump’s plans to split the Russia-China alliance are easier said than done.

The configuration of power in Eurasian geopolitics is an important reason why Henry Kissinger’s historic visit to China in 1972 cannot be renditioned with a Russian twist. Re-designing the European security architecture in favour of Moscow – by halting military aid to Ukraine, pledging not to grant NATO membership to Kyiv, and possibly easing sanctions – would significantly reduce US commitment to its Eastern European and Baltic allies.

These nations sought NATO membership precisely because of their security concerns about Russia. The salami-slicing of Ukraine will result in a security dilemma; European countries would likely invest heavily in their defence, prompting Russia to do the same. This could lead to a dangerous cycle of military escalation and hybrid warfare operations in the Baltics and Eastern Europe.

The Russia-China relations have grown since 2014, the year Russia annexed Crimea. Trade improved from $88 billion in 2014 to $240 billion in 2024; the energy trade increased, Moscow began supplying cutting-edge defence exports such as the S-400 system and SU-35 fighter jets, and Chinese investments in Russia increased. However, since 2022, concerns have been observed, about the partnership becoming deeply asymmetric where Russia’s political economy is becoming increasingly dependent on China as the number of Moscow’s viable trading partners shrinks because of sanctions.

However, with secondary sanctions imposed on nations trading with Russia, Beijing began to follow export control regulations. Furthermore, China does not export cutting-edge critical technology to Moscow. Chinese banks have also stopped processing ruble transactions. China is, still, an important partner for Moscow. The latter aims to execute its pivot to the East, re-orienting its supply chains to China and Southeast Asia. The price of getting Moscow to de-link from China is very steep.

Along with China, Iran is an important strategic partner in the South Caucasus for Moscow; both nations have shared grievances with the West. Following Trump’s withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Moscow-Tehran partnership has improved, especially in the defence, energy and economic realms, with both states poised to sign a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership treaty.

Thus, Trump’s desire to break these partnerships does not take into account the contexts in which these were formed in the first place, nor is there an attempt to understand the drivers of these partnerships. This is why there is no talk of the carrots or sticks to be employed in the attainment of Washington’s goals. This is why bringing the war in Ukraine to a ceasefire and splitting Moscow’s so-called alliances must be considered separate ambitions.

Furthermore, for Moscow, Trump’s arrival at the White House was viewed positively as it reflects a change in policy direction. However, Moscow is skeptical of Trump following through on the promises. Russia, in return for fulfilling its demands, will have to strategically de-link from China, Iran, and North Korea and give up ambitions of creating an alternative BRICS-backed currency while rejoining the Western-led geoeconomic order. Thus, even for Putin, the price is exorbitantly high.

What if it’s status quo?

If Trump is unable to split these alliances, we will observe the policy continuance of the outgoing Biden administration of arming Ukraine while demanding greater engagement of NATO countries. The Trump administration will likely improve its outreach to Central Asian and Caucasian countries and take a more proactive stance in regional geopolitics, for instance, investing further in emerging economies in Central Asia, such as Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, on rare earth, critical minerals, energy resources, etc.

Further, Washington will aim to strengthen cooperation with Armenia; the latter aims to pivot away from Moscow’s regional security apparatus following Russia’s inability to stop the carnage at Nagorno Karabakh, inevitably leading to its capture by Azerbaijan in September 2023.

Along with attempting to increase its influence in Eurasia, Washington will continue its aggressive sanctions policy and tighten secondary sanctions and export control mechanisms to countries that facilitate the trade of sanctioned goods and have good relations with Russia, such as India, UAE, and Turkey which will weaken the multipolar order. Thus, the coming weeks will be crucial in ascertaining what Trump aims to do.

(The writer is a research assistant at the Observer Research Foundation)