Take the Vajpayee line

On April 22, 2002, then Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee addressing Indian troops along the 740-km Line of Control (LoC) in Kupwara, which divides the two parts of Jammu and Kashmir, had thundered that India was prepared to go to war with Pakistan to end the menace of terrorism as he asked the soldiers "to be ready for sacrifice. Your goal should be victory. It's time to fight a decisive battle. We'll write a new chapter of victory."

Nuclear-armed Indian and Pakistani militaries were on the brink of war. Troops had amassed on both sides of the LoC after a foiled attack to take hostage legislators in the Indian Parliament on December 13, 2001, allegedly by the terrorist outfit Jaish-e-Mohammad. On May 14, 2002, an attack on the Kaluchak army family quarters in J&K killed 31 people, including 10 children, eight women and five soldiers, further escalating tensions. Among the items recovered from the killed terrorists was a Sialkot cinema ticket.

Thanks to backchannel diplomacy, blessed by Vajpayee and then Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf, the tensions eased over several months. Surprising everyone, the two countries announced a ceasefire along the LoC on November 26, 2003. The LoC, which was marked by mortar and artillery shelling for years, suddenly went silent. Other steps followed, including regulated civilian traffic across the LoC through five points. On the table was the negotiated resolution of the Kashmir issue and possible demilitarisation of the Siachen heights, the world’s highest battlefield, among other issues.

The situation along the hilly LoC is often a barometer of Indian and Pakistani relations. That is why the February 25 surprise joint statement by both militaries to strictly observe all agreements on ceasefire along the LoC becomes significant. The two sides claim that the announcement came after hotline discussions by the Director Generals of Military Operations (DGMO) of the two countries. Within the political establishment on both sides, there is caution in the air and there is reluctance to provide more details. On the Pakistani side, a comment was made by 40-year-old Mooed Yusuf, who enjoys a position analogous to National Security Adviser (NSA), as he denied media reports that the ceasefire was brokered by his meeting with his 76-year-old counterpart Ajit Doval.

Understanding the context in which the ceasefire announcement was made may provide some cues at best. First, the announcement is merely a restatement of commitment by both countries to adhere to the 2003 ceasefire on the LoC. The 2003 ceasefire had lost its meaning on the ground. There were reportedly 5,100 instances of ceasefire violation along the LoC in 2020, the highest in nearly 18 years. Second, in the past, the overall regional security environment was seen as one of the factors that pushed Pakistan to agree to a ceasefire in 2003 as it needed troops to fight against the Taliban on its western border. The realities have not changed much for Pakistan, as stabilising the situation in the border areas along Afghanistan remains one of its core interests.

In India’s case, in contrast to 2003, there is additional demand on the army to deter China’s aggressive posture along the Line of Actual Control, which divides the China-controlled Tibetan region from the Ladakh frontier. Both countries have claimed to agree to withdraw from the heights, though if the past is any guide, there is need for eternal vigilance so as not to be caught off guard. India gains in terms of its counterterrorism strategy as it makes available more troops to strengthen the internal counterinsurgency grid within J&K. With summer approaching, there will likely be greater infiltration from across the LoC as the snow melts. The threat perception rises within J&K, too. More than one lakh soldiers are reportedly posted along the LoC, apart from other security personnel.

Third, the internal political environment in both countries is both enabling and disabling for further progress in their relations. In Pakistan, Prime Minister Imran Khan faces a political challenge from two established parties, the left-of-centre PPP, led by Bilawal Bhutto, and right-of-centre Nawaz Sharif-led Pakistan Muslim League, which have roots in two populous provinces Sindh and Punjab, respectively. There is a silver lining to the cloud. If Imran Khan takes some bold measures, which include possible concessions on Jammu and Kashmir, he may possibly face less opposition. The main resonance to the Kashmir issue is in the most populous Punjab province, where a large number of Muslim migrant families from southern J&K settled in 1947-48.

Nawaz Sharif, who has been prime minister thrice, is in exile in the UK and has done the unthinkable by asking for the Pakistani military’s accountability for successive political interventions. He has accused the military leadership of sabotaging his efforts to bring peace with India, alluding to the Kargil misadventure in 1998 by the Pakistani military that led to war between the two countries just months after the Sharif-Vajpayee Lahore Declaration.

In India, the clinching argument for making an effort towards peace is that only a party like the BJP, with its core appeal of Hindu nationalism, can take the political risk of finding a negotiated deal with Pakistan.

If the past is any guide, in addition to dialogue with Pakistan, the Modi government also faces disaffection in Kashmir valley, which requires a more compassionate and sensitive handling. More than administrative micro-management, it is political messaging that could reduce that disaffection. And for that, the BJP has to look no further than the legacy of its founders. With his masterful poetic ambivalence, Vajpayee could reconcile several contradictions of the subcontinent by noting that "you can change friends, but not neighbours," and by simultaneously reaching out to the disaffected population in the Kashmir valley by promising them honour and dignity.

(The writer is the author of “Across the LoC”, Columbia University Press)