<p>Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Foreign Minister of China, visited India for the 24th meeting of the Special Representatives on boundary issues. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Tianjin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit this weekend, his first visit to China since 2020.</p>.<p>Speculations are rife in some sections of the media and policy circles in India and China that given US President Donald Trump’s U-turn on India, New Delhi is recalibrating its China policy. This analysis is misguided for four reasons. First, after Galwan, many Chinese scholars anticipated that this was a brief deviation in the relationship and that the bilateral ties would soon be on their normal course. However, India’s non-compromising stance on the ‘boundary first’ approach proved otherwise. Second, it was Trump’s first salvo of tariffs aimed at China that prodded Zhongnanhai to rethink its India policy. This Chinese approach to India may have triggered Washington to recalibrate its trade policy towards Beijing, since containment yielded no results.</p>.India drills tariff wall for elephant to pass .<p>Third, from BRICS in Xiamen, 2017 to SCO in Tianjin, 2025, India-China engagement indicates the strategic relevance of these groupings in pushing warring states to soften their positions. Fourth, a hostile neighbourhood risks minimising the strategic impact of China going global and of a shared-destiny construct. Beijing’s all-out approach towards India exhibits Chinese limitations in antagonising India.</p>.<p>But we also need to ask if this rapprochement is just another reset in the engagement without learning from the past mishaps. The Special Representatives’ (SR) meeting on border questions, apart from renewing the existing mechanisms, inter alia agreed to set up two expert groups to explore “early harvest” in boundary delimitation in the border areas and advance effective border management to maintain peace and tranquillity. Furthermore, both countries agreed to establish general-level mechanisms in the eastern and middle sectors, covering the three sectors of the boundary disputes.</p>.<p>Achieving domestic growth targets requires peaceful borders and trade and investment flows. Recent Chinese restrictions on the export of fertilisers, rare earth magnets, and tunnel-boring machines may have slowed down India’s growth trajectory in the short term. Similarly, New Delhi’s foreign direct investment policy since 2020 has prevented neighbouring countries, including China, from investing in India, thereby restricting Chinese industries from benefiting from the large Indian market.</p>.<p>The readout of the SR meeting underlines India’s concern about China’s dam on the Brahmaputra River in Tibet and acknowledges the role of the India-China Expert Level Mechanism on trans-border rivers. Nevertheless, creating a Brahmaputra River Water Commission with three riparian countries – China, India, and Bangladesh – will be strategically more prudent. In addition, instead of sharing hydrological information only during emergencies based on ‘humanitarian considerations’, New Delhi should push Beijing for binding responsibilities.</p>.<p><strong>Trump in the mix</strong></p>.<p>What is promising is the re-opening of border trade through the three designated trading points, namely Lipulekh Pass, Shipki La Pass and Nathu La Pass. As many studies have concluded that these border trades invariably reduce transgressions, these experiences should be implemented in the Western sector, as the Ladakh 2025 Vision Document also envisioned the reopening of ancient trade routes.</p>.<p>Apart from bilateral compulsions, regional and international factors have contributed to the thawing in the relationship between India and China. Geopolitical dynamics are in flux and the pressure on India to abandon its cherished strategic autonomy has been mounting since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the unpredictability of Donald Trump, exhibiting the ‘unipolar disorder’ of the American system, is altering the rule-based order, thereby necessitating the upholding of the beneficial multilateral order, as both China and India are at the receiving end.</p>.<p class="bodytext">Operation Sindoor has altered the regional dynamics in South Asia. The warming of the Pakistan-US relationship necessitates neutralising the Pakistan-China alliance. However, given the nature of the Islamabad-Beijing ties, this will require sharp diplomatic manoeuvring.</p>.<p class="bodytext">Mini laterals are also becoming realities of the emerging order. New Delhi may not like to leave space for Beijing to dominate the SCO. Given that Pakistan is a member of the SCO, it is crucial that India takes part in the summit and not let the grouping give voice to the China-Pakistan rhetoric.</p>.<p class="bodytext">India’s foreign policy is being recalibrated to adjust to the new geopolitical realities and to set new priorities in international engagements. How will this shift play out? The jury is still out.</p>.<p class="bodytext"><span class="italic">(The writer is an associate professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi)</span></p>
<p>Wang Yi, a member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and Foreign Minister of China, visited India for the 24th meeting of the Special Representatives on boundary issues. Prime Minister Narendra Modi will visit Tianjin to attend the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit this weekend, his first visit to China since 2020.</p>.<p>Speculations are rife in some sections of the media and policy circles in India and China that given US President Donald Trump’s U-turn on India, New Delhi is recalibrating its China policy. This analysis is misguided for four reasons. First, after Galwan, many Chinese scholars anticipated that this was a brief deviation in the relationship and that the bilateral ties would soon be on their normal course. However, India’s non-compromising stance on the ‘boundary first’ approach proved otherwise. Second, it was Trump’s first salvo of tariffs aimed at China that prodded Zhongnanhai to rethink its India policy. This Chinese approach to India may have triggered Washington to recalibrate its trade policy towards Beijing, since containment yielded no results.</p>.India drills tariff wall for elephant to pass .<p>Third, from BRICS in Xiamen, 2017 to SCO in Tianjin, 2025, India-China engagement indicates the strategic relevance of these groupings in pushing warring states to soften their positions. Fourth, a hostile neighbourhood risks minimising the strategic impact of China going global and of a shared-destiny construct. Beijing’s all-out approach towards India exhibits Chinese limitations in antagonising India.</p>.<p>But we also need to ask if this rapprochement is just another reset in the engagement without learning from the past mishaps. The Special Representatives’ (SR) meeting on border questions, apart from renewing the existing mechanisms, inter alia agreed to set up two expert groups to explore “early harvest” in boundary delimitation in the border areas and advance effective border management to maintain peace and tranquillity. Furthermore, both countries agreed to establish general-level mechanisms in the eastern and middle sectors, covering the three sectors of the boundary disputes.</p>.<p>Achieving domestic growth targets requires peaceful borders and trade and investment flows. Recent Chinese restrictions on the export of fertilisers, rare earth magnets, and tunnel-boring machines may have slowed down India’s growth trajectory in the short term. Similarly, New Delhi’s foreign direct investment policy since 2020 has prevented neighbouring countries, including China, from investing in India, thereby restricting Chinese industries from benefiting from the large Indian market.</p>.<p>The readout of the SR meeting underlines India’s concern about China’s dam on the Brahmaputra River in Tibet and acknowledges the role of the India-China Expert Level Mechanism on trans-border rivers. Nevertheless, creating a Brahmaputra River Water Commission with three riparian countries – China, India, and Bangladesh – will be strategically more prudent. In addition, instead of sharing hydrological information only during emergencies based on ‘humanitarian considerations’, New Delhi should push Beijing for binding responsibilities.</p>.<p><strong>Trump in the mix</strong></p>.<p>What is promising is the re-opening of border trade through the three designated trading points, namely Lipulekh Pass, Shipki La Pass and Nathu La Pass. As many studies have concluded that these border trades invariably reduce transgressions, these experiences should be implemented in the Western sector, as the Ladakh 2025 Vision Document also envisioned the reopening of ancient trade routes.</p>.<p>Apart from bilateral compulsions, regional and international factors have contributed to the thawing in the relationship between India and China. Geopolitical dynamics are in flux and the pressure on India to abandon its cherished strategic autonomy has been mounting since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war. However, the unpredictability of Donald Trump, exhibiting the ‘unipolar disorder’ of the American system, is altering the rule-based order, thereby necessitating the upholding of the beneficial multilateral order, as both China and India are at the receiving end.</p>.<p class="bodytext">Operation Sindoor has altered the regional dynamics in South Asia. The warming of the Pakistan-US relationship necessitates neutralising the Pakistan-China alliance. However, given the nature of the Islamabad-Beijing ties, this will require sharp diplomatic manoeuvring.</p>.<p class="bodytext">Mini laterals are also becoming realities of the emerging order. New Delhi may not like to leave space for Beijing to dominate the SCO. Given that Pakistan is a member of the SCO, it is crucial that India takes part in the summit and not let the grouping give voice to the China-Pakistan rhetoric.</p>.<p class="bodytext">India’s foreign policy is being recalibrated to adjust to the new geopolitical realities and to set new priorities in international engagements. How will this shift play out? The jury is still out.</p>.<p class="bodytext"><span class="italic">(The writer is an associate professor of Chinese Studies at the Department of East Asian Studies, University of Delhi)</span></p>
