<p>Russia recently unveiled its maritime doctrine. The doctrine is released in the changing regional and global security context. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has altered the strategic dynamics in Europe and the wider Eurasian region. The West and Russia are on a collision course, and the strategic rivalries have intensified in the waters of the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas.</p>.<p>Therefore, how Russia sees maritime geopolitics matters, and the doctrine lays out Russia's vision in the maritime domain. The doctrine defines Russia as 'a great maritime power' whose national interests 'extend to the entire World Ocean and the Caspian Sea'. Russia's priority maritime areas are divided into two categories: vital and important. The 'vital' zones consist of 'internal sea waters and the territorial sea' of Russia.</p>.<p>Interestingly, Russia asserts that the Arctic basin and the water area of the Northern Sea Route is now a vital zone. The doctrine makes it clear that Russia will "along with political, diplomatic, economic and informational methods, make full use of military force methods".</p>.<p>Russia considers the Black, Baltic, and Azov seas, eastern Mediterranean, and maritime passageways along the Asian and African coasts 'important' zones. These areas influence the economic development and national security interests of Russia. They also shape the strategic and regional security scenario of Russia.<br /> <br /><strong>India and the Indian Ocean<br /> </strong><br />For observers in India, the most interesting section of the doctrine is the one dealing with the Indian Ocean. Russia asserts that developing ties with India and other key littoral states like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq is a priority. This assertion in itself reflects the changing strategic context. In the previous 2015 doctrine, Russia made a much stronger formulation for India. It said that the "development of friendly relations with India is the most important goal of the National Maritime Policy in the Indian Ocean region". This time, Russia has clubbed India with other West Asian countries. The growing strategic ties between India and the United States and the increasing Russian presence in the Middle East since 2015 are key factors behind this changing approach.</p>.<p>Russia also wants to expand its presence in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf region based on 'logistic support points' and wants to use the infrastructure of the regional countries 'in the interests of ensuring the naval activities'. The mention of the Red Sea and logistic support points is a novelty as the 2015 doctrine had not made any reference to either of them. Since 2017, Russia has engaged Sudan for a naval base in the Red Sea. Although the base is yet to come up, the intent is clear.<br /> <br /><strong>Indo-Pacific</strong></p>.<p>The doctrine does not mention the term 'Indo-Pacific'. Russia believes that the concept is coined by the US and its allies to contain China. However, Russia, by virtue of its geography and strategic interests, is, indeed, an Indo-Pacific power. Far-Eastern regions of Russia are oriented towards the Pacific Ocean and Russia is a critical player in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia.</p>.<p>The Russian objectives in the Pacific region are to reduce the 'level of threats to national security' and ensure 'strategic stability'. The doctrine makes a case for 'strengthening the combat potential of the forces (troops) of the Northern and Pacific fleets'.</p>.<p>It makes pointed references to 'Asia-Pacific', a term now mostly discarded in favour of the Indo-Pacific. According to the doctrine, Russia would like to integrate the 'Far East into the economic space of the Asia-Pacific region'. In 2019, India had demonstrated considerable interest in developing the Russian Far East. However, with the looming threat of economic sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine war, it remains to be seen whether India would go ahead with its plans.<br /> <br /><strong>The overall strategic context</strong></p>.<p>The doctrine offers a good peek into Russian thinking after the invasion of Ukraine. Russia's objectives in the Black and Azov Seas regions are 'comprehensive strengthening of the geopolitical positions' and 'improvement and strengthening of groupings of forces (troops) of the Black Sea Fleet, development of their infrastructure in the Crimea and on the coast of the Krasnodar Territory'. The Russian resolve to maintain and strengthen positions in the Black Sea region will be tested in the face of the Ukrainian offensive in the Crimea region.</p>.<p>Russia believes that the pursuit of 'independent foreign and domestic policy provokes opposition from the United States and its allies' as they seek to maintain their dominance in the world. Their policy is 'to contain' Russia. The doctrine asserts that 'in international relations, the role of the force factor is not diminishing'. In a veiled reference to the US, the doctrine states that the 'leading world powers with significant naval potential and a developed basing system continue to build up their naval presence' across the world, including in the 'waters of the oceans and seas adjacent to the territory' of Russia.</p>.<p>The doctrine is a statement of intent from Russia in maritime geopolitics. However, whether and how Russia can meet the objectives spelt out in the doctrine will be interesting to watch</p>.<p><em>(Sankalp Gurjar, a Delhi-based strategic analyst, specialises in great power politics and Indo-Pacific security)</em></p>
<p>Russia recently unveiled its maritime doctrine. The doctrine is released in the changing regional and global security context. Russia's invasion of Ukraine has altered the strategic dynamics in Europe and the wider Eurasian region. The West and Russia are on a collision course, and the strategic rivalries have intensified in the waters of the Arctic, Baltic, and Black Seas.</p>.<p>Therefore, how Russia sees maritime geopolitics matters, and the doctrine lays out Russia's vision in the maritime domain. The doctrine defines Russia as 'a great maritime power' whose national interests 'extend to the entire World Ocean and the Caspian Sea'. Russia's priority maritime areas are divided into two categories: vital and important. The 'vital' zones consist of 'internal sea waters and the territorial sea' of Russia.</p>.<p>Interestingly, Russia asserts that the Arctic basin and the water area of the Northern Sea Route is now a vital zone. The doctrine makes it clear that Russia will "along with political, diplomatic, economic and informational methods, make full use of military force methods".</p>.<p>Russia considers the Black, Baltic, and Azov seas, eastern Mediterranean, and maritime passageways along the Asian and African coasts 'important' zones. These areas influence the economic development and national security interests of Russia. They also shape the strategic and regional security scenario of Russia.<br /> <br /><strong>India and the Indian Ocean<br /> </strong><br />For observers in India, the most interesting section of the doctrine is the one dealing with the Indian Ocean. Russia asserts that developing ties with India and other key littoral states like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq is a priority. This assertion in itself reflects the changing strategic context. In the previous 2015 doctrine, Russia made a much stronger formulation for India. It said that the "development of friendly relations with India is the most important goal of the National Maritime Policy in the Indian Ocean region". This time, Russia has clubbed India with other West Asian countries. The growing strategic ties between India and the United States and the increasing Russian presence in the Middle East since 2015 are key factors behind this changing approach.</p>.<p>Russia also wants to expand its presence in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf region based on 'logistic support points' and wants to use the infrastructure of the regional countries 'in the interests of ensuring the naval activities'. The mention of the Red Sea and logistic support points is a novelty as the 2015 doctrine had not made any reference to either of them. Since 2017, Russia has engaged Sudan for a naval base in the Red Sea. Although the base is yet to come up, the intent is clear.<br /> <br /><strong>Indo-Pacific</strong></p>.<p>The doctrine does not mention the term 'Indo-Pacific'. Russia believes that the concept is coined by the US and its allies to contain China. However, Russia, by virtue of its geography and strategic interests, is, indeed, an Indo-Pacific power. Far-Eastern regions of Russia are oriented towards the Pacific Ocean and Russia is a critical player in the geopolitics of Northeast Asia.</p>.<p>The Russian objectives in the Pacific region are to reduce the 'level of threats to national security' and ensure 'strategic stability'. The doctrine makes a case for 'strengthening the combat potential of the forces (troops) of the Northern and Pacific fleets'.</p>.<p>It makes pointed references to 'Asia-Pacific', a term now mostly discarded in favour of the Indo-Pacific. According to the doctrine, Russia would like to integrate the 'Far East into the economic space of the Asia-Pacific region'. In 2019, India had demonstrated considerable interest in developing the Russian Far East. However, with the looming threat of economic sanctions in the wake of the Ukraine war, it remains to be seen whether India would go ahead with its plans.<br /> <br /><strong>The overall strategic context</strong></p>.<p>The doctrine offers a good peek into Russian thinking after the invasion of Ukraine. Russia's objectives in the Black and Azov Seas regions are 'comprehensive strengthening of the geopolitical positions' and 'improvement and strengthening of groupings of forces (troops) of the Black Sea Fleet, development of their infrastructure in the Crimea and on the coast of the Krasnodar Territory'. The Russian resolve to maintain and strengthen positions in the Black Sea region will be tested in the face of the Ukrainian offensive in the Crimea region.</p>.<p>Russia believes that the pursuit of 'independent foreign and domestic policy provokes opposition from the United States and its allies' as they seek to maintain their dominance in the world. Their policy is 'to contain' Russia. The doctrine asserts that 'in international relations, the role of the force factor is not diminishing'. In a veiled reference to the US, the doctrine states that the 'leading world powers with significant naval potential and a developed basing system continue to build up their naval presence' across the world, including in the 'waters of the oceans and seas adjacent to the territory' of Russia.</p>.<p>The doctrine is a statement of intent from Russia in maritime geopolitics. However, whether and how Russia can meet the objectives spelt out in the doctrine will be interesting to watch</p>.<p><em>(Sankalp Gurjar, a Delhi-based strategic analyst, specialises in great power politics and Indo-Pacific security)</em></p>