Split-ticket voting: Is this India’s new federal dynamic?

Gov-Shastra

Lost in the din of explanations and accusations that followed the recent state elections is any analysis of the structural shift underway in Indian politics. The Indian electorate is increasingly expressing a preference for split-ticket voting i.e. voting differently in state and national elections. Consider Uttar Pradesh, Chhattisgarh, Rajasthan, Haryana, Jharkhand, and Maharashtra – states that voted very differently in state and national elections. More starkly, consider the simultaneous election in Nanded, Maharashtra – voters chose a Congress candidate for the Lok Sabha while preferring the BJP and Shinde’s Shiv Sena for the Assembly.

If current trends prevail, the landscape of political party competition is likely to undergo a structural change and its effects on the terms of India’s federal bargain will be significant. Writing in the aftermath of the 2019 elections, political scientist Neelanjan Sircar and I highlighted the significance of split-ticket voting and its implications for regional parties. In the coalition era, the sustained national presence of regional parties enabled them to credibly signal their ability to negotiate and extract bargains in the national arena while responding to regional ethnic and identity assertions of voters at the state level. The Modi era, defined by BJP’s undiluted power at the centre and its personality-centric ‘Modi ki guarantee’ governance, altered this dynamic. Centralisation enabled the BJP to consolidate political attribution into the national government, creating a distinction between national and state governance that voters are responding to differentially.

In sharp contrast to the pre-2014 era, survey data since 2019 shows credit attribution for welfare schemes launched by the central government goes directly to the Prime Minister, unlike in the past where this was spread across state and national governments. On the other hand, the BJP’s ideological impatience with accommodating diverse regional and ethnic aspirations sustained regional parties’ appeal in state elections.

This is best evidenced in Odisha where, in the simultaneous elections of 2019, the BJP received a far greater vote share in the national elections (38%) compared with state elections (33%). Significantly, the Biju Janata Dal (which won the state elections) secured a far lower vote share in 14 out of 21 constituencies in the national elections. In 2024, we can see this pattern playing out, but in reverse. Disenchanted voters shifted to the I.N.D.I.A bloc in areas where the BJP was dominant and voters were able to attribute governance failure directly to the BJP (even though in state elections, notably in Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh, this shifted in favour of the BJP).

Yogendra Yadav and co-authors show the BJP vote share plummeted largely in areas where it was dominant, i.e. the Hindi belt. On the other hand, it gained in states where it was challenging regional parties and the Congress. Consequently, the Samajwadi Party regained ground, while regional parties like the BJD and BRS lost their base. In state elections, voters chose differently. Not only have we seen reversals for the Congress in head-to-head contests with the BJP (Haryana and Maharashtra) but even regional parties that had lost ground in the 2024 national elections (JMM, NCP, and Shinde’s Shiv Sena) regained their regional bastions. Indeed, the NCP is particularly interesting, from being a drag in the national elections, it helped propel the BJP to its grand sweep, months later in the state elections. Arguably, voters considered its ability to bargain with the national government as a significant positive for the state even while they preferred, as visible in the Nanded by-election, to have a less dominant BJP-led alliance in the Lok Sabha.

Moreover, the attribution effects of national policy shifted in favour of the Mahayuti. The CSDS survey shows that while inflation and unemployment were serious concerns which had hurt the BJP-led alliance in the national elections, in the state elections, voters directed more blame to the national government, in turn, shifting voting preference to the same set of political actors at the state government.

States like Tamil Nadu and West Bengal have bucked the trend of split-ticket voting but broadly, this is a phenomenon in Indian politics with significant consequences on the political calculus that shapes India’s federal dynamic. State governments have taken a page out of the BJP’s playbook to deploy similar tactics to regain ground via cash transfer schemes. Competitive welfarism is here to stay. Further, this is likely to harden the political stance of opposition parties on emerging federal fault-lines linked to fiscal devolution, inequality, and delimitation. After all, the need to protect state rights and regional representation deepens the relevance of regional parties on the national stage.

What does this imply for the BJP’s calculus? Arguably, it is in recognition of this split-ticket phenomenon post-general elections that the party actively self-corrected by reducing Modi’s presence in state elections. Equally, it will continue to gain ground by seeking to consolidate regional identities that are the primary appeal of regional parties, through a more aggressive and virulent Hindutva. This presents a real opportunity for the opposition to gain greater ideological coherence in combating Hindutva at the national level. In the states, with a less dominant BJP at the centre, regional parties and the Congress may face a harder struggle than it did in 2019-2024. This is the peculiarity of split-ticket voting. It will ensure that India remains politically competitive and could, if effectively leveraged, be a bulwark against the pernicious centralising tendencies of our politics.