Washington's China reset leaves India exposed

America’s commitment is now conditional. India must prioritise self-reliance in deterring its neighbour

The December 2025 release of the United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and the Pentagon’s China Military Power Report highlights a widening divergence in American strategy, with serious consequences for India. Both identify China as the primary strategic competitor. The NSS reflects domestic priorities, transactional logic, and political restraint, while the Pentagon stresses urgency, timelines, and military preparedness.

Recent US actions, such as decisive intervention in Venezuela reflecting territorial prioritisation, and President Donald Trump’s statement on January 8 that Xi Jinping considers Taiwan “to be a part of China and that’s up to him what he’s going to be doing,” show this divergence is no longer just bureaucratic. These actions reflect a deeper doctrinal shift towards accepting great-power spheres of influence, sharply raising the risks for partners like India.

Across three administrations, US policy towards India has moved from diagnosis to diffusion, and then to forced realism. The 2020 Pentagon report identified China as a revisionist power and India as a strategic balancer, but avoided specifying timelines for potential conflict or India’s exposure along the Line of Actual Control (LAC). The 2023 framework diluted focus through “integrated deterrence,” celebrating partnership but leaving US responses to Chinese pressure ambiguous. The 2025 report restores urgency but puts the primary burden of deterrence on India, signalling reluctance to guarantee support in a crisis.

A fourth phase is emerging under Trump: personalised sphere management. Commitments are framed not as institutional obligations but as leader-dependent judgments. For India, this brings a deeper layer of uncertainty.

The Pentagon confirms that China applies deliberate, calibrated pressure on India to prevent deeper US-India alignment. Beijing now calls Arunachal Pradesh a “core interest”, along with Taiwan and the South China Sea. China wants to stabilise tensions tactically along the LAC while keeping pressure below the level that would prompt US intervention.

China’s military capabilities continue to expand rapidly: a nuclear stockpile projected to exceed 1,000 warheads by 2030, long-range precision strike systems, early-warning counterstrike satellites, and growing PLA reach across the Indo-Pacific. China’s readiness for “national total war” underscores its intention to escalate if necessary. India faces this growing power with weaker US security guarantees. Key vulnerabilities include India’s military asymmetry, exposure to information warfare, frequent cyberattacks, and ongoing economic coercion, all of which threaten national autonomy.

Trump’s Taiwan remarks signal to Beijing that calibrated, patiently managed coercion is unlikely to trigger escalation from the US. This lowers the threshold for sustained grey-zone pressure against India, especially during US political transitions.

The gap between political intent and military assessment is wider now. The NSS frames China mainly as an economic competitor and emphasises “muscular restraint.” The Pentagon, by contrast, describes China’s preparations for high-intensity conflict, including hypersonic weapons, sixth-generation aircraft, and whole-of-nation mobilisation. This is no longer just caution versus alarm. Trump’s moves in Venezuela and his Taiwan remarks show a political logic that separates “our sphere” from “theirs”. The Pentagon’s realism cannot offset political leaders who withhold deterrence. For India, this means stronger US military ties may not guarantee political support in a crisis.

The NSS seeks “improved commercial relations with India” to encourage New Delhi’s contribution to Indo-Pacific security. Instead of supporting India’s rise as a China balancer, the US now expects India to contribute first as a condition for stronger ties.

The US expects India to deter Chinese aggression along the LAC and in the Indian Ocean. However, while the potential loss of control over maritime points such as the Malacca choke-point could impact trade, a Ladakh incursion represents an immediate threat to territorial sovereignty and national security. This contrast underscores why continental deterrence remains decisive.

The Venezuela case shows that geography plays a central role in US intervention thresholds. The US acted decisively within its own hemisphere while signalling tolerance for coercion in other regions. India is expected to manage deterrence along the LAC largely without US support, despite China’s expanding military posture.

The Quad remains a platform for coordinating technology, supply chains, and maritime awareness. It is not a security guarantee. The Pentagon is cautious on the Quad and recognises its limitations. There is no collective military response or formal commitment to defend India. This leaves a critical risk gap. This ambiguity increases India’s vulnerability.

In a sphere-of-influence world, this ambiguity is structural, not accidental. Drawing a parallel with the 1930s’ “Far Eastern Munich” analogy, we see how aggressors have historically exploited unclear commitments to advance their agendas. Beijing understands there is no automatic US military response and calibrates pressure accordingly.

India’s imperative

Beijing is likely to see American retrenchment and hemispheric prioritisation as an opportunity. Grey-zone coercion along the LAC and in the Indian Ocean will intensify as China’s defence spending, already $304–377 billion in 2024, continues to grow.

Trump’s remarks on Taiwan remove any remaining illusion of predictability. If Taiwan’s fate depends on who is in the White House, India must assume zero certainty during crises. Strategic autonomy is no longer ideological; it is an operational necessity.

India must therefore accelerate defence industrial sovereignty, prioritise LAC-specific capabilities, negotiate transactional reciprocity with the US, and diversify partnerships with Europe, especially France, Germany, Israel, Japan, and Australia. Maritime strength matters, but continental deterrence is decisive.

The 2025 US strategy replaces solidarity with conditional cooperation and burden-shifting, now reinforced by Trump’s implicit acceptance of spheres of influence. As China prepares for a protracted confrontation, India faces greater risk without dependable external guarantees. The US partnership remains useful, but no longer foundational. India must plan for a world where great powers tolerate each other’s coercion as long as it remains geographically contained. Strategic autonomy is no longer a choice; it is the price of survival.

(The writer is a research fellow at the Takshashila Institution)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.