Why China is absent in Red Sea

Since December 2023, the Red Sea has turned perilous for global shipping due to Houthi attacks on ships associated with Israel. These attacks have compelled major global shipping companies to avoid the Red Sea and take a longer route via the Cape of Good Hope. To counter Houthis, the United States and its allies have launched Operation Prosperity Guardian. India also has dispatched naval warships in the region for the protection of the cargo ships. Surprisingly, China, despite having a base in Djibouti, has refrained from participating in the maritime security operations led by the US or, like India, launching its own independent naval operations. What explains this Chinese behaviour?

As the US withdrew from the Middle East, China expanded its economic and strategic presence. Beijing is a major economic partner for Middle Eastern economies and has reportedly engaged with the United Arab Emirates and Oman in establishing military bases. The Beijing-brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023 was seen as a big moment for China in the Middle East. Dispatching naval warships to the Red Sea for securing global shipping would perhaps be a logical step for China. It would help China’s PLA Navy to gather valuable experience of operating far away from its home shores (like it did during the anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden) and burnish its image as a key player in maritime geopolitics. However, Chinese calculations seemed to be different.

Primarily, China’s no-show stems from the fact that the US has spearheaded operations to secure global shipping. Despite recent reduction in tensions, US-China ties remain fragile and fraught. The US has been strengthening its presence in the Indo-Pacific region and has sought to reassure its allies against the aggressive China. Moreover, the US has been standing firmly with Israel in its war in Gaza. The humanitarian crisis in Gaza has not diminished the US support for Israel, and China is vary of being perceived as aligning with the US and, by extension, Israel. 

Secondly, the Houthis have declared that they will not attack the Chinese and Russian ships if they are not linked with Israel. The role of Iran seems to be critical in this posture. Iran backs Houthi rebels and, in the last few years, China and Iran have deepened their strategic partnership. Beijing and Tehran share the worldview of anti-Americanism and would like to reshape Eurasian geopolitics. They have signed a long-term energy partnership and are key partners in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) as well as in the BRICS grouping. Therefore, the Houthis have stayed away from the Chinese ships and perhaps, as a result, China has not sent naval warships to protect the global shipping. 

Thirdly, China has opted for diplomatic channels so far and seems unlikely to resort to naval intervention in the Red Sea crisis. Beijing views the instability in the Red Sea as linked with the war in Gaza and, therefore, has called on ‘relevant parties’ to ‘avoid adding fuel to the fire’. China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi in his recent visit to Africa has engaged Egypt, Tunisia, and the Arab League to discuss the Israel-Palestine issue. Regarding the Red Sea crisis, Wang had said, “We should jointly uphold the security on the sea lanes of the Red Sea in accordance with the law and also respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the countries along the Red Sea coast, including Yemen.” However, Wang did not clarify what he meant by ‘we’ and how to uphold the security of the sea lanes.

While China remains passive in the ongoing Red Sea crisis, attention turns to Beijing’s strategic presence in the Western Indian Ocean (WIO). The war in Gaza and the crisis in the Red Sea have brought the US back into the region. The US’ role in the Middle East will shape the emerging regional geopolitics. The crisis underscores the limits of Chinese power. Although China’s international trade with Europe and Africa has suffered due to the Red Sea instability, it has not been able to put an end to the Houthi attacks. This is an indication that China’s role in the Middle East in general and, specifically, its leverage over Iran, is limited. Besides, China’s cautious approach to the Red Sea despite the naval base at Djibouti raises questions over the functions of the base and capabilities of the Chinese navy. 

(The writer is the author of The Superpowers’ Playground: Djibouti and
Geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific in the 21st Century)