Pakistan faces fallout of its Afghanistan policy

Taliban defiance deepens border crisis with its one-time ally.

The chickens of Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy have come home to roost with its latest and most serious border skirmishes with Taliban forces.

Pakistan and Afghanistan have had a chequered relationship marked by frequent downturns. Instead of playing a constructive role as Afghanistan’s immediate neighbour, Pakistan has long hankered after a pliable government and strategic depth in the country. In doing so, it has alienated most governments in Kabul, the Taliban being the latest.

The Taliban’s victory in Afghanistan in August 2021, hailed in Pakistan as a vindication of its Afghanistan policy, has turned into a security nightmare. No longer dependent on Pakistan for their war effort, the Taliban have asserted their independence. The fallout centres on the Taliban’s refusal — like all previous Afghan governments — to recognise the Durand Line, and on Pakistan’s allegation that the Taliban provide sanctuary and support to the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), which has fuelled a surge in terrorism since 2021. Pakistan further alleges Indian backing for the TTP. The Taliban flatly deny these charges, maintaining ideological affinity with the TTP, which fought alongside them against US-led NATO forces. The Taliban, in turn, accuse Pakistan of harbouring their nemesis — the Islamic State (IS).

Pakistan’s efforts to coerce the Taliban government through restrictions on Afghan transit trade, the expulsion of large numbers of Afghans, and sporadic air strikes have failed. There have been periodic, smaller border skirmishes in the past as well.

The trigger for the latest flare-up was Pakistan’s aerial strikes in Kabul and Paktika, close to the Pak-Afghan border, on the night of 9–10 October. The Kabul strikes, a major escalation, were said to target TTP leader Noor Wali Mehsud. However, messages purportedly from Mehsud, claiming he was safe, surfaced soon after. The airstrikes followed the killing of 11 Pakistani security personnel in a TTP attack in the tribal belt and coincided with the visit to India by Taliban Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi.

While not confirming the strikes, the Pakistan Army said all measures necessary to safeguard Pakistani lives and property would be taken. The Afghan Defence Ministry vowed to defend Afghan territory. What transpired thereafter remains unclear. Afghanistan claimed its forces killed 58 Pakistani soldiers in overnight retaliatory strikes and captured 25 Pakistani army posts. Pakistan said it had responded to unprovoked Afghan firing on the night of 11–12 October, destroyed several Afghan check posts, killed more than 200 Taliban and “affiliated terrorists”, and taken control of 19 Afghan posts. Islamabad admitted to losing only 23 soldiers.

Fighting flared again after a brief lull. Pakistan claimed on 15 October that it had carried out “precision strikes” in Kabul and Kandahar provinces. Later that day, both sides announced a ceasefire, with Pakistan describing it as a 48-hour pause to facilitate dialogue. Each side made apparently exaggerated claims about the damage inflicted on the other.

Tensions remain high, with unconfirmed reports suggesting an extension of the ceasefire to enable talks in Doha, followed by further Pakistani airstrikes in Paktika that reignited border clashes.

For Pakistan, Afghan hostility presents a serious challenge in its vulnerable Pakhtun belt, marked by widespread alienation due to the state’s heavy-handed tactics and deep-rooted radicalisation dating back to the Afghan jihad against the Soviet Union. Added to this volatile mix is the pull from across the Durand Line, which Afghanistan refuses to recognise.

Both sides are unlikely to risk an all-out military conflict. Such a war could see much of Pakistan’s army bogged down in Afghanistan, as happened with mightier powers before. Islamabad may therefore prefer limited aerial attacks and seek to destabilise the Taliban government by exploiting internal fissures — it has maintained close ties with the Haqqani faction — or by supporting rival Afghan groups as proxies.

A Pakistan Foreign Office spokesman recently described the Taliban as a group “holding power by force”, adding that one day Afghans “will elect a government led by their true representatives.” The Taliban, for their part, would likely rely on guerrilla tactics and covert operations rather than open warfare.

The Pak-Afghan conflict threatens to further destabilise both nations and spill over into the wider region — a matter of concern for regional players and global powers alike. Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Iran have urged restraint and attempted mediation. China, sensing a threat to its agenda in the Af-Pak region, has also offered to mediate, though its past efforts have failed. The differences between Islamabad and Kabul remain irreconcilable and can at best be temporarily papered over.

US President Donald Trump, eyeing a potential diplomatic breakthrough, has expressed his intent to “handle” the Pak-Afghan hostilities — possibly as leverage to secure access to the Bagram airbase.

Radicalisation and instability in Afghanistan and Pakistan — threatening the broader region — are not of India’s making. New Delhi must, however, deal with the consequences, including Pakistan’s hostility, which stems from both internal dynamics and the short-sighted policies of major powers.

The ideal of a stable, democratic, inclusive, and moderate Afghanistan remains distant. Yet, Pakistan’s preoccupation with its western frontier constrains its adventurism towards India. Beyond civilisational links and development aid, India has long been a partner for Afghanistan against Pakistan’s attempts to reduce it to a vassal state.

In the current conflict, India has reaffirmed its commitment to Afghanistan’s sovereignty, territorial integrity, and independence. Its recent decision to upgrade engagement with the Taliban government — short of formal recognition — must be viewed in this context. It does not imply endorsement of the Taliban’s exclusionary policies. No bilateral relationship equates to full approval of another state’s actions. Rather, it is a pragmatic step shaped by evolving regional dynamics, as India cannot afford to cede strategic space in Afghanistan to hostile forces.

The situation remains fluid. India will need to stay nimble-footed to safeguard its interests.

(Sharat Sabharwal is a former High Commissioner to Pakistan and author of “India’s Pakistan Conundrum: Managing a Complex Relationship.”)