India may not be able to do much to reverse the steep decline in bilateral relations with the Maldives, where China has gleefully stepped in after the election of Mohamed Muizzu as its new president. India, however, cannot afford to diminish its engagement with the strategically located Indian Ocean Region (IOR) nation, straddling vital sea lanes.
Retaining influence over neighbouring countries has become increasingly challenging for India. Despite the diplomatic heft and resources invested in pursuit of its ‘Neighbourhood First’ policy, China’s financial and military muscle is difficult to match. Complicating matters is the choice of a country’s political leadership to align with China over India.
India has faced its share of troubles with Nepal, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives whenever a China-leaning government assumes power there. In the Maldives, newly-elected Muizzu has quickly embraced China, straining ties between New Delhi and Malé.
India has intensified its efforts in recent years to counter China’s influence by funding various infrastructure projects and providing grants, Lines of Credit (LoC), development, and humanitarian assistance to its neighbours. New Delhi has also sought to set itself apart from Beijing’s more aggressive and predatory approach, maintaining that its people-centric assistance is driven by what the neighbour wants. But the odds remain stacked against India.
Many political leaders in these countries are willing to overlook the Chinese debt trap policies as well as the opacity with which it funds projects for short-term gains. The Maldives, struggling to repay loans taken during China-leaning Abdulla Yameen’s presidential tenure from 2013 to 2018, finds itself drawn closer to China, leaving India on the sidelines.
India enjoyed robust bilateral ties under Muizzu’s predecessor, Ibu Solih, and worked to consolidate its influence in the archipelago. But Solih’s ‘India First’ policy also seemed to have worked against his own re-election bid amid a strident ‘India Out’ campaign by the opposition parties in the Maldives. India, perhaps, also overplayed its cards by overtly backing the Solih government. This only egged on the opposition to fuel the anti-India sentiment further.
The split in the Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) shortly before the presidential polls also contributed to the ruling party’s defeat. Former Maldives President Mohamed Nasheed, perceived as a disruptive element by the Indian establishment, left the MDP shortly before the crucial polls, indirectly helping China make a comeback in the archipelago.
Snubbing New Delhi, Muizzu chose to visit China before India earlier this month. During his five-day state visit, 20 agreements were signed, with the two sides agreeing to upgrade ties to a “comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.” Beijing declared its support for Malé in “upholding its national sovereignty, independence, and national dignity”, saying it “firmly opposes external interference in the internal affairs of the Maldives’’. There is undeniable irony in this, given China’s own dubious record of meddling in the internal affairs of other nations, be it the Maldives or Nepal.
Muizzu is now aggressively pushing for the removal of the 70-odd Indian military personnel who operate two naval helicopters, a Dornier aircraft, and an offshore patrol vessel in the archipelago, having set a March 15 deadline for it.
India is now well accustomed to leaders in its neighbourhood raising the issue of sovereignty to whip up public support. Former Nepalese PM K P Sharma Oli had also done so to good effect during his country’s border row with India. Often accused of playing big brother by its neighbours, India has to tread carefully without appearing overtly overbearing.
Take, for instance, the very public diplomatic spat after three of Muizzu’s cabinet ministers made intemperate remarks against PM Narendra Modi. After Muizzu suspended the three, the issue may have cooled down. But a shrill social media campaign led by Indian celebrities was unleashed against the Maldives, calling for its boycott as a tourist destination. This damaged the relationship further, with Muizzu turning to China for both greater economic assistance and more tourists.
In setting a March 15 deadline, just two days before the Maldives votes for its Majlis (Parliament) members, Muizzu may be leveraging a hyper-nationalistic pitch. The MDP, which has a majority in the outgoing parliament, will need to convince voters that close engagement with India does not impact the archipelago’s sovereignty. India, too, will need to continue with its development work in the Maldives, quietly but effectively.
What would have brought some cheer to the MDP is the victory of its candidate in the recent polls to elect Malé’s mayor, a post vacated by Muizzu to contest the presidential elections. Eventually, the majority in the Majlis will shape the nation’s future and foreign policy approach.
New Delhi will be keeping its fingers crossed.
(The writer is a senior New Delhi-based journalist)