Ayni exit and India’s lost leverage

Retreat from the airbase in Tajikistan dilutes India’s influence in a region dominated by Russia and China.

New Delhi’s quiet withdrawal from the Ayni Airbase in Tajikistan may appear procedural, but it is a strategic setback with deep geopolitical undertones. For over two decades, Ayni stood as India’s lone military outpost overseas, symbolising ambition and reach in the turbulent heart of Eurasia in the 2000s. Established in 2008 at the Gissar Military Aerodrome, near the Tajik-Afghan border, the base provided India with a rare vantage point to monitor developments in Afghanistan, particularly during the post-9/11 realignment and the subsequent political transformation in 2001.

The clarification from the Indian Ministry of Foreign Affairs about the lease ending in 2022 came at a moment of renewed instability in the subcontinent. The Pahalgam attack, followed by Operation Sindoor, reignited old insecurities regarding cross-border terrorism. Against this backdrop, India’s exit from its only strategic foothold in Central Asia is not just symbolic; it narrows New Delhi’s operational depth and shrinks its geopolitical visibility in a region increasingly dominated by Russia and China.

Located about 10 km west of Dushanbe, the Soviet-built Ayni Airbase served Moscow’s Afghan campaign from 1979 to 1989, before falling into neglect after the USSR’s disintegration. India revived it in 2002 during the War on Terror, investing around $70-100 million to modernise its infrastructure, extend its runway, and make it capable of hosting Su-30 MKI jets and Mi-17 helicopters.

Geographically, Ayni provided India with a strategic foothold, located around 500 km from Peshawar and within reconnaissance range of
Afghanistan’s Wakhan Corridor. This made it a crucial hub for monitoring terror networks and supporting humanitarian missions.

The airbase enabled India to coordinate efforts with the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and provide support to Afghan forces, while also closely monitoring regional developments, particularly those originating from Pakistan and China. The base was instrumental in securing India’s interests in the broader context of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and in maintaining an anti-terror stance. The subtext to the official description – “a natural conclusion of a lease agreement” – suggests external pressure and internal recalibration were at play.

First, the base was highly important when the Northern Alliance came to power in Afghanistan in 2001. India supported the government against Taliban-led terror activities back then. During this time, India was still helping Tajikistan renovate the base and came to formalise the Indian presence in 2008. However, after the de facto recognition of the Taliban, it doesn’t make sense for India to have an airbase originally intended to root out the Taliban.

Second, India’s power projection in the Central Asian region is in question, given the significant presence of China and Russia in the region. Russia, which has stationed over 7,000 troops in Tajikistan under its 201st Motor Rifle Division, long viewed the Indian-operated base outside the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) framework with quiet unease and withheld approval for India’s deployment in 2007. China, meanwhile, regarded Ayni as a potential surveillance threat near its sensitive western frontier. With Tajikistan heavily dependent on Russian military protection and over $3 billion in Chinese loans, the growing convergence of Moscow and Beijing’s interests, tightened further after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, left little room for India, making its exit from Ayni almost inevitable.

Third, the diminishing importance of Central Asia in India’s foreign policy calculus could be a reason for the loss of momentum in maintaining a military base in Tajikistan.

A new, strategic pivot

Though India’s operations from Ayni had been limited for years, the base held enduring strategic value amid a volatile neighbourhood. Its closure signals not just the end of India’s physical presence in Central Asia but a loss of symbolic power projection and surveillance capability in a region now dominated by Russia and China. The move weakens India’s security profile in Eurasia and marginally dilutes its bilateral engagement with Tajikistan. More broadly, the loss of Ayni curtails India’s ability to monitor developments in Afghanistan and Pakistan, two theatres central to its regional security calculus.

Once a symbol of ambition, Ayni had long ceased to be an active strategic asset. For Tajikistan, India’s withdrawal reinforces the primacy of CSTO-led security. For India, it highlights the limitations of its presence in a region still dominated by Russian and Chinese influence. India’s Eurasian engagement must now pivot from static security footprints to dynamic economic, technological, and people-centric partnerships. Central Asia should remain integral to India’s foreign policy vision, not as a lost frontier, but as a region where renewed engagement can still yield strategic dividends.

(The writer is a research consultant at the Chintan Research Foundation, New Delhi. She researches Central Asia)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.