<p>The United States Department of War’s ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, recently submitted to the US Congress, has drawn considerable attention as it sets the baseline for funding multiple military platforms and capability development.</p><p>Its stark warning of an accelerating Chinese military buildup, however, must be weighed against the precedent of past reports on ‘Soviet Military Power’, which repeatedly warned about immense capabilities even as the Soviet Union collapsed into history. China is rapidly expanding its arsenal, but it is crucial to distinguish between empirical assessment and strategic signalling in Washington’s portrayal of China’s military rise.</p>.Appeal against Murugha Sharana based on legal opinion: G Parameshwara.<p><strong>The numbers</strong></p><p>The Pentagon estimates China’s nuclear arsenal in the ‘low 600s’ through 2024, up from 200-250 warheads in 2020, and remains ‘on track to have over 1,000’ by 2030. The report highlights expanded delivery systems, including new ICBM silo fields and China’s first Pacific ICBM test launch in decades. It also emphasises hypersonic weapons, calling China the ‘world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal’. In all, China is deploying more road-mobile ICBMs and advanced missiles — nuclear and conventional — under a ‘strategic counterbalance’ strategy.</p><p>The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is described as ‘numerically the largest navy in the world’, in terms of hull count, with over 370 ships and submarines, including 140 major combatants. In 2024, China launched new destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and its most advanced systems. December saw the first aircraft landing on the Fujian, China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, alongside the launch of its first Type-076 amphibious assault ship. The PLAN has three carriers in service or trials, with six more planned by 2035.</p><p>China’s Air Force has expanded inventories of advanced fighters (J-10C, J-16, and J-20) and support aircraft. Exercises such as Joint Sword demonstrated the ability to surge sorties across the Taiwan Strait, though China still lacks sufficient amphibious lift for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.</p><p>Non-kinetic warfare is a major theme. The report notes cyber operations like ‘Volt Typhoon’ infiltrating US critical infrastructure and communications networks, and notes China’s growing space programme, with 359 ISR satellites and plans for a 12,000-satellite ‘G60 Starlink’ network.</p><p>China’s official defence budget was about ¥1.67 trillion (≈$231 billion), but the Pentagon estimates true spending at $231 billion.</p><p><strong>Analysis</strong></p><p>The report underscores a rapidly modernising PLA, linking each achievement to US vulnerability. Its tone is urgent, calling China’s buildup ‘historic’, and warning of direct threats to the US homeland. It signals to US policymakers that a strong response is required, repeatedly framing Chinese advances as challenges to US interests. For example, it notes that PLA exercises have ‘tested essential components’ of a Taiwan invasion, and can strike targets (including US bases) up to 1,500-2,000 nautical miles from China. It even states that China’s leaders expect to ‘fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027’.</p><p>This strategic framing is meant to emphasise urgency. The Pentagon warns that China’s rise leaves the US ‘increasingly vulnerable’, and that its arsenal expansion ‘directly threaten[s] Americans’ security’. By spotlighting near-term threats, the report makes the case for continued US military readiness and funding. Highlighting China’s naval expansion and nuclear growth helps justify the US force buildup.</p><p>Yet China’s ~600 warheads remain a fraction of the 3,700-5,000 held by the US and Russia. China is expanding, but it is not yet a ‘nuclear peer’ of the US. Calling the PLAN the ‘world’s largest navy’ reflects hull count rather than firepower or global reach. A recent Pentagon analysis found China building many ships, but the US fleets remain larger in tonnage, with greater experience and overseas bases. While the data points are serious, the report’s language tends to overstate equivalence.</p><p>For India, the Pentagon assessment highlights that the Chinese military expansion is increasingly geared towards regional coercion, with a direct impact on the Line of Actual Control and India’s neighbourhood. The buildup of Rocket Force, ISR networks, cyber capabilities, and rapid mobilisation assets has enhanced the PLA's capability to maintain pressure without resorting to war.</p><p>New Delhi should interpret the report not so much as a warning of militarily matched China and the US, but as a confirmation that China is developing the means for constant, multi-domain pressure on its neighbours. This implies that India should be more determined in deterrence, resilience, and indigenous capability than in adopting foreign threat narratives.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The analysis is aimed at US lawmakers and policymakers, not Beijing. It portrays China as a peer competitor, implying that a strong US response is warranted. References to China’s ‘largest navy’ or rapid warhead buildup are primarily intended to spotlight US modernisation (and its funding). Many underlying facts are accurate, but interpretation is another matter. Experts reject the notion that China is a nuclear ‘peer’ of the US.</p><p>The report’s pattern — warning of urgent capabilities and linking them to US strategic interests — suggests a motive to sustain US military readiness (and budgets). Beijing’s military buildup is significant, but it must be contextualised within broader power balances and Chinese strategic doctrine. The facts on PLA modernisation are credible, but the narrative aims to galvanise US policy.</p><p><em>Ashu Maan, an associate fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025.</em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</em></p>
<p>The United States Department of War’s ‘Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China’, recently submitted to the US Congress, has drawn considerable attention as it sets the baseline for funding multiple military platforms and capability development.</p><p>Its stark warning of an accelerating Chinese military buildup, however, must be weighed against the precedent of past reports on ‘Soviet Military Power’, which repeatedly warned about immense capabilities even as the Soviet Union collapsed into history. China is rapidly expanding its arsenal, but it is crucial to distinguish between empirical assessment and strategic signalling in Washington’s portrayal of China’s military rise.</p>.Appeal against Murugha Sharana based on legal opinion: G Parameshwara.<p><strong>The numbers</strong></p><p>The Pentagon estimates China’s nuclear arsenal in the ‘low 600s’ through 2024, up from 200-250 warheads in 2020, and remains ‘on track to have over 1,000’ by 2030. The report highlights expanded delivery systems, including new ICBM silo fields and China’s first Pacific ICBM test launch in decades. It also emphasises hypersonic weapons, calling China the ‘world’s leading hypersonic missile arsenal’. In all, China is deploying more road-mobile ICBMs and advanced missiles — nuclear and conventional — under a ‘strategic counterbalance’ strategy.</p><p>The People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) is described as ‘numerically the largest navy in the world’, in terms of hull count, with over 370 ships and submarines, including 140 major combatants. In 2024, China launched new destroyers, frigates, amphibious ships, and its most advanced systems. December saw the first aircraft landing on the Fujian, China’s first indigenously built aircraft carrier, alongside the launch of its first Type-076 amphibious assault ship. The PLAN has three carriers in service or trials, with six more planned by 2035.</p><p>China’s Air Force has expanded inventories of advanced fighters (J-10C, J-16, and J-20) and support aircraft. Exercises such as Joint Sword demonstrated the ability to surge sorties across the Taiwan Strait, though China still lacks sufficient amphibious lift for a full-scale invasion of Taiwan.</p><p>Non-kinetic warfare is a major theme. The report notes cyber operations like ‘Volt Typhoon’ infiltrating US critical infrastructure and communications networks, and notes China’s growing space programme, with 359 ISR satellites and plans for a 12,000-satellite ‘G60 Starlink’ network.</p><p>China’s official defence budget was about ¥1.67 trillion (≈$231 billion), but the Pentagon estimates true spending at $231 billion.</p><p><strong>Analysis</strong></p><p>The report underscores a rapidly modernising PLA, linking each achievement to US vulnerability. Its tone is urgent, calling China’s buildup ‘historic’, and warning of direct threats to the US homeland. It signals to US policymakers that a strong response is required, repeatedly framing Chinese advances as challenges to US interests. For example, it notes that PLA exercises have ‘tested essential components’ of a Taiwan invasion, and can strike targets (including US bases) up to 1,500-2,000 nautical miles from China. It even states that China’s leaders expect to ‘fight and win a war on Taiwan by the end of 2027’.</p><p>This strategic framing is meant to emphasise urgency. The Pentagon warns that China’s rise leaves the US ‘increasingly vulnerable’, and that its arsenal expansion ‘directly threaten[s] Americans’ security’. By spotlighting near-term threats, the report makes the case for continued US military readiness and funding. Highlighting China’s naval expansion and nuclear growth helps justify the US force buildup.</p><p>Yet China’s ~600 warheads remain a fraction of the 3,700-5,000 held by the US and Russia. China is expanding, but it is not yet a ‘nuclear peer’ of the US. Calling the PLAN the ‘world’s largest navy’ reflects hull count rather than firepower or global reach. A recent Pentagon analysis found China building many ships, but the US fleets remain larger in tonnage, with greater experience and overseas bases. While the data points are serious, the report’s language tends to overstate equivalence.</p><p>For India, the Pentagon assessment highlights that the Chinese military expansion is increasingly geared towards regional coercion, with a direct impact on the Line of Actual Control and India’s neighbourhood. The buildup of Rocket Force, ISR networks, cyber capabilities, and rapid mobilisation assets has enhanced the PLA's capability to maintain pressure without resorting to war.</p><p>New Delhi should interpret the report not so much as a warning of militarily matched China and the US, but as a confirmation that China is developing the means for constant, multi-domain pressure on its neighbours. This implies that India should be more determined in deterrence, resilience, and indigenous capability than in adopting foreign threat narratives.</p><p><strong>Conclusion</strong></p><p>The analysis is aimed at US lawmakers and policymakers, not Beijing. It portrays China as a peer competitor, implying that a strong US response is warranted. References to China’s ‘largest navy’ or rapid warhead buildup are primarily intended to spotlight US modernisation (and its funding). Many underlying facts are accurate, but interpretation is another matter. Experts reject the notion that China is a nuclear ‘peer’ of the US.</p><p>The report’s pattern — warning of urgent capabilities and linking them to US strategic interests — suggests a motive to sustain US military readiness (and budgets). Beijing’s military buildup is significant, but it must be contextualised within broader power balances and Chinese strategic doctrine. The facts on PLA modernisation are credible, but the narrative aims to galvanise US policy.</p><p><em>Ashu Maan, an associate fellow at the Centre for Land Warfare Studies, was awarded the Vice Chief of the Army Staff Commendation card on Army Day 2025.</em></p><p><em>(Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.)</em></p>