Caste on campus: A case for substantive equality

Viewed from the lens of substantive equality, the Supreme Court order dated January 29, 2026, staying the UGC Regulations, 2026 [commonly called UGC caste regulations] is profoundly concerning.

In equality law, there are two major schools of thought – formal and substantive equality. Those subscribing to a formal view of equality believe that everyone must be treated alike and that equality means sameness. Those subscribing to a substantive view of equality, however, contend that our society was never equal to begin with. The law, they argue, must account for the patterns of disadvantage and discrimination that certain groups, such as women, black people, the scheduled castes, and persons with disabilities, have suffered for centuries and must be designed asymmetrically to undo that discrimination.

Viewed from the lens of substantive equality, the Supreme Court order dated January 29, 2026, staying the UGC (Promotion of Equity in Higher Education Institutions) Regulations, 2026 [commonly called UGC caste regulations] is profoundly concerning. While framed as a cautious, prima facie intervention, the order reflects a troubling reversion to a formal, symmetry-based understanding of equality that risks obscuring the very structural injustices the Regulations sought to confront.

At the heart of the Court’s reasoning lies discomfort with Clause 3(c), which defines “caste-based discrimination” in a manner focused on historically marginalised caste groups. The Court appears persuaded by the argument that such a definition is “restrictive and exclusionary” because it does not extend equal remedial protection to individuals from non-reserved or general categories. This ignores that caste is not a neutral social marker operating symmetrically across society. It is a deeply entrenched system of hierarchical ordering, sustained through material deprivation, social exclusion, and institutional bias. To insist that caste-based discrimination must be conceptualised as bidirectional to satisfy equality norms is to ignore the structural reality of caste as a system of dominance. Such an approach risks converting equality law into an instrument that neutralises, rather than dismantles, entrenched disadvantage.

The Court was concerned with the possibility of misuse of this clause. A lawyer for the petitioners argued that, in case a general category candidate, who is in his or her first year, is subjected to ragging by a second-year SC student and lodges a complaint against the latter, the latter may use Clause 3(c) to file a cross-case on caste-based discrimination. The invocation of potential misuse has historically functioned as a rhetorical device to resist equality-enhancing measures, particularly those that disrupt existing hierarchies. Even assuming that there will be some cases in which the regulations are misused, the response has to be through strong mechanisms to punish those lodging baseless complaints.

The Court also seems to have, with respect, altogether misunderstood the definition of “segregation” in the Regulations. The Regulations state that Higher Education Institutions shall ensure that any selection, segregation, or allocation for hostels, classrooms, mentorship groups, or any other academic purposes is transparent, fair, and non-discriminatory. The Court interprets this to mean that the Regulations call for maintenance of separate, caste-based hostels when that is the very thing the Regulations seek to prohibit. To my mind, this clause would cover situations in which, for instance, a scheduled caste or disabled candidate is not given hostel accommodation along with her able-bodied or general category peers. The Court’s understanding of the clause, to mean that they call for separation amongst different groups, is not borne out by the text or purpose of the clause.

The Court also raises concerns about the omission of “ragging” as a specific category of discrimination in the 2026 Regulations, suggesting a regressive step vis-à-vis the 2012 framework. The definition of discrimination in Clause 3(e) of the Regulations is broad enough to cover ragging, regardless of the caste of the perpetrator or victim. Therefore, this concern is misplaced. Even if the Court felt that ragging needed to expressly be included as a form of prohibited treatment, it could have insisted that the same be added to the Regulations, rather than staying them altogether.

Perhaps the most troubling is the decision to keep the 2026 Regulations in abeyance in their entirety, while reviving the 2012 Regulations through the Court’s extraordinary powers. Interim measures are not neutral. In equality contexts, delay itself can constitute harm. By freezing a reformist regulatory framework aimed at promoting equity, the Court effectively privileges a status quo that has demonstrably failed to prevent identity-based exclusion, student suicides, and institutional indifference. Substantive equality recognises that maintaining existing arrangements in the face of proven disadvantage is not a neutral act, but consciously freezes an unjust status quo. It is hoped that the Court will course-correct in future hearings and build in safeguards and guardrails wherever required, rather than throwing the baby out with the bathwater.

(The writer is a practising lawyer with expertise in disability rights and IP law, and is co-founder of Mission Accessibility. He wears more hats than he can himself sometimes count.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.