Does statehood restoration to J&K align with BJP’s political objectives?

On October 16, 2024, Omar Abdullah was sworn in as the first chief minister of the Union Territory (UT) of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) after the National Conference (NC) emerged victorious in the assembly elections—the first since 2014.

The election came more than five years after the central government, led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi, revoked the erstwhile state’s special status under Article 370 of the Indian Constitution and bifurcated it into two Union Territories: Jammu & Kashmir and Ladakh, bordering China in the east.

In December 2023, the Supreme Court upheld the Modi government’s decision to abrogate Article 370 but directed that assembly elections be held by September 30, 2024, and that statehood be restored to J&K “at the earliest.” While the elections were conducted as per the Court’s directive, the restoration of statehood remains uncertain. Despite multiple assurances from both the Prime Minister and Union Home Minister Amit Shah, no concrete timeline for restoring statehood has been provided.

This raises a key question: does the restoration of statehood align with the Bharatiya Janata Party’s political objectives, and what role will the Omar Abdullah-led NC government play in this process? For the BJP, restoring statehood could be a strategic move to consolidate support in Jammu, a region that has largely backed the party’s stance on J&K. It could also help address the concerns of those in Jammu who feel marginalised under direct central control, offering a more inclusive political agenda.

For Omar’s government, statehood is not just a political promise but a governance challenge. J&K is still a UT, where the Lieutenant Governor wields significant power, including control over the J&K Police and authority over the posting and transfer of All India Civil Service officers. While the NC has climbed down on its demand for the restoration of Article 370, on the question of statehood, Omar is walking a fine line: how far should he push the central government, and is there room for a compromise with the BJP?

In recent times, Omar’s perceived closeness with the central government despite his party being part of the opposition I.N.D.I.A bloc has raised the possibility of a political deal over statehood between the two parties (NC and BJP). Soon after winning the election in October 2024, he said that he did not expect restoration of Article 370 from the Modi-led government, and his immediate priority was restoration of statehood.

However, striking such a deal would not be without significant political consequences for Omar and the NC. Collaborating with the BJP, even on the restoration of statehood, could alienate NC’s voter base, especially in Kashmir, where opposition to the BJP is strong. The NC’s ideological stance against the abrogation of Article 370 could also make it difficult for the party to justify any deal with the BJP that could be seen as compromising on this core issue.

A further complication could arise if the BJP demands that the NC support a resolution on the abrogation of Article 370 in the J&K Assembly as part of a statehood deal. This would be a high-risk move for the NC, as it would force the party to accept a decision that fundamentally contradicts its political position.

For the BJP, such a move would help legitimise the abrogation of Article 370 and demonstrate a willingness to engage with regional parties. However, for the NC, accepting such a proposal would likely be seen as a betrayal by many in Kashmir, potentially damaging the party’s credibility irreparably.

The geopolitics of the Kashmir conflict are complex, involving territorial disputes, religious and ideological differences, and strategic concerns. J&K is a border state sharing boundaries with two nuclear-armed neighbours, China and Pakistan, and has been a flashpoint of conflict for decades. For seventy years, the region has been plagued by internal strife, much of it fuelled by Pakistan, which has presented significant security challenges for India.

Given the continuing instability and the region’s strategic importance, New Delhi may be reluctant to restore full statehood to J&K in the near future. The central government likely wants to maintain direct control over security issues to address potential threats and preserve stability, prioritising national security over political considerations.

The restoration of statehood also involves significant legal and administrative challenges. A substantial amount of legislation needs to be reinstated to bring the region back to its previous status, requiring extensive amendments to existing laws and the drafting of new ones.

Additionally, the process involves a considerable amount of paperwork and bureaucratic procedures to ensure the smooth transfer of powers back to the state government. Given these complexities, the restoration of statehood cannot be achieved quickly and will require careful planning and execution by both the Central and UT authorities.

One of the key successes for New Delhi since the revocation of Article 370 has been the relative calm in Kashmir post-August 5, 2019. However, whether this calm is permanent and if New Delhi has finally succeeded in quashing the resistance in Kashmir remains to be seen. Only time will tell.