<p id="thickbox_headline">A major encounter between security forces and Maoists in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district has claimed the lives of at least 17 personnel of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) and the Special Task Force (STF). Fifteen others were injured, two of them critically. Details about the attacks are still sketchy. Police officials said they had received intelligence that the Maoists were planning a large meeting in the Elmagunda area. Acting on this, personnel of the DRG, STF and the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) were dispatched to launch an operation. But things didn’t go as per plan. The Maoists were lying in ambush and opened fire on the security forces. An encounter that lasted for five hours followed in which the security forces suffered heavy losses. </p>.<p>This is the biggest Maoist attack in three years; an ambush-encounter in April 2017 led to the death of 24 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. The attack is a major blow to the security forces not just in terms of lives but morale as well. It raises troubling questions. Maoists may be attacking less frequently than in the past and in a more restricted geographic area but their capacity to inflict damage has not diminished. It was not as though the security forces were outgunned; there were 600 police personnel in the area, compared to 250 Maoists. However, the Maoists scored by outmanoeuvring them. They lured the security forces into a trap and ambushed them at Minpa. This disaster was clearly an outcome of intelligence failure, of intelligence officials and decision-makers not seeing through the false input they were fed. It is evident, too, that poor communications among security personnel continue to weaken their operations. The whereabouts of the 17 personnel were unknown for several hours and it was only much later that their bodies were discovered.</p>.<p>Intelligence gathering in Maoist hotbeds in Bastar remains an area of concern. Despite the government’s development initiatives in the region, substantial local support remains with the rebels. This is partly because people are terrified of the Maoists and are reluctant to turn informers of the State. But also, security forces and local officials have not acted to endear themselves to the locals. Staged encounters and arbitrary arrests continue. Benefits of development go to outsiders – non-tribals and contractors. Consequently, locals are unwilling to share information regarding Maoist movements and plans. But importantly, police officials need to understand and interpret data intelligently. They must ensure that every patrol is preceded by a road opening party and that all personnel follow standard operating procedures. They must ensure that there are no chinks in the armour for Maoists to exploit. </p>
<p id="thickbox_headline">A major encounter between security forces and Maoists in Chhattisgarh’s Sukma district has claimed the lives of at least 17 personnel of the District Reserve Guards (DRG) and the Special Task Force (STF). Fifteen others were injured, two of them critically. Details about the attacks are still sketchy. Police officials said they had received intelligence that the Maoists were planning a large meeting in the Elmagunda area. Acting on this, personnel of the DRG, STF and the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) were dispatched to launch an operation. But things didn’t go as per plan. The Maoists were lying in ambush and opened fire on the security forces. An encounter that lasted for five hours followed in which the security forces suffered heavy losses. </p>.<p>This is the biggest Maoist attack in three years; an ambush-encounter in April 2017 led to the death of 24 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel. The attack is a major blow to the security forces not just in terms of lives but morale as well. It raises troubling questions. Maoists may be attacking less frequently than in the past and in a more restricted geographic area but their capacity to inflict damage has not diminished. It was not as though the security forces were outgunned; there were 600 police personnel in the area, compared to 250 Maoists. However, the Maoists scored by outmanoeuvring them. They lured the security forces into a trap and ambushed them at Minpa. This disaster was clearly an outcome of intelligence failure, of intelligence officials and decision-makers not seeing through the false input they were fed. It is evident, too, that poor communications among security personnel continue to weaken their operations. The whereabouts of the 17 personnel were unknown for several hours and it was only much later that their bodies were discovered.</p>.<p>Intelligence gathering in Maoist hotbeds in Bastar remains an area of concern. Despite the government’s development initiatives in the region, substantial local support remains with the rebels. This is partly because people are terrified of the Maoists and are reluctant to turn informers of the State. But also, security forces and local officials have not acted to endear themselves to the locals. Staged encounters and arbitrary arrests continue. Benefits of development go to outsiders – non-tribals and contractors. Consequently, locals are unwilling to share information regarding Maoist movements and plans. But importantly, police officials need to understand and interpret data intelligently. They must ensure that every patrol is preceded by a road opening party and that all personnel follow standard operating procedures. They must ensure that there are no chinks in the armour for Maoists to exploit. </p>
