From grievance to jihad | How Kashmir’s militancy is being recast

The Indian State faces a new challenge: decoding a militancy that hides in plain sight

The unfolding of the network behind the Red Fort terrorist attack suggests that a new demographic, new ideologies, and new strategies are reshaping the face of Kashmiri militancy; one that the Indian State is yet trying to understand.

Earlier, up to 2015 or so, the path of Kashmir militancy and terror was broadly limited to educationally and economically disadvantaged youth. That changed with Burhan Wani, Zakir Musa, Rafiq Bhat, etc. and then died down. However, the continuing attraction of militancy for doctors and tech-savvy youth suggests that a lethal mix of grievance and ideology, not just poverty and lack of economic opportunities, has once again started taking centre-stage in Kashmir militancy.

That terrorist attacks were being planned for December 6, the anniversary of the Babri masjid demolition, is an indication that, perhaps for the first time, Kashmiri militants were trying to invoke a sense of ‘shared grievances’ with Muslims in the rest of India.

Why is the professional youth of Kashmir getting radicalised? One only needs to visit Kashmir and listen to what the locals, irrespective of their age profile, feel deeply about. Their emotions are shaped by a complex mix of political alienation (despite an election which has only produced dyarchy), a deep identity crisis, and an emotional response to local developments.

These feelings are felt more sharply by the youth which sees before them a lifetime of political disenfranchisement and uncertainty. People feel that the Indian State used to go the extra mile to mitigate the alienation of the Kashmiri people, despite the gradual hollowing out of Article 370 earlier. Now, they feel they have been silenced. There is a perception that the silence of the Kashmiris, which they themselves see as a form of resistance, has been taken for consent by New Delhi.

The general feeling is that the most visible Kashmiri politicians are eminently purchasable by a State that appears to be interested only in occupying the territory of Kashmir with little concern for the people inhabiting it.

An unelected lieutenant governor appointed by New Delhi runs the government in the name of democracy. His statements provoke people, such as the claim that the history of Kashmir has been distorted and needs to be rewritten. There is a widespread perception of attempts to dilute Kashmiri identity through cultural and demographic means, particularly through land and residency laws. The visits of Hindu godmen and sadhus to State-run schools to lecture about Hinduism also make locals apprehensive. There is also resistance to Muslim school children being asked to sing ‘Raghupati Raghav Raja Ram’, which is seen as a Hindu devotional song.

The elected government is dismissed, declaring that ‘we elected Omar Abdullah, but Delhi castrated him politically.’ Sheikh Abdullah, Kashmiris point out, did not settle for ‘this India’, and recalled his apprehensions about Hindu majoritarianism.

When even an average Kashmiri accepts that the narrative of secular India has been ‘betrayed’, for some youngsters militancy becomes the means of defending Kashmiri identity. The news of encounters involving civilian deaths, impunity for human rights violations, and blatant attacks on innocent Kashmiri students across India, each time there is a terror attack in J&K, acts as emotional catalysts. These incidents reinforce the impression that democratic channels are ineffective, and that the State lacks accountability. They align with groups and cause where they think they can find dignity, purpose, and belonging. In this context, the romanticisation of militancy on social media platforms becomes a powerful influence on impressionable minds.

The alarming fusion of Islamic ideology and militancy in Kashmir among the educated youngsters has marginalised the earlier framework of nationality or autonomy that infused the earlier generation of radicals. Those demands could still be addressed through political negotiation within the flexible framework of the Indian Constitution.

Those political goals are now sought to be replaced by Islamic absolutism and the rationalisation of martyrdom narratives. Witness the video of Red Fort bomber Dr Umar Nabi, in which he describes his suicide attack as a “martyrdom operation” and justifies suicide bombing as a “misunderstood” concept in Islam — framing his terrorist act as both symbolic resistance and religious duty. The video was designed to be a manifesto, to justify suicide attacks within Islam, and to inspire others.

The fusing of Islam and Kashmiri grievances has become possible because of the rise of Wahabi and Salafi currents in Kashmir, which seek to marginalise its Sufi-inspired Islam. Radical clerics and Pakistan-based Islamic terror organisations are helping to frame Kashmir’s grievances not just as local and regional ones, but as part of a grander and larger global jihadi cause.

The targeting of educated youth by these jihadist groups gives them a twin advantage: they are more ideologically aware and digitally connected — therefore, prime targets; and because they have no previous criminal or separatist history, they can operate under the radar, blend into civilian life in hospitals, universities, and other workplaces, without leaving any intelligence footprints.

Digital recruitment of educated and tech-savvy youngsters is easier with the use of friendship circles, religious study groups, and professional interactions — all hard to infiltrate. Dr Shaheen Shahid or ‘Madam Surgeon’ of the doctors module, was initially indoctrinated by fellow doctors at her university, but later also through VOIP by a radical cleric based in Kashmir.

Does the planning of the attacks on the anniversary of the Babri masjid demolition on December 6 (dubbed ‘D-6 Mission’, according to the investigators), suggest that Kashmir militants were trying to forge a link with the Muslim grievances in the rest of India? As of now, the operational network was limited to a few radicalised individuals.

The investigations up to now have not uncovered any extensive pan-India support or co-ordination network. What their efforts do demonstrate, however, is that they tried to frame the planned December 6 attacks to be terrorism-as-communal-justice.

However, the political priorities of Indian Muslims outside of J&K, have been very different from those of the Kashmiris. Their focus is on education, civil rights, political and economic inclusion, not separatism or militancy. The Kashmir conflict is ethno-political with deep historical roots, while Muslims in the rest of India navigate a different set of challenges within the Indian political system.

While the ‘doctor module’ underlines the sophistication and reach of the emerging Kashmir militancy, it does not reflect the beginning of an ideological alliance between them and Muslims in the rest of India.

Bharat Bhushan, a senior journalist, was in Kashmir a few days before the Red Fort attack.

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.