India and China meet on the floor. The waltz can wait

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to Tianjin to attend the 25th Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) meeting had triggered widespread expectations on offsetting the damage caused by the United States’ 50% tariffs, ushering in a multipolar world, and normalising relations with China stalled since the 2020 Galwan clashes.

The possible outcomes, however, may be limited. To counter the US tariffs, India has to diversify trade (to Russia, China, and other SCO states), exchange in local currencies, sign more preferential free trade agreements, and initiate other measures. However, while Russia agreed to open its markets to Indian goods, China continues to restrict Indian exports through non-tariff barriers. China is also exerting tremendous pressure on India to further open the 400-million consumer base in response to India’s desire for stable border regions. Its suggestions on furthering trade are fraught with problems, as trade deficits have already widened to more than $1.5 trillion in favour of Beijing.

As China also faces US tariffs, its export-led economy is suffering, with growth rates plummeting from 10% a decade ago to less than 3%. It needs the Indian market, but does not initiate de-escalation on the border.

Modi did acknowledge that “peace and stability is now in place”, in his 50-minute bilateral interaction with President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the summit. However, he underlined the need for “mutual trust, mutual respect and mutual sensitivity” to normalise bilateral relations.

Though Xi stated that both countries should treat each other “as partners and not as rivals”, China’s actions do not instill confidence in India. For instance, three days after Modi left Tianjin, China and Pakistan reiterated their “all-weather friendship”.

Specifically, on September 4, the Sino-Pak action plan for 2025-29 stated that both countries will “deepen defence and strategic cooperation”, “closely coordinate in international and regional affairs”, and acknowledged “Pakistan’s calm approach during the recent conflict in the region” (Operation Sindoor).

During the May 7-10 India-Pakistan conflict, China’s weapon systems, such as J-10 and JF-17 fighter aircraft, Hongqi-9 missile systems, and Wing Loong II drones, were extensively used by Pakistan. The Chinese Communist Party-controlled media lampooned Indian weapon systems, specifically the Rafale aircraft. Furthermore, both countries reiterated the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor as the “mainstay” of bilateral relations. China is also financing the $2-billion Karakoram Highway II (Thakot-Raikot) realignment project, which passes through Pakistan-occupied Kashmir.

This China-Pakistan joint statement came after Modi’s speech at the summit that connectivity issues should not disturb the sovereignty of the SCO member-states. While the SCO summit condemned the April 22 Pahalgam terror attack, which left 26 people dead, it was watered down by including Pakistan-based incidents such as the Jaffar Express attack, implicitly condoning Pakistan’s role in the Pahalgam killings. Over 30 Chinese citizens were killed in Pakistan in recent years, and yet, China wants to deal with this issue at the bilateral or even unilateral levels.

India is also concerned about China’s balancing act, even as both sides, over the past 11 months, have seen improved relations. Late last year, China began bifurcating the disputed Aksai Chin into two counties. It announced a road connecting the border areas with India for military mobilisation. Beijing also announced a $167-billion mega dam, triggering concerns downstream in Arunachal Pradesh.

Another issue that attracted global attention to the Tianjin summit was multipolarity. Indeed, since the late 1990s, India, Russia, and China have been at the forefront, pursuing a multipolar world order. However, due to the shifting ground realities, this concept met with differential treatment by the three countries.

China, for instance, pursued close relations with the US, resulting in common postures on global and regional security, counter-terrorism, climate change, energy security, and economic cooperation. The US extending the Most Favoured Nation treatment to China and the latter’s entry into the World Trade Organisation resulted in Chinese exports of over $525 billion to the US in 2024, with a cumulative trade deficit of $1.7 trillion in the last two decades in favour of Beijing. It is after the first Trump administration, which began levying tariffs for the first time, that China renewed interest in a multipolar order.

Of course, unlike other countries facing the US tariff heat, such as India, Beijing received a reprieve of 90 days.

Eventually, the Tianjin Declaration “strongly condemned” the US (and Israel) over the attacks on Iran and mentioned ‘multipolar world’ thrice, even though it was silent on the US tariffs or sanctions. Thus, while the optics at Tianjin may have attracted global attention, it is too early to say what India received from Beijing. Surely, this is not a bilateral meeting, yet it is hard to find actual deliverables.

The writer is the JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years.