JOIN USIs Pakistan back in action?
Terrorist acts often reveal their intentions by the choice of targets. The drone attack on the IAF’s Jammu airbase on the night of June 26/27 may have more tactical and strategic strands than meets the eye. The combination of the choice of target, the method of attack, and its timing could provide clues on the purpose of the attack. The identification of purpose will indicate the perpetrators and help formulate responses.
The attack was launched from an air-based platform that caused two explosions. One of them made a hole in the roof of a building next to the Technical Area at the airbase and the other exploded harmlessly in the open. The damage can be described as minimal. The air-based platform was ab initio described as a drone and from all reports, it appears that a drone armed with explosives was the attack vector.
Technologically sophisticated armed and unarmed drones have been in use for nearly two decades, especially by the Americans. But drone attacks came to the fore in September 2019 when two key oil installations in Saudi Arabia were damaged through the innovative use of a small-sized drones in a swarm by the Houthis of Yemen. Iran had supposedly supplied the drones. The attack temporarily disrupted global oil supplies. In September 2020, the victory of Azerbaijan over Armenia was attributed to the successful use of armed drones supplied by Turkey. Reportedly, the Taliban has used low-technology armed drones against the US. Drone warfare seems to have come of age.
Surveillance drones have been in use on the Indo-Pak border for nearly a decade. In mid-May 2021, the BSF had reported that they had recovered some arms and ammunition, which was said to have been drone-dropped 250 meters inside Indian territory in the Samba Sector. It had triggered much debate in India about the use of drones by China and Pakistan.
The use of drones to deliver explosive warheads in Jammu therefore further inflames the debate and, more importantly, serves to publicise India’s vulnerabilities. Notably, the use of drones in the manner it was done provides deniability and is typical of Pakistan’s style of conducting terrorist operations. No terrorist group in J&K or Pakistan have claimed responsibility so far. The Pakistani hand in the attack is apparent. The question is, why was a military target chosen?
The target is an Indian Air Force base that is co-located with Jammu airport and is 14 km from the Line of Control. Helicopters and UAVs are based here. The choice of target creates room to suspect either Pakistan or terrorists in Jammu aided by Pakistan. It provokes the narrative that whoever is behind the attack chose a military target to trigger an Indian reaction and worsen Indo-Pak relations.
An attack on a military target ensures that the news of the attack receives national and international attention. Domestically, it dents the strongman image that the Modi government has carefully nurtured and therefore had the potential to provoke a quick reaction had it been successful. Someone wants to deepen tensions between the two countries. The question is, why at this time?
The ambience of Indo-Pak relations was apparently improving after it touched the deep end following India’s abrogation of Article 370 and the division of the erstwhile state of J&K in August 2019. The thaw was flagged in February 2021 by an understanding that both sides would respect the 2003 cease fire agreement. The Pakistan Army had supported the move. However, the US troop withdrawal from Afghanistan by September and India’s moves for reconciliation with the political leaders of J&K may have converged with the complex domestic political factors within Pakistan for the military to change its mind regarding stabilising relations with India. While the precise motivations for the military’s change of mind will remain unknown, the fact that it has apparently changed its mind is what is pertinent.
The objective of Pakistan could be two-fold. First, derail political reconciliation in J&K by inducing insecurity and prevent relaxation of restrictions imposed on civilians – a key demand of J&K political leaders. Second, utilise the continued restrictions on human rights in J&K to keep India from moving closer to the US. A lobby exists in the US that exerts pressure to link human rights with strategic partnership. It is possibly being hoped that Pakistan’s loss of leverage with the US after the Afghan withdrawal may not thus easily translate to stronger Indo-US relations.
The greatest fear of the Pakistani military is the weakening of the ‘India threat’ in Pakistan’s political discourse. It can be rekindled only if India reacts militarily. The Jammu gamble has in all probability emanated from military minds, as they must have calculated that with the Chinese already putting pressure on the northern border, India’s military reaction can be invited as it will only be a muted one that Pakistan can handle. The objective of restoring the ‘India threat’ will have been achieved. The military’s hand will thus be strengthened and terrorism in Kashmir can be ignited using the fuel of local discontentment. The plan may not have worked too well this time, but further attempts to provoke a military reaction can be expected.
Measures for defence against drones and other enhanced security measures can now be expected to remain the staple of security and media discourse. India’s political leadership must be cognisant of the Pakistani military’s gameplan, which may well be disconnected from its political leadership.
The Jammu attack may also be another round of a growing Sino-Pak nexus. It was meant to provoke but has failed due to its apparent ineffectiveness. It provides India some time to prepare to prevent future attacks as well as to formulate reactions to them. Whatever be the case, India must disabuse Pakistan of the notion that its reaction to a terrorist strike will be stymied by China posing a military threat. The ostensible failure of the Jammu attack has forewarned us. The challenge for statecraft is to fashion a response that strengthens deterrence. The time gained must not be wasted, for it is not a question of whether the next terrorist strike will happen, but when.