Myanmar’s polls spell deeper turmoil

The junta eyes an extension to the regime through a sham election. Democracy remains a casualty.

When Myanmar’s military ruler, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing, announced that multi-phase elections would begin on December 28, 2025, the declaration sounded not as hope but as betrayal.

Four years after the 2021 coup that toppled Aung San Suu Kyi’s elected government, the junta now seeks legitimacy through a ballot it has already rigged.

Opposition parties, including the National League for Democracy (NLD), have vowed to boycott the polls, calling them a façade to prolong military rule. With leaders imprisoned, civil war raging, and ethnic armies controlling swathes of territory in the country, the promise of a “return to democracy” is neither free nor fair — it is a smokescreen.

Campaigning has begun under suffocating restrictions, with propaganda films, censorship, and laws that punish dissent.Public scepticism hasdeepened as conflict-ridden regions and areas under resistance control are excluded from voting. The electoral framework has been shaped to favour the junta-backed parties, and one in seven parliamentary constituencies will not vote, mostly in war zones. Dozens of opposition parties, including the NLD, have been disbanded by the army-appointed Election Commission, leaving little doubt that the outcome of the poll is predetermined.

For India, the elections pose a complex strategic test. The junta’s weakening control has spilled across the border, pushing thousands of refugees into Mizoram while rebel groups operate freely along the frontier. Key connectivity projects — including the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transport Project and the Sittwe port — remain hostage to instability. New Delhi initially worked quietly with the junta to secure its interests and prevent China from dominating Myanmar.

But as the resistance forces advanced, India also began engaging ethnic armed organisations and the shadow National Unity Government (NUG). This balancing act reflects India’s concern about alienating democratic forces in Myanmar while avoiding a situation where the generals move fully into China’s fold.

Beijing has been the biggest geopolitical beneficiary of Myanmar’s turmoil. It backs Min Aung Hlaing while maintaining ties with the northern ethnic armies, ensuring that its influence endures regardless of who governs Naypyidaw. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor are vital to Beijing’s Belt and Road ambitions. The junta, desperate for backing, depends on China for diplomatic support and military supplies. Resistance gains — including Lashio, Ann, and Thandwe — have paradoxically strengthened Beijing, as both sides now seek its patronage. For China, Myanmar is a gateway to the Indian Ocean, not a democracy-building project. A flawed election that is condemned globally but tolerated by Beijing will only fortify its presence.

Under Donald Trump’s second term, the United States’ policy toward Myanmar will be shaped less by ideals and more by its competition with China. Biden imposed sanctions and supported the NUG, but Trump has shown limited interest in human rights-based foreign policy. The question is whether Washington uses Myanmar as a lever to obstruct Beijing. Supporting resistance forces could block China’s access to the Bay of Bengal, but risks worsening instability; ignoring Myanmar leaves China uncontested. Trump’s transactional approach suggests that the US engagement will depend on whether Myanmar contributes to the wider US-China rivalry, not democratic transition.

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has been unable to act decisively. Its ‘Five-Point Consensus’ has remained symbolic, blocked by the junta’s refusal to implement even minimal commitments. The 58th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting in July 2025 again produced rhetoric without a roadmap. By avoiding confrontation, ASEAN has emboldened the junta and isolated democratic forces.

An ethnic battlefield

Myanmar is no longer a state fully controlled by the junta. The Arakan Army, Ta’ang National Liberation Army, and Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army under the Three Brotherhood Alliance control large stretches of territory, including 40 of 70 towns in Rakhine State. Border trade posts with India and China are in rebel hands, depriving the junta of revenue and legitimacy.

As December 28 approaches, Myanmar faces a grim paradox: elections expected to mark a transition instead threaten to entrench dictatorship. The junta’s weakening control, China’s opportunism, Trump’s uncertainty, ASEAN’s paralysis, and the ethnic battlefield together form a volatile mix.

For India, the stakes are immediate; for China, turmoil is an opportunity; for the US, Myanmar is a test of whether geostrategic priorities outweigh principle; for ASEAN, it is a crisis of relevance. These elections may accelerate Myanmar’s fragmentation into a country where generals cling to shrinking territory, armed groups carve out autonomous zones, and foreign powers shape outcomes. Democracy, for now, remains imprisoned with Aung San Suu Kyi, awaiting a distant future.

(The writer is a strategic affairs columnist and senior political analyst from Shimla)