Pakistan’s new nuclear brinkmanship

In July, when India celebrated the 24th Vijay Diwas of the 1999 Kargil War, the nuclear question between the two arch-rivals got refreshed. Both sides are said to have reportedly weighed the nuclear option then. Pakistan was reported to have moved ballistic missiles toward the border. American officials and security experts had in 2000 claimed that India, too, had prepared nuclear-tipped ballistic missiles. If true, this was the closest India and Pakistan had ever come to a nuclear exchange. 

Recently, Pakistan’s strategic planners have hinted to a shift in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine, which seems to be quite radical. On the 25th anniversary of Pakistan’s nuclear tests, Lt General Khalid Kidwai (retd), adviser to Pakistan’s National Command Authority, sent ripples across the strategic and security community in Asia and the West when he revisited Pakistan’s nuclear strategy. Kidwai, who was the first and longest-serving Director-General of Pakistan’s Strategic Plans Division, touched on two important things: First, he referred to “Full Spectrum Deterrence” (FSD); second, he referred to “Zero meters to 2,750 kilometres”. Both phrases suggest a makeover of Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine. 

FSD and Zero meters

Full Spectrum Deterrence refers to expanding the nuclear delivery triad at tactical and strategic levels from land, air and sea. Pakistan intends to increase its battlefield and strategic nuclear strike capabilities. ‘Zero meters’ is suggestive of advancing the doctrine of using battlefield nuclear weapons during war as well as nuclear missiles deep into Indian territory.

The ‘zero meters’ emphasis may not be so new, but FSD could shake up South Asia’s regional security stability. China has been active in helping build up Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal since decades. An unclassified document from the US National Security Archive shows that for 15 years, Beijing rebuffed US queries on Chinese aid to Pakistan’s nuclear programme. The record further indicates that in 1983, China was assisting Pakistan with the production of fissile materials and continues to do so even now through clandestine cooperation. If Pakistan embarks on the FSD approach, it would accelerate this covert cooperation and strengthen Pakistan’s overall nuclear capabilities throughout the spectrum - land, air and sea. A few months ago, China-Pakistan maritime cooperation gained traction when China delivered modern naval frigates to Pakistan. It will not be incorrect to read that with Chinese cooperation, achieving nuclear FSD would not be impossible for Pakistan.   

New Delhi could see China’s cooperation with Pakistan on geoeconomic affairs as a strategic irritant, rather than an alarming factor in its relations with the two adversaries, but nuclear cooperation between the two is a different matter altogether. There’s a crucial difference in the two countries’ nuclear doctrines: India has a No First Use policy and relies entirely on the threat of a massive retaliation to achieve nuclear deterrence; Pakistan’s doctrine, in contrast, calls for a first strike if it feels “threatened” by India in any way -- economically, politically, or militarily. If it uses China’s help to develop advanced tactical nuclear weapons, ranging from small-yield missile warheads to atomic demolition munitions, that’s a cause for grave concern. Combining these with various verticals of Pakistani firepower, especially with Pakistan’s navy, and thus developing its ‘Zero meters’ and FSD capability would strengthen not only Pakistan’s deterrence capability, it would also tempt Pakistan to play the nuclear blackmailing game even more brazenly than it already does, thus putting the South Asian region on a tinderbox.  

What transpired during the Kargil war provides some insights into the nuclear factor. As we already know, both nations did reportedly nuclear escalation. The deterrence capability is a defining line for decision-making in such situations. As the late Gen Musharraf put it: “If we attack India with one atomic bomb, then India could finish us off by hitting back with 20 atomic bombs. Then the only solution is that we should first attack them with 50 atomic bombs so that they cannot hit back at us with 20 bombs.”

Such statements that have shaped Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine puts India in a difficult position with regard to managing the conflict escalation ladder. The shift in Pakistan’s nuclear doctrine hinted at by Kidwai, if it succeeds, would further complicate India’s options in maintaining the nuclear threshold while carrying out effective strikes or, for that matter, pre-emptive strikes. International pressure, sanctions, and India’s own growing counter-ballistic capabilities may, to some extent, help to manage the nuclear escalation ladder. But any nuclear scenario between the two nations will severely disturb the South Asian power game. Pakistan achieving Full Spectrum Deterrence will only add fuel to the nuclear fire in South Asia.

(The writer is a New Delhi- based lawyer and columnist)