JOIN USThe EU’s Covid-19 vaccine rollout: Stronger together or compromised?
That many nations in the developing world would struggle with Covid-19 vaccine procurement was expected. But amidst vaccine nationalism and a global drive to secure enough doses to vaccinate their respective populations, one leading entity was unexpectedly found scrambling -- the European Union.
Recognised as a world leader in healthcare and amongst the world’s richest markets, the EU was found trailing behind other wealthy nations such as Israel, the US and the bloc’s former member Britain despite its goal of vaccinating 70 per cent of its more than 400 million citizens by summer 2021.
The EU’s collective vaccine effort, spearheaded by the European Commission, was meant to showcase how the bloc makes its 27 member-states stronger, and boost European solidarity that had crumbled during the pandemic’s initial stages when member-states imposed national export bans on much-needed medical equipment. Memories of China swooping in to exploit the divisions within the bloc, whilst Brussels struggled for a coherent response, are still fresh. Understandably, the Commission wished to do things differently this time.
But what is good in principle may not always work in practice, and collective is not always effective.
Fast forward to the pandemic’s latter stages, and the EU’s centralised, sluggish vaccine rollout appears to be costing many member-states, alongside blame games targeting pharma companies, national governments, and everyone’s favourite punching bag -- Brussels.
So, what went wrong?
Joining the Brussels effort, while certainly benefitting lower-income European states in securing more favourable negotiating terms on behalf of the EU’s huge market power, prevented many richer nations like France and Germany from securing doses through bilateral deals with pharmaceutical companies.
Despite its immense political and financial power, the EU’s structure of consultations, coordination and consensus amongst 27 member-states was bound to slow down the effort. Add to this the bloc’s sluggish bureaucracy and lack of transparency.
Following disputes with drug-makers AstraZeneca and Pfizer over vaccine supplies, the EU resorted to protectionism in a desperate bid and imposed export controls on EU-produced vaccines. In addition, thorough yet slow approvals by the European Medicines Agency failed to inspire confidence in a highly vaccine-hesitant European populace and delayed orders.
Besides, health policy is traditionally under the purview of member-states, and the EU has no experience in vaccine procurement. Brussels tasked the low-profile DG SANTE, in contrast to the UK, which put a bioscience specialist proficient in vaccine procurement in charge of negotiations. As a result, some have critiqued how the EU handled negotiations with pharma companies like it does its laborious trade deals.
But there’s a stark difference between negotiating trade deals under regular circumstances and securing maximum vaccine doses to end a pandemic, save lives and re-start economies.
Reports say that the EU is paying below $2 per dose for an AstraZeneca shot while the US is paying $4. But many have questioned the European Commission’s prioritisation of price over speed and access, alongside the EU’s whopping 750-billion-Euro Covid recovery fund, given that the price for a dose equals that of a serving of fries in Brussels. Long-drawn negotiations mean lost time and more lockdowns, with huge social and economic costs, plus lives lost. Reports predict that the EU could face a $90 billion hit to its economy if it continues its slow pace of vaccination.
In addition, unlike Britain, which gambled better and signed deals with many drug-makers, the overcautious EU bet on only a few companies, thereby limiting its supplies. Since then, as part of its efforts to tackle criticism of its rollout, the European Commission has tripled its orders of the Moderna vaccine.
Yet, photos of empty vaccination centres in Europe, alongside headlines of Britons receiving shots, have prompted backlashes even in the most pro-EU member-states of Germany and France. By mid-February, Britain had administered at least one shot to 19 per cent of its population, compared to only 1.5 per cent in the EU.
What’s particularly hard-hitting is that many European states exhibited better leadership and a more coherent Covid response than the US and Britain. But the latter’s proactiveness in their vaccination efforts has provided a more effective raison d’etre for Brexit than even what the ‘Leave’ campaign had concocted.
Irrespective of what happens now, Brussels needs to introspect on its many avoidable mistakes and miscalculations. The road ahead is long, but public memory is short. The EU still has time to sort things out and turn the public narrative in its favour.
Remember the fable of the tortoise and the hare? Sure, the EU did not get off to a head start, but it can make up for lost time by ramping up production. Perhaps, its more thorough vaccine approvals could push more people to receive the shots. And in case of side effects, the EU’s foresight in ensuring companies retained liability would be important.
If poorer member-states struggled for doses while the richer ones gained access, a similar narrative such as the one at the beginning of the pandemic would have stuck. National approaches would also mean another dilemma for the EU to contend with -- the prevalence of the virus in some countries would warrant restricting border-free travel and impact the bloc’s founding principle of open borders and free movement.
Worse, the geopolitical consequences for the EU of potentially Russia or China coming to the rescue of lower-income European nations would effectively render European solidarity a Disneyland concept.
The EU’s joint vaccine rollout has implications beyond Europe, for a world currently teetering on the brink with chauvinistic nationalism and transactionalism. Its success could make the case for some semblance of a return to international cooperation.
For the EU, the stakes are particularly high. By coming together, setting aside power equations, and establishing a level playing field when it matters, the gains to the European project in terms of deeper solidarity and integration would be remarkable. Maybe, just maybe, idealism and solidarity could triumph over pragmatism and self-interest.
(The writer has worked with the European External Action Service -- the official foreign policy wing of the EU – and with think tanks in India and Europe)