<p>The skyline of the Indian metropolis is no longer defined just by its tech parks or traffic jams, but by a frantic, neon-vested blur. The Quick Commerce (QC) revolution has transitioned from a pandemic-era experiment into a breathless, multi-billion-dollar sprint. But as the delivery promises shrink to single-digit minutes, the economic and moral costs are expanding at an unsustainable rate. From the dizzying height of venture capital funding to the asphalt-level reality of the delivery worker, the industry is operating on a logic that feels more like a fever dream than a business model.</p>.<p>The sheer scale of capital being incinerated in the QC market today is breathtaking. We are witnessing a high-stakes poker game played by five giants – Blinkit, Swiggy Instamart, Zepto, Amazon, and Tata’s BigBasket. Each has deep pockets, collectively sitting on a war chest of nearly Rs 40,000 crore. Yet they continue to bleed cash quarter after quarter.</p>.President Donald Trump has ‘nuanced and commonsense opinion’ on H-1B visas: White House.<p>By competing on the razor-thin margins of groceries and the logistical nightmare of 10-minute delivery, quick commerce firms are essentially buying turnover. But groceries are far more essential and price-sensitive than a cab ride. While it’s okay to pay a premium for milk in a pinch, why would a rational consumer routinely pay extra for a weekly basket of staples? Today, affluent urbanites spend upwards of Rs 40,000 a month on instant deliveries and prepared food. This is “peak-cycle” behaviour. When the global economy eventually stalls – a likely scenario given the wobbling AI boom in the US – the repercussions in India will be substantial. As the funding winter turns into a permafrost, the middle class will inevitably tighten its belt. When that happens, the 10-minute convenience will be the first luxury to be pruned from the household budget.</p>.<p>The only reason quick commerce makes any operational sense is the availability of cheap, desperate labour. If you stand on a street corner in Bengaluru, Mumbai, or Delhi, you will notice a stark demographic reality: the people delivering your Rs-50 chocolate bar are almost exclusively migrants. The work is back-breaking, and the stress is dehumanising. These workers are trapped in an algorithmic vice. To earn Rs 800-1,000 a day, a delivery partner must complete 25 to 30 orders. Including dead time (waiting at dark stores) and navigating India’s chaotic traffic, this translates to 12-14-hour workdays.</p>.<p>They face stiff penalties for delays – a cruel irony given that they are risking their lives to shave seconds off a delivery for someone who likely doesn’t need that sourdough bread right now. We are seeing a surge in road rage and accidents involving delivery bikes. The industry is essentially subsidising its 10-minute promise with the safety and dignity of the most vulnerable sections of society. This reliance on a gig workforce with no social security net is a ticking social time bomb. It is a system built by the elite, for the middle class, on the backs of the poor. History tells us such structures do not have happy endings.</p>.<p>Even with an average order value (AOV) that has climbed to Rs 620 (up from Rs 450 in 2023), the math remains razor-thin. At 15% gross margin, you keep Rs 93. Deducting for delivery partner payout, dark store staffing and OpEx expense, wastage, shrinkage, and last-mile logistics expense, you get a contribution margin of -Rs 7 (yes, minus seven rupees). This is loss before corporate and marketing expenses. The money is being ‘lost’ as follows:</p>.<p>A dark store is a fixed-cost monster. You pay rent and staff 24/7, but the demand is peak-heavy (8 am-11 am and 6 pm-10 pm). During the “dead hours”, your cost per order can spike from Rs 60 to Rs 150. To keep customers coming back, stores must stock high-frequency items like milk and bread. These have the highest wastage rates (5-8%). As platforms move into electronics, they face a new demon: Returns – A Rs-100 grocery order is rarely returned. A Rs-60,000 phone has a 5-7% return/replacement risk. The cost of a delivery partner going back to pick up a high-value item often wipes out the margin of 50 grocery orders.</p>.<p>The perils of <br>unplanned purchase</p>.<p>A household that plans its weekly groceries is a household in control of its finances. Quick commerce, however, thrives on the opposite: the unplanned purchase. The industry wants to institutionalise impulse buying. While this works during a market boom when time is money, it fails the test of long-term economic logic.</p>.<p>The idea that we should never have to wait – that our every whim must be satisfied within 600 seconds – is creating a generation of impatient consumers who are decoupled from the reality of supply chains. Impulse buying is a feature of a surplus economy; planning is a feature of a stable one. When the market corrects, the thrill of the 10-minute delivery will be replaced by the cold reality of the delivery fee and platform fees.</p>.<p>The quick commerce bubble is currently inflated by a mixture of FOMO (Fear Of Missing Out) among investors and a temporary surge in urban disposable income. However, the fundamental math doesn’t hold. You cannot indefinitely deliver low-value items (like a single bunch of coriander) using high-cost logistics while paying a living wage to the worker.</p>.<p>Consolidation is inevitable – over 700 startups shut down in India in 2025. Quick commerce is essentially becoming a three-player war (Blinkit, Swiggy, Zepto). Eventually, one of two things will happen: either prices will rise to the point where only the top 1% use these services, or the companies will pivot to a more rational 1 or 2-hour or next-day delivery model to survive. The 10-minute mirage will fade, the neon vests will decrease in number, and we will likely return to a world where we plan our lives a little better.</p>.<p>(The writer is the co-founder and CEO of an on-demand driver service platform)</p>.<p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>
<p>The skyline of the Indian metropolis is no longer defined just by its tech parks or traffic jams, but by a frantic, neon-vested blur. The Quick Commerce (QC) revolution has transitioned from a pandemic-era experiment into a breathless, multi-billion-dollar sprint. But as the delivery promises shrink to single-digit minutes, the economic and moral costs are expanding at an unsustainable rate. From the dizzying height of venture capital funding to the asphalt-level reality of the delivery worker, the industry is operating on a logic that feels more like a fever dream than a business model.</p>.<p>The sheer scale of capital being incinerated in the QC market today is breathtaking. We are witnessing a high-stakes poker game played by five giants – Blinkit, Swiggy Instamart, Zepto, Amazon, and Tata’s BigBasket. Each has deep pockets, collectively sitting on a war chest of nearly Rs 40,000 crore. Yet they continue to bleed cash quarter after quarter.</p>.President Donald Trump has ‘nuanced and commonsense opinion’ on H-1B visas: White House.<p>By competing on the razor-thin margins of groceries and the logistical nightmare of 10-minute delivery, quick commerce firms are essentially buying turnover. But groceries are far more essential and price-sensitive than a cab ride. While it’s okay to pay a premium for milk in a pinch, why would a rational consumer routinely pay extra for a weekly basket of staples? Today, affluent urbanites spend upwards of Rs 40,000 a month on instant deliveries and prepared food. This is “peak-cycle” behaviour. When the global economy eventually stalls – a likely scenario given the wobbling AI boom in the US – the repercussions in India will be substantial. As the funding winter turns into a permafrost, the middle class will inevitably tighten its belt. When that happens, the 10-minute convenience will be the first luxury to be pruned from the household budget.</p>.<p>The only reason quick commerce makes any operational sense is the availability of cheap, desperate labour. If you stand on a street corner in Bengaluru, Mumbai, or Delhi, you will notice a stark demographic reality: the people delivering your Rs-50 chocolate bar are almost exclusively migrants. The work is back-breaking, and the stress is dehumanising. These workers are trapped in an algorithmic vice. To earn Rs 800-1,000 a day, a delivery partner must complete 25 to 30 orders. Including dead time (waiting at dark stores) and navigating India’s chaotic traffic, this translates to 12-14-hour workdays.</p>.<p>They face stiff penalties for delays – a cruel irony given that they are risking their lives to shave seconds off a delivery for someone who likely doesn’t need that sourdough bread right now. We are seeing a surge in road rage and accidents involving delivery bikes. The industry is essentially subsidising its 10-minute promise with the safety and dignity of the most vulnerable sections of society. This reliance on a gig workforce with no social security net is a ticking social time bomb. It is a system built by the elite, for the middle class, on the backs of the poor. History tells us such structures do not have happy endings.</p>.<p>Even with an average order value (AOV) that has climbed to Rs 620 (up from Rs 450 in 2023), the math remains razor-thin. At 15% gross margin, you keep Rs 93. Deducting for delivery partner payout, dark store staffing and OpEx expense, wastage, shrinkage, and last-mile logistics expense, you get a contribution margin of -Rs 7 (yes, minus seven rupees). This is loss before corporate and marketing expenses. The money is being ‘lost’ as follows:</p>.<p>A dark store is a fixed-cost monster. You pay rent and staff 24/7, but the demand is peak-heavy (8 am-11 am and 6 pm-10 pm). During the “dead hours”, your cost per order can spike from Rs 60 to Rs 150. To keep customers coming back, stores must stock high-frequency items like milk and bread. These have the highest wastage rates (5-8%). As platforms move into electronics, they face a new demon: Returns – A Rs-100 grocery order is rarely returned. A Rs-60,000 phone has a 5-7% return/replacement risk. The cost of a delivery partner going back to pick up a high-value item often wipes out the margin of 50 grocery orders.</p>.<p>The perils of <br>unplanned purchase</p>.<p>A household that plans its weekly groceries is a household in control of its finances. Quick commerce, however, thrives on the opposite: the unplanned purchase. The industry wants to institutionalise impulse buying. While this works during a market boom when time is money, it fails the test of long-term economic logic.</p>.<p>The idea that we should never have to wait – that our every whim must be satisfied within 600 seconds – is creating a generation of impatient consumers who are decoupled from the reality of supply chains. Impulse buying is a feature of a surplus economy; planning is a feature of a stable one. When the market corrects, the thrill of the 10-minute delivery will be replaced by the cold reality of the delivery fee and platform fees.</p>.<p>The quick commerce bubble is currently inflated by a mixture of FOMO (Fear Of Missing Out) among investors and a temporary surge in urban disposable income. However, the fundamental math doesn’t hold. You cannot indefinitely deliver low-value items (like a single bunch of coriander) using high-cost logistics while paying a living wage to the worker.</p>.<p>Consolidation is inevitable – over 700 startups shut down in India in 2025. Quick commerce is essentially becoming a three-player war (Blinkit, Swiggy, Zepto). Eventually, one of two things will happen: either prices will rise to the point where only the top 1% use these services, or the companies will pivot to a more rational 1 or 2-hour or next-day delivery model to survive. The 10-minute mirage will fade, the neon vests will decrease in number, and we will likely return to a world where we plan our lives a little better.</p>.<p>(The writer is the co-founder and CEO of an on-demand driver service platform)</p>.<p><em>Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.</em></p>