The Governor in a power standoff

Federalist ethos and neutrality of the office are in question. Reform must start with the process of appointment

Recently, the Governor and the Government of Kerala reached an understanding over the appointment of vice-chancellors to two state universities, facilitated by a committee appointed by the Supreme Court. The Court, while passing the order, formally recorded its appreciation for the manner in which the issue was resolved.

This drew a curtain to the long-standing court battle over the pendency of bills presented to the Governor. Similar cases had been filed by governments of Punjab and Tamil Nadu, and the latter resulted in a verdict by the Supreme Court fixing a deadline for assent to bills by the governor, only to be turned over in an advisory opinion on a Presidential reference.

The political subtext here is the power tussle between the Centre and the states.

The exigencies at the time of independence necessitated a federation in which there was a preponderance of power in favour of the Centre. In the resulting union, the state governments played a subordinate role, as the Centre had predominance in the legislative, executive, and financial division of powers. Their operational freedom has been further reduced by the presence of governors appointed by the Centre.

Constitutionally, the position of the Governor is analogous to that of the President – a dignified presence, who functions as a nominal executive advised by the real executive. She is an apolitical person who has to step in and exercise her discretionary power only when there is an emergent situation like a hung assembly, the breakdown of constitutional machinery, or a situation where the government has lost the confidence of the legislature.

Regrettably, the office of the Governor has turned into an instrument of control. Irrespective of the party in power at the Centre, governors are invariably political appointees.

According to the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission on Centre-state relations, a person who is to be appointed a governor should be a detached figure, not intimately connected with the politics of the state. Instances of governors failing to maintain neutrality had to be addressed by the judiciary through landmark judgments of Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India and S R Bommai v. Union of India.

Governors keeping in abeyance the bills passed by legislatures have become a prevailing trend, necessitating judicial intervention.

In an evolved democracy, not only citizens but also
the constituent units have autonomy. The governor playing the role of an agent of the Centre hinders cooperative federalism. Frequent standoffs between governors and governments hurt governance.

Push for accountability

The need for a governor as a constitutional head of the state is indisputable. But it is also imperative that the office of the governor is held to the democratic standards of transparency and accountability. The current method of appointment by the central government is a colonial-era relic, which should make way for appointment through a committee constituted for the purpose.

This committee could comprise the Prime Minister, the Home Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition, apart from the Chief Minister and the Leader of the Opposition of the relevant state. Candidates could be selected from a panel of eminent persons nominated by both the central and state governments. A say in the matter for state governments would remove a major impediment.

In the current setup, governors are removed and transferred at the whims of the central government. Instituting a method of removal, the grounds for which could be a violation of the Constitution, with the state legislatures having a vote, would result in accountability.

As far as gubernatorial assent to bills passed by the state legislature is concerned, it is important that the governor withholds the assent, returns it with or without recommendations, or refers it to the President only when the bill may not be in the public interest or is against the constitutional or federal ethos. Recommendations to this effect have been made by the Sarkaria, Punchhi, and Venkatachalaiah commissions.

Alexander Hamilton, one of the founding fathers of the United States of America, said thus about the system of checks and balances in The Federalist Papers – “Power being almost always the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these will have the same disposition towards the general government”. This highlights the fact that checks and balances need to be built not only between the three branches but also between the Central and state governments. Reforming the governor’s office would be one step in restoring the balance.

(The writer is an independent researcher)