Vishwaguru needs a new global vision

While India’s diplomatic attempts to isolate Pakistan have not been successful, the Narendra Modi government has not been able to recalibrate its geopolitical alliances after the rapid changes initiated by Donald Trump’s second presidency

For over a decade now Prime Minister Narendra Modi has pushed a narrative that positioned India as a world leader (Vishwaguru), with much to teach the global community. 

At its high tide, Modi was straddling the world stage hugging world leaders, conducting economic diplomacy, and claiming to reshape international economic policies through G20.

The most recent indication of an ebb in fortunes is India’s exclusion, for the first time in six years, from the G-7 Summit in Canada. Canada has host-privileges to invite countries that are not members of G-7 (France, United States, United Kingdom, Germany, Japan, Italy and Canada). The diplomatic rift over the assassination of a Canadian Sikh separatist leader in British Columbia province could be a reason for Mike Carney’s new government delaying a re-set of ties with India. Security concerns from separatist Sikh groups may be another reason for denying Modi a place at a much sought-after high-table.

Another diplomatic setback for India is the election of Pakistan as the vice chair of the UN Security Council’s (UNSC) Counter-Terrorism Committee and Chair of the Taliban Sanctions Committee. This seeming rebuff of India’s case that Pakistan was a sponsor of terrorism was compounded by international financial institutions. Earlier in March, the IMF had released a fresh bailout package of $1 billion and now the Asian Development Bank has approved an $800 million package. India’s concerns that economic aid could be misused for financing terror are hard to address unless India can get Pakistan back on the ‘grey list’ of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). 

While India’s diplomatic attempts to isolate Pakistan have not been successful, the Modi government has not been able to recalibrate its geopolitical alliances after the rapid changes initiated by Donald Trump’s second presidency.

The so-called chemistry between Modi and Trump is unpredictable now, and New Delhi is uncertain if unilaterally reducing tariffs will ensure an acceptable trade deal with the US. While negotiations were on, the US doubled tariffs on aluminum and steel from 25% to 50%. While the UK was given an exemption from the tariff hike because of ongoing trade negotiations, India was not extended the same privilege. India has moved the WTO against the US, which has rejected India’s notice.

Trump’s insistence that he brokered the India-Pakistan ceasefire and his offer to mediate on Kashmir, shows deep insensitivity about India’s position against any third-party role in Kashmir. On top of Trump’s erratic foreign policy pronouncements, his hyphenation of India and Pakistan makes it harder for India to predict the US stance on key geostrategic issues. The India-US partnership looks much weaker, irrespective of how it is packaged.

Trump, meanwhile, seems to see a role for Pakistan in regional security, praising it for collaboration in the arrest of an Islamic State terrorist.  The US is also engaged in forging a bilateral trade agreement to boost trade, and exploring strategic alignment on digital assets with Pakistan.

Apart from oil, gas, and real-estate, the US- and Trump-associated businesses have shown interest in Pakistan’s mineral potential, especially its rare earths, copper, lithium, and gold deposits. The possibility of a Pakistan-US strategic and economic alignment cannot be good news for India.

As for India-Russia ties, India’s defence and economic co-operation with the US has strained the partnership. India’s ambivalent stance on the Ukraine war and Russia’s growing ties with China have not helped. Neither India’s sourcing of weapon systems from Western countries and Israel, nor the likelihood of coming under pressure to reduce Russian oil imports have helped 

Russia is critical of India being ensnared in Western efforts to corner China. Russia’s foreign minister Sergey Lavrov has claimed that NATO invented the concept of “Indo-Pacific” to replace “Asia-Pacific … so as to drag India into their anti-China schemes.” Lavrov has now invited India to rejoin the Russia-China-India trilateral mechanism. But India will be hobbled by the fear of displeasing the US. 

Russia’s attempts at strengthening ties with Pakistan on energy, trade, and regional stability are also bound to make India uncomfortable. Although Russia had denied a reported $26 billion for reviving Pakistan Steel Mills in Karachi “fabricated” and aimed at “disrupting ties with India”, it is clearly attempting strategic balancing in South Asia. Indian missteps could lead to a broader Russia-Pakistan strategic engagement.

With Europe, India’s economic and trade co-operation is likely to be affected by the “green tax” or a carbon levy to be paid by Indian exporters, especially in the export of steel, aluminum, cement, fertilizers, electricity, and hydrogen.

The immediate problem is that Operation Sindoor has shown the unreliability of French company Dassault’s Rafale fighter jets, which were meant to be a game-changer for India. Doubts have arisen about their combat survivability against the Chinese supplied J-10C fighters armed with PL-15E missiles with which Pakistan apparently downed one or more Indian Rafales.  This could impact future defence contracts and force India towards strategic diversification away from Europe, and also towards self-reliance.

The divergence between Europe and Indian security perceptions was pointed out by External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar when he told a German newspaper, “When you think of conflict, you think of Ukraine. But when I think of conflict, I think Pakistan, terrorism, China and our border. That is why our views cannot be the same at all.”

In its immediate neighbourhood too, India seems to be more isolated because of China’s growing outreach in Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepa,l and the Maldives. India’s visa restrictions, trade policies, limited regional connectivity, weak energy co-operation, and focus on bilateralism have also eroded its influence.  

The Modi government’s Act East Policy also seems to be going nowhere. India's strategic competition in Southeast Asia is shaped by its efforts to counter China's growing influence, which it is unable to do effectively.

While facing these ongoing challenges, India’s foreign policy has been further hobbled after Operation Sindoor. It has not been able to successfully counter the Western narrative that linked its military operations to a potential nuclear escalation. It has neither been able to counter either Pakistan’s attempts to internationalise the Kashmir issue or the US claim of mediating a ceasefire.

Meanwhile, Modi’s focus seems to have shifted from the global to the domestic, leaving India without a cohesive vision amidst a rapidly changing geopolitical scenario.

Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist.