Weaponising Indus Waters Treaty is a strategic mistake

Despite public enthusiasm in India about the Indus Waters Treaty being held in abeyance, the move is strategically flawed, and will have adverse consequences for India in the region.

Its impact on Pakistan’s citizens is an important issue, but not the only one. At stake are India’s water sharing agreements with Nepal and Bangladesh. China could now gain strategic space by expanding hydrological co-operation with them.

Disputes over the allocation of water and its usage are normal for countries sharing transboundary rivers. Agriculture, energy production, and industry and domestic consumption needs underline the securitisation of water by both upper and lower riparian states. Any disruption in flows will have economic consequences and can trigger migration, political instability, and both internal and external conflict.

This is as true not only of the six rivers of the Indus system as for the transboundary rivers shared by India with Bangladesh, Nepal and China.

Ganga Water Treaty with Bangladesh

With Bangladesh, India is in the process of renegotiating the only existing river water sharing arrangement, the Ganga Water Treaty. Signed in 1996, it runs out in 2026. The Indian action on Indus waters will undoubtedly cast a shadow over the Ganga Water Treaty renegotiation.

There is already a perception in Bangladesh that India has not been releasing ‘its fair share’ of water from the Farakka Barrage, the point where water flows into the river is calculated for sharing. It is felt that this adversely impacts fisheries, agriculture, and the domestic water supply downstream in the dry season.

Now Bangladesh’s faith in India's water-sharing commitments on the Ganga waters is bound to get further eroded. If the Ganga Water Treaty is not negotiated to the satisfaction of both countries, it will have a knock-on effect on finalising the Teesta Water Sharing Agreement. This was an interim arrangement proposed by the Manmohan Singh government in September 2011, where the major hurdle was posed by the West Bengal government. India and Bangladesh share 54 major transboundary rivers, and one can well imagine what lessons the ordinary Bangladeshi will learn from India using water as a strategic tool against Pakistan.

India could end up pushing Bangladesh further towards its strategic adversary, China. India has been trying to reduce Chinese engagement in the proposed Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project downstream in Bangladesh. The project itself was the result of the failure of India to sign the Teesta Water Sharing Agreement with Bangladesh, proposing a $1 billion engineering scheme to address water shortage and flooding in the region.

Now China has promised $ 2.1 billion in loans, investment and grants during the interim government’s chief adviser Muhammad Yunus’s visit to Beijing at the end of March. The Teesta management and restoration were the focal point of the bilateral relationship.

The Teesta redevelopment project entails deepening the riverbed, building a reservoir, embankment roads and satellite cities on the banks of the Teesta. China’s role in regional water management will also be strengthened with Bangladesh signing an agreement with it for exchanging hydrological data on the Brahmaputra (called Yarlung Tsangpo in China, and Jamuna in Bangladesh).

Media reports suggest that China is also planning to construct a hospital on the banks of the Teesta. A Chinese team reportedly inspected a 20-acre plot within a total of 100 acres of land in Char Kalgachi in northern Bangladesh for the hospital site. As it is, Bangladesh under Yunus and Islamist-inclined student leadership is not India-friendly, the uncertainty caused by the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty will alienate them further.

Negotiations with Nepal

Nepal, as an upper riparian state, will not be threatened by India’s actions on the Indus, in the same way as Pakistan and Bangladesh. However, the securitisation of transboundary water is likely to be seen by Nepal as India’s penchant for the suspension of protocols and procedures, and adopting extraordinary measures to suit its interests. As a precedent, India’s unilateral action on the Indus could impact future negotiations with Nepal.

India is involved in several hydroelectric projects in Nepal. Notable among them are Upper Karnali, Phukot Karnali, West Seti, and Arum III. These projects are designed and executed by Indian companies, and India purchases electricity from these projects. There are also agreements for the construction of the Sapta Kosi High Dam on the Kosi, and projects under the Mahakali Treaty, including the Pancheshwar Dam. Any perceived uncertainty in any of these agreements could impact hydrological co-operation, impacting investment, and development in this sector.

It might lead to demands for scrutinising and renegotiating existing river water and hydrological treaties — the Mahakali, Kosi Gandak, and Sarada treaties, and the Tanakpur Agreement related to the Mahakali Treaty.

If India loses its position as a preferred partner in the Nepalese hydropower sector, China will be only too eager to fill the gap. China is already involved in several hydroelectric projects in Nepal despite India’s opposition.

India and China have been jostling for influence in Nepal, and this has been evident in the hydropower sector as well. India refuses to buy any electricity from Nepal that is generated using Chinese-funded or Chinese-built plants.

Chinese woes

India and China also share several transboundary rivers, the biggest ones being the Indus, Sutlej, and the Brahmaputra. On the Brahmaputra, China plans to build a series of dams upstream; including what is being described as the world’s largest dam (60,000 MW) on the lower reaches of the Brahmaputra before it enters India.

There is no scientific way of addressing these concerns or verifying the Chinese hydroelectric plans because of piecemeal co-operation between India and China on transboundary rivers. There is only an agreement to share hydrological data as of now.

There have also been reports of Chinese plans for diverting water from the rivers flowing through the Tibetan plateau. This has raised concerns in India not only about water scarcity and disturbance to the river ecosystems, but also about China’s ability to use the ‘water bomb’ against India. Experts fear that the sudden release of water from Chinese dams upstream during hostilities may cause floods downstream in India — especially in Arunachal Pradesh, Assam, and potentially even impacting Bangladesh.

Using water as a strategic weapon is a game that more than one country can play. India has made a mistake by invoking the Indus Waters Treaty as a strategic weapon. It may boomerang on India vis-a-vis its other neighbours.

Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist.