What it takes to beat BJP

The Bharatiya Janata Party’s (BJP) often-stated claim that it has shed its stereotypical “Brahmin-Bania” attire and has become an all-inclusive party (except for Muslims) appears to have impressed the socially backward communities.

The claim that the right-wing party has increased its support among the Dalit and Adivasi communities, in particular, has surprised political pundits, as these communities are frequently regarded as the bearers of radical ideological viewpoints. Though a vast majority of the Dalit and Adivasi populace suffers under precarious socio-economic conditions, sections among them do not hesitate to look upon right-wing ideology as its prime saviour.

The BJP has managed to attract sizeable Dalit and Adivasi sections without promising that it will resolve their perpetual problems of social injustice, economic backwardness, and political marginalisation and will elevate them from their undignified social locations.

Instead, the BJP has adopted smart and effective cultural strategies to invite the Dalit-Adivasi groups into the right-wing agenda. In contrast, the Opposition (including the Dalit movement) has adopted passive political strategies and failed to build movements by heralding the historic cultural legacies that have challenged the Brahmanical hegemony in the past.

It is well known that the majority of Dalit-Adivasis adopt and profess the religious and cultural traditions that are frequently grouped under the Hindu civilisational ethos. Various local rituals, folklore, and cultural symbols correspond with the Hindu pantheon, crafting an idea of cultural similarities. The Hindutva brigade has systematically intervened in the Dalit-Adivasi cultural spheres and often manipulated the local traditions and cultural symbols to build a nationalist imagination of Hindu identity. The right-wing even claims that distinct religious and cultural traditions (such as Sarna religion, Buddhism, and Sikhism) are integral to Hindu traditions.

On the ground, the right-wing has reinvented local deities associated with Dalit-Adivasi groups (such as Savari and Eklavya), folk heroes (such as Suheldev and Nishadraj), village traditions, and other cultural artefacts in order to establish the primacy of cultural symbols in social and political discourse. Such cultural- and tradition-specific deliberations assist the BJP in navigating the political debate and avoiding their substantive claims for social justice and economic empowerment. Such cultural bonding relegates the issues of class and caste inequalities and inspires the Dalit-Adivasi groups to build an emotional connection with Hindutva’s politics. The opposition to the BJP appears clueless about these strategies.

Passive Resistance

In the past, Congress and the Communist parties were hesitant to deliberate on cultural issues, especially the socio-religious claims of the Dalit-Adivasi communities. It has provided an inclusive and hegemonic setup led by “secular” social elites who have frequently undermined and belittled subaltern socio-cultural demands, branding them as symbols of petty-bourgeois sensationalism that disrupt secular unity. Even the Dalit Ambedkarite movement was targeted and relegated on similar lines.

The contemporary Left overtly believed that class inequalities were growing under neo-liberal economic reforms, and with the rise of militant Hindutva, constitutional values like secularism and social justice had receded further.

They believed that the growing crisis would inspire the poor to vote against right-wing politics. The secular outfits aspired to mobilise the working-class population on the substantive issues of economic justice and secularism; however, since 2014, they have failed miserably in the electoral battles.

The BJP, on the other hand, implements cultural strategies that engage the Hindu majority in emotional socio-cultural programmes while carving out a militant communal majority. Here, the rhetoric of religiosity, caste rituals, and even patriarchal traditions is valued more than the crucial issues of class exploitation and caste discrimination.

The cultural programmes and strategies of Hindutva have successfully enchanted the vast majority of socially marginalised groups, including Dalits and Adivasis. In such a hegemonic construction, it appears that the Dalit-Bahujan-Adivasi groups have also forgotten that they inherit an independent cultural universe and a robust ethical vision. Their revolutionary legacies are distinct from the communal and violent political agenda that the right-wing often proposes. Unfortunately, even political parties and intellectuals who claim to represent the concerns and interests of the oppressed (including the BSP) have been unable to articulate a comprehensive cultural alternative to Brahmanical Hindutva.

For example, Ambedkar proposed religious conversion to Buddhism as a dynamic strategy that would help the worst-off Hindu social groups escape the brutal caste order. Embracing Buddhism was poised to provide the untouchable not only with a dynamic religious identity but also with principles that endorsed modern constitutional ethics. Further, conversion makes them proud beholders of a dignified historic location, marked as an intellectual community that has challenged the Brahmanical order. However, the social justice movement remained distant from such radical possibilities and never appreciated its potential for challenging right-wing politics.

Similarly, the idea that the Adivasis’ religious identity belongs to a distinct civilisational model and shall be called “Sarna Dharma” surely disturbs the hegemonic construction of Hindu nationalism. However, the opposition often neglects such a powerful indigenous movement.

The alternative religious and cultural movements by the Dalit-Adivasi groups aspire to cultivate a society based on the ethical principles of peace, fraternity, and justice. However, it has not been valued much by “secular” political leadership until the recent past.

While it is imperative for the opposition to build impressive movements of the marginalised groups, highlighting their depleting social and economic conditions (like the recent farmers’ movement), it is equally required that the political engagements also highlight the revolutionary Dalit-Bahujan Adivasis’ cultural and religious traditions. It inspires them to escape the hegemonic Brahmanical political ideology and challenges the domination of the social elites. Alongside the claims for socialistic redistribution of economic assets, it is required that the opposition also build a powerful opposition on the Dalit-Adivasi religious and cultural fronts.

(The writer teaches at the Centre for Political Studies, JNU.)