When purges create a power vacuum

Last week, China’s most powerful military leader, Gen Zhang Youxia, was purged, along with the Joint Chief of Staff, Gen Liu Zhenli, on charges of “serious violations of party discipline and law”. Sacking of top military officers in China is not new. However, the latest round leaves all military members out of the nodal Central Military Commission (CMC), barring Gen Zhang Shengmin, who is known for his political rather than combat work. Today, China has no full-fledged higher military command.

At the fourth plenum of the 20th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), held last year, 12 high-ranking officers were confirmed as expelled. Since the ascendancy of President Xi Jinping in 2012, over 160 General-level senior officers of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) have been investigated. In all, ten CMC members, including four vice chairmen, were sacked.

The scale of purges in the PLA indicates that corruption – paying superior officers bribes to secure higher ranks, diverting budgetary allocations, procuring weapon systems, misusing funds, smuggling goods in military vehicles, and the like – has become rampant. This may have impacted military outcomes: the PLA has been unable to fight wars since the drubbing it took in the Vietnam War in 1979. Post-Galwan border skirmishes with India have proved to be costly, with estimated losses of around $150 billion.

Zhang Youxia, reportedly, had many differences with Xi, despite their “princeling” affinity since the 1960s. Reports said Zhang confronted Xi on the latter’s plans for a 4th term as General Secretary of the CCP. The next party congress is due in October 2027; the 5th plenary session scheduled this year will see moves to designate the upcoming members. Xi has not announced a successor, thus increasing uncertainty in the CCP, which now has a depleting lineup of senior leaders – Li Keqiang, once seen as the most influential leader in the party after Xi, died in 2023.

Xi and Zhang are also reported to have differed on Taiwan, the standoff with Japan over the Senkaku Islands, and the territorial dispute with India. The PLA’s combat limitations were exposed in its inability to contain the Philippines at Scarborough Shoal and India at Galwan. While Xi has made the incorporation of Taiwan a part of the vision for a larger China, Taiwan’s military is formidable, and any invasion by the PLA is estimated to cause heavy casualties, besides impacting the CCP and China at a time when the country is on the rise as a global force. It has been reported that Zhang tried to dissuade Xi from initiating military action.

The General is said to have had issues with Xi over undue favours extended to military officials such as He Weidong, Miao Hua, and Wei Fenghe (all have been purged). This has disrupted the military ranks, leading to a weakening of the higher command.

Xi’s supporters have accused Zhang of not following an established convention in the CMC – that the rank and file have to be “absolutely loyal, absolutely pure, and absolutely reliable” to the Chairman and the CCP. Since 1982, this line has been institutionalised; it was amended recently to remove any leverage for the vice chairmen, thus consolidating Xi’s authority. This opens up a charge of “insubordination” against Zhang.

This internal rift in China comes in the wake of the Donald Trump administration’s deal with Xi at Busan last October on trade, tariffs, and rare earth metals. More significantly, the US National Security Strategy has toned down postures of “strategic competition”, with President Trump going to the extent of referencing the ‘G-2’ with China, strengthening Xi’s position.

The US’s new focus on consolidating influence in the Western Hemisphere leaves China a free hand in the Taiwan Straits and the South and East China Seas. But the CMC has no combat-experienced member, and the PLA is in churn and precariously placed. The Taiwan situation can lead to two possible scenarios: an invasion may be ruled out, given the potential resistance and perceived losses, or a high-risk mission may be initiated, with local commanders complying with no questions asked. The purge of Zhang and the other PLA officers points to severe political and military rifts and a climate of mistrust. For India, a fragile peace prevails on its border with China after disengagement and patrolling agreements were reached in October 2024. Nevertheless, since no forward movement has been made on the de-induction of troops, India needs to watch the evolving China situation closely.

(The writer is the JNU Prof has been Peking behind the Bamboo Curtain for 30 years)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.