Why Ukraine diplomacy is converging in New Delhi

India must carve its independent path, but Modi govt must remember its choices will have costs, and it must prepare India for those

The VIP lounge at New Delhi's Indira Gandhi International Airport is unusually busy these days. The war in Ukraine is 4,500 km away, but many of the world's top diplomats and leaders are rushing to India to discuss the conflict with the Narendra Modi government.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and British Foreign Secretary Liz Truss arrived on Thursday, a day after German National Security Adviser Jens Plotner and US Deputy National Security Adviser Daleep Singh landed. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi visited last week on an unannounced trip, and Japan's Prime Minister Fumio Kishida was in the Indian capital the week before. Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison has also held a virtual summit with Modi in this period, while British Prime Minister Boris Johnson has spoken with the Indian leader on the phone.

On the face of it, this might suggest a coming-of-age moment for India's aspirations as a leading power player in geopolitics. In reality, the crush of visits is a reflection of New Delhi's precarious tightrope walk over the war and how that's testing its friendships on all sides.

India has repeatedly abstained at United Nations votes condemning Russia for its aggression against Ukraine. It has so far refused to directly blame Moscow for the crisis. But it has, at the same time, distanced itself from the Kremlin's position. It has sought respect for Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty, asking for an end to violence and calling for diplomacy. In effect, that stance translates into India's disapproval of Russia's actions but its unwillingness to join Western efforts to embarrass or punish Moscow.

That's not an ideal scenario for India's friends in the West. But it is one that the United States has seen before when it has imposed sanctions on Iran, North Korea and Venezuela. New Delhi's policy of opposition to sanctions other than those imposed by the UN means it could not publicly support the economic penalties in any of those cases. Yet under the threat of secondary sanctions from the US, New Delhi quietly complied, for the most part, turning the tap of oil it used to get from Iran and Venezuela down to a trickle.

So far, Washington has steered clear of secondary sanctions against organisations, individuals and countries that continue to trade with Russia. But they could very well come into play if the war continues and US President Joe Biden feels the need to further hit Russia's already beleaguered economy.

In recent days, India has increased its import of Russian oil after Moscow offered crude at subsidised rates to New Delhi. Russia is the world's largest producer of rough diamonds, and most of its precious stones pass through India, where they are cut and polished for the international market. The US has banned imports of Russian oil and diamonds, hoping to deal a major blow to Russian revenues. But if India significantly increases its purchase of Russian oil and helps mask the origin of Russian diamonds for global consumers, it could fundamentally undermine some of the sanctions against Moscow.

That scenario might make fiscal sense for India at the moment — the country's citizens can certainly do with cheaper petrol and diesel. But the tense equilibrium that India has so far maintained with its Western friends might collapse if New Delhi is seen as actively helping Moscow reduce the impact of sanctions.

That's the message Britain's Truss, America's Singh, and Germany's Plotner were likely carrying with them as they met top Indian officials, including external affairs minister S Jaishankar and National Security Adviser Ajit Doval.

In theory, India doesn't need to accept any red lines. After all, maintaining strong ties with India — a giant market and an Indo-Pacific bulwark against China — is in the West's interests. It might be tempting for New Delhi to push the US and Europe to see how much leeway it can get in trade and strategic ties with Moscow without inviting a backlash.

Lavrov, on his part, will likely urge India to maintain its emphasis on strategic autonomy — effectively a 21st-century code for what used to be known as non-alignment — during his meetings in New Delhi.

But India's balancing act runs the real risk of weakening ties with all of its friends. New Delhi cannot match Beijing in the support and relief it can give to Moscow. Behind closed doors, Indian officials have, in fact, been at pains to emphasise to Western interlocutors that they aren't backing Russia — and blaming the US and NATO for the war — the way China is. For Russia, all of this only increases the salience of China over India.

Meanwhile, India's refusal to publicly join other major democracies in condemning Russia is bound to increase scepticism in Western capitals over how much they can count on their friendship with New Delhi on matters of global concern.

To be sure, India must carve out its own independent path and must not buckle under pressure that will only mount in the coming weeks — from all sides. But the Modi government must remember that its choices will have costs. And it must prepare India for those.

(Charu Sudan Kasturi is a journalist)

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