To war with wisdom, not blustering into it

The doyen among military institutions in India is the Defence Services Staff College (DSSC)-Wellington. The institution teaches war and staff duties to all three Services. As recognition of the wisdom it imparts, it has, like many of its counterparts worldwide, adopted the owl as its symbol, which sits atop a scroll with the words ‘Tam Marte Quam Minerva’. Translated from Latin, it means, ‘To War with Wisdom’. It has been Sanskritized now for some years to ‘Yudham Pragya’, with the same meaning. The Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehradun, which imparts training for permanent commission to officers, has ‘Veerta aur Vivek’ emblazoned across the scroll below the swords and the torch; translated, this too means ‘Valour and Wisdom’.

Why the emphasis on logos and credos? Simply because around the world and sufficiently in India, too, military institutions teach officers that to go blustering into war is a recipe for failure. It is only wisdom that ensures the correct usage of weapons and ammunition in the hands of soldiers and the application of their collective might and will against the adversary that brings victory. Apply that understanding to our security scenario in India and you discover that less the military, everyone else wishes to go to war not out of wisdom but out of anger.

The context here obviously is the situation following the Pulwama car-bomb attack on the CRPF convoy which led to the horrific carnage on the National Highway to Jammu, not far from Srinagar. The nation is rightfully angry that Pakistan chose to sponsor and execute the event, which has drawn worldwide condemnation. The anger is a cumulative one, built up over a long time but triggered mostly by recent acts of sponsored terror in the last three years. Being a man who wore the Indian Army uniform for 40 years and lived in the same environment for 20 years prior to that, imbibing every teaching of war, it does frustrate me.

Yet, that very teaching tells me that war is not one-dimensional; rather, it’s a spectrum that allows those smart and well educated in its ways to choose their wares with care and apply a choice as per need from that spectrum in which everything is not just military.

Little do people realize the existence of the non-military options within the scope of the war spectrum. The Chinese, for example, believe in the teaching of Sun Tzu, their own military philosopher with a universal following, who expounded – “win a war without fighting one.”

Post-Gulf War I in 1990, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was the first to adopt a major lesson while introducing the doctrine of ‘War under Informationized Conditions’. Progressively, with new technology, it led to the adoption in 2003 of what is now described as ‘Three Strategies’ -- cyber war, media war and legal war. The PLA’s entire philosophy now runs on the necessity of being eternally strong for deterrence but fighting through the ‘Three Strategies’ when forced.

Closer in the neighbourhood, in 1977 Pakistan’s General Zia ul Haq, seething under the devastating defeat of 1971 which halved his nation and left 93,000 prisoners of war in Indian hands, evolved his plan for retribution. There was no immediacy about it; it was a plan to wait and involved ways of overcoming asymmetry with India, including going nuclear. The essence of the plan selected from the war spectrum was the employment of ‘hybrid war’ against India, targeting Jammu & Kashmir as the core, and disruption of social cohesion across India’s vast diversity. The latter was, in Zia ul Haq’s opinion, the real weakness of India, the fault lines being many.

War under public pressure is becoming an increasing phenomenon. The power of social media, which allows every citizen to express opinions on things he knows very little about, has become a millstone around the neck of even popular leaders. What is surprising is that television news channels conduct surveys and pose questions about the viability of war as a response to the Pulwama incident -- to people who have no idea of war as a means of settling disputes.

India’s weak strategic culture throws up questions as inane as “what’s the use of a 1.3 million-strong army if it is not immediately launched into war on a trigger provided by the adversary?” Undoubtedly, large conventional armies are maintained for deterrence and when that deterrence fails, the public is justified in questioning their worth to the nation. But there is one fundamental thing that no one ever explains to the public in the context of India-Pakistan relations. This is that Pakistan has been smart by directing against us fourth generation warriors (4GWs), the state-sponsored but so-called non-state actors; responding against them in the conventional domain is hardly an option.

This is exactly what Russia has done in Ukraine. Small teams of Russian-sponsored actors, along with massive doses of cyber, psychological and influence warfare, helped swing the situation in its favour. The US and the rest of NATO are left with very few options for response and they, too, realize that the conventional domain is not an option.

In 2001 and 2003, the US responded to perceived asymmetric threats emanating from Afghanistan and Iraq. This response was in the conventional domain. It was the wisdom of General David Petraeus that led to the adoption of the COIN (Counter-Insurgency) doctrine through which the wars were subsequently fought. That decision did not lead anyone to question the viability of holding a large conventional army for multiple other purposes besides deterrence.

Where the public is entirely right is that since deterrence against acts of terror is generally absent in the India-Pakistan equation, there is a need for swift and decisive punitive action against terror groups without which India will be perceived as a soft target. The surgical strikes of September 2016 were designed exactly for this; to communicate India’s resolve and willingness to strike. However, there always remains a limitation. Unless some solid and visible terrorist facility is struck, there will always be the factor of denial. Pakistan followed denial with a degree of credibility given its very competent public relations machinery.

There are ways to calibrate the surgical strikes to a higher level. Firstly, by penetrating deeper into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) and running the risk of own casualties, too. Second, by targeting Pakistan Army infrastructure and personnel, which will prevent any form of denial; and thirdly, through one-time missile strikes, which will evoke a response from Pakistan.

It’s a difficult decision for the leadership, as all strategic decisions are, but whatever be the decision, it is the wisdom of history that must be included in the factors under consideration. Among those, the highest priority must be accorded to the fact that disunited nations seldom win military stand-offs. What’s happening with the Kashmiris all over India is deplorable and does not contribute towards the social cohesion that must exist for the leadership to select its options prudently.

The owl of DSSC, Wellington, and the torch in the IMA logo are not for nothing; they emphasize the need to go to war with wisdom.

(The writer, a former Corps Commander of the Srinagar-based 15 Corps, is currently associated with the Vivekananda International Foundation)