Instability in West Asia tests India’s strategic restraint

Evolving alliances and rivalries leave New Delhi walking a diplomatic tightrope.

As the saying goes, West Asia is not for the faint of heart. Even by its own standards, the current turmoil is unprecedented and deeply challenging. Several fronts are on the brink of instability. With the delayed yet determined retrieval of the last hostage’s remains from the October 7 attacks, Israel may finally close the hostage chapter. The fragile Gaza ceasefire that began last October can now move to the next stage, involving the disarming of Hamas, the gradual transfer of daily governance of the Gaza Strip to a technocratic administration, and an Israeli military withdrawal.

The larger question concerns the willingness and composition of an International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to replace Hamas. While several countries have offered to contribute, the force’s formation will be contentious. Israel is likely to demand normalisation as a condition for troop deployment, something countries such as Pakistan and Bangladesh may find difficult due to domestic opposition. Israel also has unresolved issues with Qatar and Türkiye over their past support for Hamas. More importantly, will the ISF have the mandate and capability to disarm Hamas if it resists, or will it be confined to peacekeeping rather than peace enforcement? There are more questions than answers.

Iran remains another major flashpoint, this time because of domestic unrest. What began as protests over economic grievances quickly escalated into anti-regime demonstrations. This is the third major protest against the clerical establishment since 1979 and the first directly driven by economic hardship. The Green Movement of 2010 followed Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s disputed election victory, while the 2022 protests erupted after the death of Jina Amini (Persianised as Mahsa) over the hijab issue. This time, economic distress is central. The regime is determined to survive, using force to stabilise the situation. According to some Iranian officials, up to 30,000 Iranians were killed during January 8–9 alone. Since both victims and perpetrators are Shias, the Global South—which was vocal during the Gaza crisis—has remained largely silent.

The Iranian crackdown prompted President Donald Trump to deploy US military assets in and around the Persian Gulf. Early in the protests, he declared, “Help is on the way.” Several Arab countries have warned against military action that could trigger wider regional consequences. Although Iran’s proxies—Hamas, Hizballah, the Houthis and the Popular Mobilisation Force—are significantly weakened, Tehran still retains offensive capabilities that could threaten US interests. Iran has also threatened to strike the “heart of Tel Aviv” in the event of a US attack.

At the same time, intra-Gulf Arab tensions have become more visible. For nearly a decade, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and Emirati leader Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) shared close personal ties and coordinated policies. Recently, however, differences over Yemen have surfaced. Saudi Arabia seeks stability along its southern border, while the UAE appears to favour a divided Yemen. Saudi military attacks in December on forces backed by the Emirates marked a turning point and led to the UAE’s withdrawal from Yemen. Many now see this as a potential rupture in the MbS–MbZ relationship, with Riyadh seeking to curb growing Emirati influence.

Pakistan has also emerged as a more assertive actor in West Asia. Since independence, it has promoted the idea of an Islamic bloc, culminating in the formation of the Organisation of Islamic Conference, later renamed the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation. Dissatisfied with limited security cooperation with Saudi Arabia and Jordan, Pakistan pushed the idea of an Islamic NATO, particularly after the 1990–91 Kuwait crisis. Tensions with Riyadh over deploying a Sunni-only force to Yemen in 2015 led to speculation that Islamabad was exploring alternative alignments with Iran, Malaysia and Türkiye. The rise of ISIS, however, allowed Pakistan to join the Saudi-backed Islamic Military Alliance, with General Raheel Shareef appointed as its commander.

Pakistan’s ties with Türkiye remain strong. During the Cold War, both aligned with Western policies, and military dominance in politics helped cement close strategic relations. A notable recent development is Saudi Arabia’s willingness to reconcile with Türkiye, indirectly advancing Pakistan’s long-standing proposal for an Islamic NATO.

Amid these uncertainties and the possibility of a US–Iran confrontation, what options does India have? Hard-nosed realism suggests several measures.

India should position the UAE as a central pillar of its West Asia strategy. On key issues, including Israel and the broader Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the two sides broadly converge. Recent Saudi-Emirati tensions may have unsettled MbZ, making Indian reassurance and diplomatic support particularly valuable.

Strategic surprises such as the Saudi-Pakistan Strategic Mutual Defence Agreement signed last September underline the need for stronger intelligence and accountability within South Block. Major diplomatic shifts do not occur overnight. If lapses have occurred, Prime Minister Narendra Modi should not hesitate to enforce bureaucratic corrections, including shortening tenures or making political appointments to sensitive posts.

India has wisely avoided active participation in President Trump’s Gaza peace initiatives. While it sent a junior minister to the Sharm el-Sheikh summit in October, it has remained silent on President Trump’s recent announcement regarding the Board of Peace. This restrained approach should continue, with India limiting public statements on West Asian issues unless absolutely necessary.

At the same time, President Trump’s Gaza plans offer Prime Minister Modi an opportunity to recalibrate India’s approach by demonstrating a tangible commitment to Gaza’s reconstruction. Making Gaza’s rebuilding a key component of India’s engagement with initiatives such as IMEEC and I2U2 would enhance India’s credibility.

India should also expand economic support for the Palestinians. This could include offering around 500 ICCR scholarships over five years, extending eligibility to Indian higher education institutions based in the UAE, and committing US$250 million to UNRWA over a decade.

Finally, India should work closely with Israel to ensure the success of economic and humanitarian projects in the Palestinian territories, especially Gaza. Given President Mahmoud Abbas’s health constraints, sustained engagement through senior Indian ministers is essential.

The tension and conflict-filled West Asia presents India with opportunities to assume greater economic responsibilities. While India may not speak loudly or forcefully on major unfolding events, it should discreetly expand its influence through small but purposeful actions. Actions should give way to rhetorical statements.

(The writer teaches contemporary Middle East at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Delhi)