Shater's role in Egypt's voting scene

To attract support, he has vowed to empo-wer Muslim clerics to vet all legislation if he is elected.

Having won a majority of seats in Egypt's upper and lower houses of parliament, the Muslim Brotherhood has shown its determination to dominate the political scene by putting forward its own candidate for president in the May 23rd-24th poll and appointing half the members of the constitutional assembly.

The Brotherhood selected its finance manager and political strategies, Khairat el-Shater as its candidate although the movement, founded in 1928, had promised more than a year ago not to field its own nominee for the top post.

Shater, a multi-millionaire businessman, is a controversial choice.  In 1992, he was arrested and accused of money laundering and funding the then banned Brotherhood. In 2006, he was jailed on the same charges and was released in March 2011 following the ouster of President Hosni Mubarak during the uprising against his rule.

Shater, a member of the conservative wing of the Brotherhood, has entered the race with the assistance of the military. Earlier this year, his assets, seized when he was jailed, were unfrozen and a military court issued a pardon for illegal Brotherhood activities during Mubarak's reign. These actions opened the way for the lifting of a ban on his candidacy, confirming suspicions of Egyptian analysts that the Brotherhood and the military intend to rule the country in partnership.

Shater's candidacy could split the fundamentalist vote three ways. He is standing against Abdel-Moneim Abul-Fatouh, a popular liberal expelled by the Brotherhood for declaring his candidacy, and Muhammad Selim el-Awa, a controversial commentator who is a strong supporter of the military junta.

At present, the three appear to be the favourites, running neck-and-neck.  

Ultra-orthodox Salafi

A fourth fundamentalist candidate, Hazem Salah Abu-Ismail, has put himself forward but his eligibility is contested.  He is an ultra-orthodox Salafi who took part in the uprising and has the backing of many Salafi youngsters.

In a bid to attract their support, Shater has vowed to call upon Muslim clerics to vet all legislation if he is elected.

When it decided to back Shater, the Brotherhood broke a promise made in February 2011 that it would not put forward its own candidate. At the same time, the movement pledged that it would not field candidates for more than one-third of the seats in parliament.

Later the Brotherhood promised that it would not seek majority representation in the commission established to write a new constitution.  The Brotherhood has reneged on all three pledges. It now holds 47 per cent of the seats in the lower house and 58 per cent of the elected seats in the upper house. Salafi ultras have 20 per cent in the and 25 per cent, respectively.

Since they have total control of both houses the fundamentalists appointed 70 of the 100 members of the constitutional commission, precipitating the resignation of 25 members from secular parties, the Coptic Christian minority (nine million out of a population of 85 million), professional associations, and al-Azhar.  Shaikh Ahmad el-Tayyeb, the rector of al-Azhar, the Sunni world's seat of learning, has insisted that the make-up of the commission should reflect the composition of Egyptian society. He also declared that the liberal basic freedoms document put forward by al-Azhar should be incorporated into the constitution.

While most of the commissioners who have resigned have called for the body to be disbanded and reformed, the Brotherhood and the Salafis have agreed only to replace some of their representatives with people on the list of substitutes.

Although the Brotherhood has repeatedly reiterated its commitment to a "civil" (secular) constitution that enshrines equal rights for all Egyptians, few secularists and Christians believe this assurance.The fielding of Shater demonstrated to many Egyptians that the Brotherhood could not be trusted.

For secularists and Christians, the composition of the constitutional commission is the key to Egypt's future because the new document will define the Egyptian state - secular or “Islamic” - and decide whether Egypt will adopt a presidential or parliamentary system.

A Shater victory in the presidential election following the movement's success in the parliamentary poll could enable the Brotherhood to ensure that the new constitution will pave the way for the transition of Egypt from a "civil" to an "Islamic state," where Muslim Sharia, religious law, is the law of the land.

The case of Pakistan, founded as a state for Muslims but gradually "Islamicised," shows that hardline fundamentalists, funded and inspired by Saudi Arabia, can dictate the agenda to more moderate fundamentalist parties once they come to power.

This is partly true also in Gaza, where Hamas, a Palestinian offshoot of the Egyptian Brotherhood, took power in 2007.  So far, Hamas, which does not face a major challenge from Salafis, has largely managed to keep to a modest, moderate agenda. But the longer the Israeli siege and blockade of Gaza continues, the more likely is the rise to power of the radical Salafis.