<p>A main concern among Gulf academics is India’s “obsession” with oil, which has discouraged “a non-oil paradigm to Gulf realities.”<br /><br /></p>.<p> A section of academics in the Gulf has been questioning the importance of the region’s ties with India. After attending a conference in Delhi recently, one of them commented: “It was disappointing to see the Gulf-India relationship reduced to mere economics...the view of the region among India’s strategic elites is a copy-paste of the Western approach.” <br /><br />The main concerns were the “ambiguity” of the “future power’s” role in Gulf security; and India’s “obsession” with oil, which has discouraged “a non-oil paradigm to Gulf realities.” The following is a counter-narrative to these and other deductions.<br /><br />India is a country of contradictions. Despite its recent economic growth, it is still a ‘super poor’ country that either aspires to or is expected to play the role of a ‘superpower’. In reality, neither the aspiration nor the expectation can be realised in a short span. The churn that India, the Gulf and the world are undergoing requires long-term planning, not quick-fix and knee-jerk action.<br /><br />Several global factors helped Asia and Gulf ‘rediscover’ their ties during the last decade, which resulted in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) adopting a ‘Look East’ policy where India is a significant partner. Similarly, India emphasised the benefits of viewing the Gulf region as part of its “natural economic hinterland.”<br /><br />The GCC countries are undoubtedly the fulcrum of India’s energy security and the bloc is among India’s top trade partners. But India is also willing to showcase its power and influence in the region. Following decades of inactivity, India is now in an advanced stage of foreign-security policy change that emphasises greater strategic realism. This is driven by necessity, ambition and opportunity, and resulted in expansion of its military power.<br /><br />A key role in this ‘power projection’ is that of the Indian Navy. A ring of national security involving the Indian Ocean littoral and the Gulf, the need to play a prominent role in the region, and a readiness to deploy resources for such tasks are a part of the Indian thinking. <br /><br />India, therefore, launched the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2007 to develop “cooperative, consultative and inclusive” mechanisms to address threats to Indian Ocean security. It signed a defence agreement with Qatar in 2008, which combines an energy-security link and a commitment to protect Qatar’s assets and interests.<br /><br />These and other specifics of the ‘non-intrusive’ deal serve as a template for future GCC-India security cooperation. Similarly, India and Saudi Arabia signed the Riyadh Declaration in 2010 which expanded bilateral cooperation to cover ‘strategic’ and security issues.<br /><br />If these fall short of expectations, the GCC countries also have not elaborated on their decade-long pronouncements about looking beyond the US-centric security scenario. This has left the contours of any alternative security architecture to the realm of speculation.<br /><br />The Gulf academic’s other criticisms about India-Iran and India-Israel ties emanate from a subjective assessment of India’s hitherto non-flamboyant foreign policy amid hyperactive, but non-constructive, diplomacy. Any objective clarification leads us to the core of India’s foreign policy – equity in the conduct of international relations and addressing its national and security interests.<br /><br />Since Pakistan denies India access to Afghanistan, Iran is the window to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further, despite reduction in oil supply owing to sanctions, Iran is still among the biggest suppliers. India’s opposition to Western sanctions has been rooted in its belief that they hurt the common people, not the government, especially since they add to UN sanctions.<br /><br /><br />But, realising that Iran’s nuclear programme could destabilise the region, the Riyadh Declaration urged Iran to “remove doubts about its nuclear weapons programme.” <br /><br />India also endorsed the Arab call for a nuclear weapons-free West Asia. It is ironic that India-Iran ties are questioned when the region’s principal security guarantor, the United States, is now at an advanced stage of negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, which risk compromising the GCC’s concerns.<br /><br />India-Israel ties<br /><br />Finally, it is equally ironic that India-Israel relations are also an issue in the context of Gulf-India ties, while the US-Israel bonhomie and its impact on the Palestinians are underplayed in the context of Gulf-US ties. If the reason for this is strategic, so is India’s position. Among other areas of cooperation, Israel is India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia.<br /><br />Yet, India has always backed the Palestinian demand for a sovereign, independent, viable and united Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, as endorsed in the Arab Peace Initiative. Further, the fact that President Mahmoud Abbas inaugurated the new embassy premises – built with Indian aid – in New Delhi in September 2012, indicates that Palestine will remain a part of India’s consciousness.<br /><br />The bottom line is that as much as Gulf-India ties have to look beyond oil, trade and expatriates – which is already a part the Track II agenda and even witnessing movement on the ground – there has been no significant ‘breakthrough’ in the security arena because both realise that the situation is yet to reach critical mass.<br /><br />The evolving security scenario in the region is bound to demand alternative arrangements during the next few decades. At that point, India will have to take a stand – at least to protect its own interests. <br /><br />Such a role is unlikely to be a solo effort; it is more likely to be part of a distinct ‘collective’ security approach. The fact that it would naturally coincide with the region’s security requirements will yield a win-win formula.<br /><br />Till then, however, the name of the game will be ‘wait and watch’ or ‘better safe than sorry’, which is not a “copy-paste of the Western approach” and which will not undermine age-old India-Gulf ties in anyway.<br /><br />(The writer is a Dubai-based political analyst and honorary fellow, University of Exeter, UK)</p>
<p>A main concern among Gulf academics is India’s “obsession” with oil, which has discouraged “a non-oil paradigm to Gulf realities.”<br /><br /></p>.<p> A section of academics in the Gulf has been questioning the importance of the region’s ties with India. After attending a conference in Delhi recently, one of them commented: “It was disappointing to see the Gulf-India relationship reduced to mere economics...the view of the region among India’s strategic elites is a copy-paste of the Western approach.” <br /><br />The main concerns were the “ambiguity” of the “future power’s” role in Gulf security; and India’s “obsession” with oil, which has discouraged “a non-oil paradigm to Gulf realities.” The following is a counter-narrative to these and other deductions.<br /><br />India is a country of contradictions. Despite its recent economic growth, it is still a ‘super poor’ country that either aspires to or is expected to play the role of a ‘superpower’. In reality, neither the aspiration nor the expectation can be realised in a short span. The churn that India, the Gulf and the world are undergoing requires long-term planning, not quick-fix and knee-jerk action.<br /><br />Several global factors helped Asia and Gulf ‘rediscover’ their ties during the last decade, which resulted in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) adopting a ‘Look East’ policy where India is a significant partner. Similarly, India emphasised the benefits of viewing the Gulf region as part of its “natural economic hinterland.”<br /><br />The GCC countries are undoubtedly the fulcrum of India’s energy security and the bloc is among India’s top trade partners. But India is also willing to showcase its power and influence in the region. Following decades of inactivity, India is now in an advanced stage of foreign-security policy change that emphasises greater strategic realism. This is driven by necessity, ambition and opportunity, and resulted in expansion of its military power.<br /><br />A key role in this ‘power projection’ is that of the Indian Navy. A ring of national security involving the Indian Ocean littoral and the Gulf, the need to play a prominent role in the region, and a readiness to deploy resources for such tasks are a part of the Indian thinking. <br /><br />India, therefore, launched the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium in 2007 to develop “cooperative, consultative and inclusive” mechanisms to address threats to Indian Ocean security. It signed a defence agreement with Qatar in 2008, which combines an energy-security link and a commitment to protect Qatar’s assets and interests.<br /><br />These and other specifics of the ‘non-intrusive’ deal serve as a template for future GCC-India security cooperation. Similarly, India and Saudi Arabia signed the Riyadh Declaration in 2010 which expanded bilateral cooperation to cover ‘strategic’ and security issues.<br /><br />If these fall short of expectations, the GCC countries also have not elaborated on their decade-long pronouncements about looking beyond the US-centric security scenario. This has left the contours of any alternative security architecture to the realm of speculation.<br /><br />The Gulf academic’s other criticisms about India-Iran and India-Israel ties emanate from a subjective assessment of India’s hitherto non-flamboyant foreign policy amid hyperactive, but non-constructive, diplomacy. Any objective clarification leads us to the core of India’s foreign policy – equity in the conduct of international relations and addressing its national and security interests.<br /><br />Since Pakistan denies India access to Afghanistan, Iran is the window to Afghanistan and Central Asia. Further, despite reduction in oil supply owing to sanctions, Iran is still among the biggest suppliers. India’s opposition to Western sanctions has been rooted in its belief that they hurt the common people, not the government, especially since they add to UN sanctions.<br /><br /><br />But, realising that Iran’s nuclear programme could destabilise the region, the Riyadh Declaration urged Iran to “remove doubts about its nuclear weapons programme.” <br /><br />India also endorsed the Arab call for a nuclear weapons-free West Asia. It is ironic that India-Iran ties are questioned when the region’s principal security guarantor, the United States, is now at an advanced stage of negotiations with Iran on the nuclear issue, which risk compromising the GCC’s concerns.<br /><br />India-Israel ties<br /><br />Finally, it is equally ironic that India-Israel relations are also an issue in the context of Gulf-India ties, while the US-Israel bonhomie and its impact on the Palestinians are underplayed in the context of Gulf-US ties. If the reason for this is strategic, so is India’s position. Among other areas of cooperation, Israel is India’s second largest arms supplier after Russia.<br /><br />Yet, India has always backed the Palestinian demand for a sovereign, independent, viable and united Palestine with East Jerusalem as its capital, as endorsed in the Arab Peace Initiative. Further, the fact that President Mahmoud Abbas inaugurated the new embassy premises – built with Indian aid – in New Delhi in September 2012, indicates that Palestine will remain a part of India’s consciousness.<br /><br />The bottom line is that as much as Gulf-India ties have to look beyond oil, trade and expatriates – which is already a part the Track II agenda and even witnessing movement on the ground – there has been no significant ‘breakthrough’ in the security arena because both realise that the situation is yet to reach critical mass.<br /><br />The evolving security scenario in the region is bound to demand alternative arrangements during the next few decades. At that point, India will have to take a stand – at least to protect its own interests. <br /><br />Such a role is unlikely to be a solo effort; it is more likely to be part of a distinct ‘collective’ security approach. The fact that it would naturally coincide with the region’s security requirements will yield a win-win formula.<br /><br />Till then, however, the name of the game will be ‘wait and watch’ or ‘better safe than sorry’, which is not a “copy-paste of the Western approach” and which will not undermine age-old India-Gulf ties in anyway.<br /><br />(The writer is a Dubai-based political analyst and honorary fellow, University of Exeter, UK)</p>
