<p>The victory in Iraq’s March 7 parliamentary election of the secular Iraqiyq bloc headed by former premier Iyad Allawi was a blow against the ethno-sectarian regime in power in Iraq since 2003. Iraqiya won 91 seats in the 325-member national assembly while Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Shia sectarian State of Law took 89 seats.<br /><br />Allawi should be given the first chance to form the next government. But Maliki is pulling out all the stops to prevent this from happening. He is charging fraud and vote rigging although the electoral commission, the UN, and US declared the vote free from major tampering. He warned that unless there was recounts, there could be violence. He convinced the supreme court to allow blocs formed after the election to compete for the top job and is seeking to recruit to his bloc other parties and winners with the aim of securing the most seats before parliament sits in June.<br /><br />Officials loyal to Maliki could disqualify 55 candidates on the ground that they are covert members of the outlawed Baath party. Since some of those banned could be on Allawi’s list, their exclusion would deprive him of his plurality.</p>.<p>Changing path<br />Ahead of provincial elections last year, Maliki took a secular line and tried to project himself as an Iraqi nationalist. However, as soon as his candidates took office, he reverted to the political Shiism of his Dawa (Enlightenment) party which ran on as a moderately sectarian Shia entity in the poll. Now is he trying to manoeuvre himself into the premiership by making alliances with the fundamentalist Shia Iraqi National Alliance (INA), which won 70 seats, and the Kurdish bloc, with 43 seats.<br /><br />Maliki is determined to thwart the will of 30 per cent of Iraqis who are secular or Sunni. While Maliki’s tactical aim is to retain the post of premier in the new government, his drive to achieve this end also promotes the strategic objective of maintaining the ascendancy of Shia fundamentalists and Kurdish secessionists given power by the Bush administration with the aim of dividing and ruling Iraq.<br /><br />Allawi is an obstacle to Shia-Kurd ascendancy and this game plan. He personifies the unified, tolerant ‘old Iraq’ destroyed by the US invasion. He was born in 1945 into a privileged Shia commercial family. His mother belonged to a leading Lebanese Shia clan, his father was an Iraqi doctor and legislator. His grandfather had taken part in negotiations for Iraq’s independence from Britain in 1932.<br /><br />Allawi studied at Baghdad College, the school of Iraq’s elite, joined the secular nationalist Baath party as a teenager, trained as a doctor in Baghdad and specialised in London. His first wife was a an Iraqi Catholic; his sister married a Sunni. People of the ‘old Iraq’ were not ruled by distinctions of sect or ethnicity. It was common for Iraqis of different communities to intermarry and intermarriage was encouraged between Shia and Sunni tribes as a means to promote good relations.<br /><br />Allawi’s background and world view contrast with those of Shias who joined clandestine religious movements. They developed a narrow, sectarian outlook and strove to overthrow the ‘old Iraq’. The objective of the tribal Kurds was secession and a Kurdish state embracing Kurds in Iran, Turkey and Syria as well as Iraq.<br />The reassertion of ethnic Kurdish and fundamentalist sectarian Shia blocs in Iraq could not only destabilise that country but also countries in strategic West Asia where Shias and Kurds are restive.<br /><br />Shias are a majority in Saudi Arabia’s oil producing Eastern Province. In recent years, the Sunni Saudi government has used both carrot and stick to maintain quiet in this region but tensions have been rising. Yemen, next door, just achieved a ceasefire with Shia rebels, located on the Saudi border, who have been fighting the secular government in Sanaa for the past six years. Shias, the largest community in Lebanon, in a state based on sectarian power sharing, could exercise their muscle, thereby undermining the country’s fragile stability. Shias are demanding political power in Bahrain, a Shia majority country ruled by a Sunni king. Kurds in Iraq’s neighbours are clamouring for their right to self-determination. Behind much of the Shia unrest is Iran, which, thanks to the US, finds its ally, Maliki, and INA surrogates in power in Iraq.<br /><br />Tehran has a major stake in keeping its Iraqi allies in power. From the day of its founding, the Iranian Islamic Republic has attempted to export its Shia revolutionary ideology. It failed until 2003 when the US overthrew Iraq’s secular Baathist regime and installed in power in Iraq Iran’s allies. Constantly challenged by the US and under threat of attack from US ally Israel, Tehran is in no mood to allow its Iraqi allies to be beseted by a secular party headed by secular nationalist Allawi, once an asset of the US CIA.</p>
<p>The victory in Iraq’s March 7 parliamentary election of the secular Iraqiyq bloc headed by former premier Iyad Allawi was a blow against the ethno-sectarian regime in power in Iraq since 2003. Iraqiya won 91 seats in the 325-member national assembly while Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki’s Shia sectarian State of Law took 89 seats.<br /><br />Allawi should be given the first chance to form the next government. But Maliki is pulling out all the stops to prevent this from happening. He is charging fraud and vote rigging although the electoral commission, the UN, and US declared the vote free from major tampering. He warned that unless there was recounts, there could be violence. He convinced the supreme court to allow blocs formed after the election to compete for the top job and is seeking to recruit to his bloc other parties and winners with the aim of securing the most seats before parliament sits in June.<br /><br />Officials loyal to Maliki could disqualify 55 candidates on the ground that they are covert members of the outlawed Baath party. Since some of those banned could be on Allawi’s list, their exclusion would deprive him of his plurality.</p>.<p>Changing path<br />Ahead of provincial elections last year, Maliki took a secular line and tried to project himself as an Iraqi nationalist. However, as soon as his candidates took office, he reverted to the political Shiism of his Dawa (Enlightenment) party which ran on as a moderately sectarian Shia entity in the poll. Now is he trying to manoeuvre himself into the premiership by making alliances with the fundamentalist Shia Iraqi National Alliance (INA), which won 70 seats, and the Kurdish bloc, with 43 seats.<br /><br />Maliki is determined to thwart the will of 30 per cent of Iraqis who are secular or Sunni. While Maliki’s tactical aim is to retain the post of premier in the new government, his drive to achieve this end also promotes the strategic objective of maintaining the ascendancy of Shia fundamentalists and Kurdish secessionists given power by the Bush administration with the aim of dividing and ruling Iraq.<br /><br />Allawi is an obstacle to Shia-Kurd ascendancy and this game plan. He personifies the unified, tolerant ‘old Iraq’ destroyed by the US invasion. He was born in 1945 into a privileged Shia commercial family. His mother belonged to a leading Lebanese Shia clan, his father was an Iraqi doctor and legislator. His grandfather had taken part in negotiations for Iraq’s independence from Britain in 1932.<br /><br />Allawi studied at Baghdad College, the school of Iraq’s elite, joined the secular nationalist Baath party as a teenager, trained as a doctor in Baghdad and specialised in London. His first wife was a an Iraqi Catholic; his sister married a Sunni. People of the ‘old Iraq’ were not ruled by distinctions of sect or ethnicity. It was common for Iraqis of different communities to intermarry and intermarriage was encouraged between Shia and Sunni tribes as a means to promote good relations.<br /><br />Allawi’s background and world view contrast with those of Shias who joined clandestine religious movements. They developed a narrow, sectarian outlook and strove to overthrow the ‘old Iraq’. The objective of the tribal Kurds was secession and a Kurdish state embracing Kurds in Iran, Turkey and Syria as well as Iraq.<br />The reassertion of ethnic Kurdish and fundamentalist sectarian Shia blocs in Iraq could not only destabilise that country but also countries in strategic West Asia where Shias and Kurds are restive.<br /><br />Shias are a majority in Saudi Arabia’s oil producing Eastern Province. In recent years, the Sunni Saudi government has used both carrot and stick to maintain quiet in this region but tensions have been rising. Yemen, next door, just achieved a ceasefire with Shia rebels, located on the Saudi border, who have been fighting the secular government in Sanaa for the past six years. Shias, the largest community in Lebanon, in a state based on sectarian power sharing, could exercise their muscle, thereby undermining the country’s fragile stability. Shias are demanding political power in Bahrain, a Shia majority country ruled by a Sunni king. Kurds in Iraq’s neighbours are clamouring for their right to self-determination. Behind much of the Shia unrest is Iran, which, thanks to the US, finds its ally, Maliki, and INA surrogates in power in Iraq.<br /><br />Tehran has a major stake in keeping its Iraqi allies in power. From the day of its founding, the Iranian Islamic Republic has attempted to export its Shia revolutionary ideology. It failed until 2003 when the US overthrew Iraq’s secular Baathist regime and installed in power in Iraq Iran’s allies. Constantly challenged by the US and under threat of attack from US ally Israel, Tehran is in no mood to allow its Iraqi allies to be beseted by a secular party headed by secular nationalist Allawi, once an asset of the US CIA.</p>