Border fix: A shaky truce short on trust

With Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri scheduled to visit Beijing soon, the full circle of high-level interactions between leaders and officials of India and China would be complete. This raises the question whether normalisation of bilateral relations has commenced after the bloody clash of troops at Galwan in June 2020. As both countries mark 75 years of establishment of diplomatic relations, the pattern indicates improvement in high-level political and official relations sans robust ties in various fields.

In October last year, Prime Minister Narendra Modi met President Xi Jinping on the sidelines of the 16th BRICS summit at Kazan in Russia. This was preceded by an announcement on disengagement of troops and resumption of patrolling in contested border areas in Depsang and Demchok in the western sector. Defence Minister Rajnath Singh met his Chinese counterpart Dong Jun at Vientiane in November. External Affairs Minister S Jaishankar met his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in July at Astana and reminded him of observing the “three mutuals” – respect, sensitivity and interest. China’s insensitivities towards India and blatant violation of written agreements have hampered bilateral relations for more than four years.

National Security Advisor and Special Representative on territorial dispute with China Ajit Doval met Wang Yi at St Petersburg in September and at Beijing in December. However, the Indian foreign ministry spokesman denied any “six-point consensus” that emerged out of this meeting as China suggested.

Apart from these strategic leadership discussions, there were as many as 22 rounds of Corps Commanders (Senior Highest Military Commanders) meetings at the tactical level to usher in the disengagement of troops. A month after the Galwan skirmish, the first disengagement of troops in all friction areas was announced. Four more rounds followed – in February 2021 in Pangong Tso lake, in August of that year in Gogra area, in September 2022 in Hot Springs, and in October last year at the Demchok and Depsang Plains.

While overall disengagement of troops took place, as trust levels are low given the Chinese volte face in 2020, the Indian Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi suggested recently that the situation is “stable but sensitive”. However, given the ground realities, the Indian Army is unwilling to de-induct troops in the border areas. That China is not fully interested in normalising ties with India is indicated by its announcements: in the midst of the troop disengagement, the construction of a mega dam on Yarlung Tsangpo at a cost of $137 billion was announced.

Attempts to normalise relations also came from external pressures. The foreign ministers’ meeting at Moscow – in September 2020, a couple of months after the Galwan incident – indicated Russian interest in bringing the two Asian parties together with the emerging Ukraine conflict in the background. Likewise, China was preparing for the American leadership transition late last year and putting in place its time-tested “united front” tactics of “not attacking in all directions” but aligning with select neighbours as a cushion. Specifically, as President Trump is toying with the idea of heavy tariffs on Chinese products, Beijing is keen to diversify exports to India and other countries.

Normalisation of bilateral relations hinges on peace and stability in the border areas. Disengagement, resumption of patrolling and traditional grazing, and the more difficult processes of de-escalation and de-induction have not been completed to the satisfaction of both parties. On the other hand, “escorted” patrolling in some areas suggest a cautious approach on the borders.

Prior to the Galwan clashes, both developed nearly 30 engagement processes such as strategic dialogues between foreign ministries, annual defence dialogues between the defence forces, macro-economic and strategic dialogue, financial dialogue, steel dialogue, youth and educational exchanges, think-tank meetings, media exchanges, and others. These have not yet resumed given the border clashes and the aftermath.

Despite these problems and the spread of the pandemic, bilateral trade has increased from $87 billion post Galwan in 2020 to $125 billion in 2021, $136 billion in 2022, $116 billion in 2023 to about $118 billion in 2024. However, more alarmingly, in the last decade, India lost over $645 billion in trade deficits to China, while cumulatively since 2008, when China became the largest trading partner for India, the trade deficit overshot more than a trillion. This has called for certain drastic economic measures from India.

Misri will also be seized with a discussion in China on resumption of the Manasarovar Yatra and visas, direct flights, and others. Yet, normalisation of bilateral relations will have to wait till trust levels are upgraded on the ground.