Democracy and the threat of violence

Leaders should address questions of social injustice, exploitation and oppression to protect hard-won Constitutional rights.

The arrest of climate activist Sonam Wangchuk, who said that frustration among Ladakh’s youth grew because the government ignored peaceful appeals for years, betrays the deep-seated fear of the central government and its awareness of the incendiary potential of mass revolts welling out of entrenched grievances.

Nearer home, mob justice and violence, evident from the expression of anger and frustration of the Nepali youth, unseated the K P Oli-led coalition government recently.

Going by the youth-led movement in Nepal, the one which overthrew the regime of Sheikh Hasina last summer, and the ouster of the Sri Lankan President Gotabaya Rajapaksa and his brother Mahinda, the prime minister, in 2022, commonalities are not far to seek: runaway corruption, stark inequalities, economic disparities and a deep resentment of the ruling elite.

The ‘Gen Z’ protests in Nepal might prompt one to ask if such violence could be avoided in a truly democratic set-up.

In the last seven decades, starting with the overthrow of the Rana autocracy in 1951, numerous strikes, demonstrations and uprisings, followed by a temporary lull, Nepal has gone through many churns.

Still, the quest for an inclusive democracy, along with peace-building and republicanism, has been an elusive goal since the people’s uprising (or jana andolan) in 1990 and 2006.

According to a recent UN report, Bangladesh’s former security and intelligence services, alongside violent elements associated with the Awami League party, systematically engaged in a range of serious human rights violations during last year’s student-led protests.

As many as 1,400 people may have been killed between July 15 and
August 5, and thousands injured, the vast majority of whom were shot by Bangladesh’s security forces, during the protests.

Of these, the report indicates that as many as 12-13% of those killed were children. The mobilisation of civil societies, driven by a distinctly anti-authoritarian mood, with a strident demand to put an end to all forms of undemocratic governments became frequent, particularly during the first two decades of the 21st century.

We might see the above instances of violence in India’s neighbourhood as the outcome of half-baked democracies and their pitfalls, taking heart in the state of Indian democracy as a shield against any revolutionary fervour and as an antidote to runaway violence. The jury is still out on how democracy affects violence.

Historians point out that the democratic revolution experienced by Western states since the 17th century was accompanied by a decline in violence. But democracy in its infancy in Britain experienced periods of violent struggle, including food riots, anti-tax rebellions, and Chartist and suffragette protests. Genocide has occurred in democratic states such as Rwanda.

India’s first universal franchise general election occurred amid the violence and displacement of Partition, the uncertain and contested integration of the princely states and the forceful quelling of internal dissent.

Sociologist Paul R Brass observes that in the last days of the British Raj, it was not only the case that violence occurred as a consequence of Partition but violence also was a “principal mechanism” for creating the conditions for Partition.

Even though the Indian Constitution supports an inclusive democracy committed to gender and caste equality, legal and constitutional provisions have not been able to fully guarantee state protections against discrimination and political exclusion.

A disproportionately large population of unemployed and under-educated youth, a hopelessly shrinking job market, strain on resources, and its distribution and allocation, are all factors that serve as triggers.

But mistaking the triggers—economic collapse and shortages in Sri Lanka; student quotas and inequality in Bangladesh; social-media ban and corruption allegations in Nepal—for long-standing discontent is a serious pitfall.

The Manipur High Court’s 2023 directive, recommending Scheduled Tribe (ST) status for Meiteis, served as a vital trigger. Tribal groups, including the Kuki-Zo groups and the Nagas, perceived it as a threat to their constitutional protections, sparking protests across all tribal districts.

According to a report, a systematic hate campaign, played out through digital media and statements made by the political leadership in prelude to the conflict, escalated the feelings of mistrust and enmity between the warring Meitei and Kuki-Zo communities. These two tribal communities were riven already by historical factors such as ethnic divisions, socio-political marginalisation and land disputes.

In Ladakh, the immediate trigger for the recent violence might seem to be the critical condition of two activists on a hunger strike, Tsering Angchuk and Tashi Dolma, who took part in a 35-day fast demanding statehood and Sixth Schedule protections, essential for preserving Ladakh’s fragile ecosystem, land rights and cultural identity.

But the issue has been hanging fire since 2019, with Ladakhi groups repeatedly demanding constitutional safeguards and pressing for statehood for Ladakh, extension of the Sixth Schedule, separate Lok Sabha seats for Leh and Kargil, alongside employment reservations.

Partition massacres, anti-Muslim violence and anti-Sikh riots in India dispel the myth that our democracy is a full-proof shield against violence.

Various forms of violence faced by women such as sex-selective abortion, trafficking, rape, domestic violence, as well as the violence faced by female sex workers and transgenders in India, must be resisted.

There is as much need to address questions of social injustice, exploitation, and oppression as to mend our imperfect democracy, in view of the threats to India’s hard-won constitutional practices of democracy, tolerance, and religious pluralism. 

(The author is a Kolkata-based commentator on geopolitics,
development and culture)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.