How China sees Trump’s Venezuela blitz, and what India can learn from it

China has deep economic interests in Venezuela, and the US cannot wish it away. The lesson New Delhi must learn is — be at the table, or be on the menu

It looked like a clean victory; a three-hour low-cost operation, one regime toppled, oilfields secured, hegemony reasserted in the United States of America’s backyard, and China apparently warned.

But behind Beijing’s great firewall, the Chinese internet saw something entirely different. What looked like a US triumph read like a strategic overreach from Zhongnanhai.

China didn’t need to fire a shot.

Two Chinese-registered oil tankers turned around and declined to take Trump’s seized oil. In doing so, did Beijing walk away? Perhaps, but Chinese netizens are still cogitating on the future course of action, reflecting semi-official views.

Hegemonic theatre meets economic reality

Beijing’s opening play was formulaic: It expressed ‘shock’ at US military strikes, talked of sovereignty, and upheld Latin America and the Caribbean as a ‘zone of peace’.

China declared that China-Venezuela co-operation remained unaffected by ‘third parties’. But the reality was soon apparent. Within days of the strikes, two Chinese supertankers, the Xingye and Thousand Sunny, reversed course and headed home.

It seemed China’s days of cheap oil for debt — at more than $13 below Brent crude — were over. But Chinese analysts have run the numbers differently, observing that the US effectively became a debtor of China’s $13 billion ‘oil-for-debt’ arrangement with Caracas. Besides, as the world’s top Venezuelan oil buyer, it held real power, also as a customer.

Moreover, it held 440 million barrels of reserves in Venezuelan oil fields, and there was their own strategic reserves of 1.3 bn barrels to literally bank on.

Triple dilemma and China’s confidence

Behind the firewall, Beijing faces a stark triple bind. First, $70 billion investments in Venezuela loom in special economic zones, digital projects, and mining. Second, the US’ overt dominance would tilt global tides, deterring anti-US forces, and thereby put pressure on China. Third, Taiwan grows riskier.

Trump, once skeptical of military adventures, has tasted quick victory. Chinese netizens wondered whether this would lead to a spike around the Taiwan Strait? Yet Chinese confidence shone through. Professor He Wenping captured it, saying that while “guns changed governments”, Venezuela’s new interim president Delcy Rodriguez thanked China thrice in 24 hours. Notably, Beijing’s ambassador was the first to get a formal meeting, ahead of other powers.

Taiwan subtext

What set Chinese military analysts ablaze, however, were the deeper strategic implications. This was not simply about Venezuela, or oil, or even hemispheric dominance. Bloggers connected the dots, to argue that this was part of a broader containment strategy of China.

The logic applied was that Trump struck at the same time that six PLA exercises shadowed Taiwan. The message was unambiguous: A preview of US military power that could be deployed globally with impunity, against defiant regimes.

But these arguments, as it turned out, worked both ways. Chinese social media erupted almost immediately with commentaries suggesting that if military force could resolve political problems so cleanly, why should Beijing wait for ‘the right moment’? Military blogs mocked: ‘Naked mockery of mainland…can’t we match US thoroughness?’. They argued that by showing that regime change was possible, rapid, and militarily feasible, Trump had inadvertently provided a template and an argument for Chinese action against Taiwan.

Information warfare mastery

China also tried seeding global discussions using Western narratives. For instance, analysts repurposed the UK’s Guardian columns to highlight Trump’s ‘620 plus airstrikes’ across seven nations to shatter ‘peacemaker’ myths. Also apparent was a conviction that the ‘law of the jungle’ wave demanded China-Russia joint preparations.

Overall, the thrust of Chinese chatter, reflects both defiance and bravado as well as acknowledgement of what military might could achieve. For Beijing, this was blitzkrieg normalised.

Beijing’s respect for strength and scorn for weakness has long been apparent. New Delhi’s thrust towards rapidly hardening defences along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), and upping its capabilities reflects this awareness. The PLA is already preparing for ‘rapid, high-intensity offensive operations’ at the LAC, even as it absorbs the lessons that lightning speed and overwhelming force are the best ways to present the opponent with a fait accompli before he has a chance to react.

China’s chatter also emphasises that its huge economic footprint in Venezuela makes it a part of its future, no matter how it goes. Military might is only half the battle.

For India, there is a lesson there as well. With a neighbourhood infested with political turmoil, New Delhi must ensure a strong economic footprint, so that it has a foot in at the door no matter any regime change exercises. As the Chinese say, ‘if you aren't part of the negotiations, you are the subject of the decision.’

Tara Kartha is Director, Research, and Dokku Nagamalleswara Rao is Research Assistant, Centre for Land Warfare Studies.

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.