On Taiwan: Sabre-rattling China, ambiguous America

The slightest misreading of intentions and capabilities by any side in the Taiwan-US-China triangle could mean a devastating war

In early October, Chinese fighter aircraft carried out more than 150 sorties over Taiwan’s airspace. Whether they had anything to do with Taiwan’s “double-tenth”, i.e., its October 10th National Day, is a matter of conjecture.

In the wake of China’s demonstration of its might as a warning, Taiwan’s Defence Minister Chiu Kuo-cheng acknowledged that tensions with China were at their worst in 40 years.

Chinese President Xi Jinping followed up the show of strength by the People’s Liberation Army’s Air Force with a stern statement.

“The historical task of the complete reunification of the motherland must be fulfilled, and will definitely be fulfilled,” he said.

The word “reunification” implies that Taiwan was a part of China. It indeed was during a part of the Qing Dynasty (1644-1912) but had been ceded to Japan in 1895. After the end of World War II and the defeat of Kuomintang (KMT or Nationalist Party) forces by those of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the former moved to Taiwan and set up the Republic of China, claiming sovereignty over all of China. It is that claim that the CPC, currently an ultra-nationalist outfit itself, has adopted, in reverse.

Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen was not wanting in coming up with strong rhetoric: “If its democracy and way of life are threatened, Taiwan will do whatever it takes to defend itself”. She added that “if Taiwan were to fall, the consequences would be catastrophic for regional peace and the democratic alliance system.”

Tsai is from the Democratic Progressive Party, which counts a large number of native Taiwanese as members, and has pro-independence leanings. But even the KMT, made up mostly of immigrants from China who arrived on the island in mid-20th century, prefers status quo, i.e., de facto independence that has lasted more than 70 years.

Taiwan has built up a modern armed force with weaponry bought from Europe and the United States, but it is obviously no match for the might of
China.

A question that frequently comes up when Taiwan and China indulge in a war of words is, what will the United States do in the event of China mounting hostilities?

When the United States switched recognition from Taiwan to China in 1979, the US Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act stating that “the United States will make available to Taiwan such defence articles and defence services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defence capability.”

However, it does not expressly promise to defend Taiwan in the case of a Chinese attack, a policy that has come to be known as “strategic ambiguity” to deter both Chinese adventurism and Taiwanese moves towards formal independence.

China watchers and journalists around the world have been furiously discussing this issue over the past few weeks. When US National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan was asked about it, he said: “Let me just say this, we are going to take action now to try to prevent that day from ever coming to pass.” But what action, he did not say.

Eventually, the question whether the US will go to Taiwan’s defence was put to President Joe Biden last week. “Yes, we have a commitment to do that,” he replied.

However, a White House spokesperson seemed to bite back Biden’s words by saying that Washington was “not announcing any change in our policy and there is no change in our policy”.

The United States has only recently withdrawn from Afghanistan. The question arises whether it would want to get into a conflict with the large and well-equipped Chinese armed forces, and were that to happen, what might be the scale of casualties on the Chinese, Taiwanese and US sides as well as the economic consequences thereof.

Much depends on Xi Jinping’s calculations and how far he wants to go down this dangerous path. He has been relentlessly consolidating his power within the ruling party and has removed a longstanding two-term limit for holders of the presidential office. Xi has formed several “leading groups” within the party, with himself at the head, including one on national security. He already holds the post of Chairman of the Central Military Commission. Thus, he gets to decide whether or when an invasion of Taiwan is to be mounted.

The world will be watching and weighing every word of his on the Taiwan issue, as well as military activity in the Taiwan Straits.

(The writer is a senior journalist who has reported from China and Hong Kong from 1988 to 2006)