For a government that has been revelling in India’s assumption of the G-20 presidency, although it comes around to each country by rotation, it must have been disappointing that it could not prevail upon members to arrive at a joint communique at either the grouping’s finance ministers meeting or the foreign ministers’ meeting.
With consensus proving elusive thus far, India will have to deftly steer the ship through choppy waters in the months ahead if it wants to ensure that the Ukraine war does not put paid to its hopes of a successful summit in New Delhi in September.
A failure to come out with a joint declaration in September would be a significant blow to multilateralism, something that Delhi has been a strong votary of and which it fears is now in crisis, as Prime Minister Narendra Modi said in his video message to the G-20 foreign ministers on March 2.
What would perhaps be equally worrying for the Modi government after pulling out all stops to showcase its presidency domestically, with G-20 events being held across the country, is the impact it would have on its ambitions to position itself as ‘Vishwaguru’ (world leader) in the run-up to the Lok Sabha elections next year.
High-decibel publicity has been accorded to all events linked with the G-20, with several Union ministers being deployed for them, and coinages like ‘Jan Bhagidari’ (people’s participation) and ‘Amrit Kaal’, meant for the domestic audience, now willy-nilly part of the Indian diplomat’s lexicon.
The jamborees being organised in various states for diplomats to “showcase” India’s culture with visits to crafts fairs, tiger reserves and national parks may be part of the government’s efforts at ‘soft diplomacy’, but it’s really a substantive summit outcome that India needs to work towards.
At both the G-20 finance ministers’ meeting in Bengaluru and the foreign ministers’ meeting in Delhi, sharp differences among G-20 members -- with Russia and China ranged against the US-led G-7 nations -- over the Ukraine war has so far put paid to any hopes India may have of forging a consensus.
Instead, both meetings saw India merely issue a ‘Chair’s Summary’ and an ‘Outcome Document’. Both documents have paras 3 and 4 taken from the text of the Bali Declaration from the summit held in Indonesia last year.
Para 3 notes, “Since February 2022, we have also witnessed the war in Ukraine further adversely impact the global economy” and also “deplores in the strongest terms the aggression of the Russian Federation against Ukraine and demands its complete and unconditional withdrawal from the territory of Ukraine”. Para 4 notes that “peaceful resolution of conflicts, efforts to address crises, as well as diplomacy and dialogue are vital. Today’s era must not be of war.”
To be fair, the G-20 foreign ministers’ meeting does not always yield a joint communique, though they are normally issued after the finance ministers’ conclave. In Bali, though, there was no joint communiqué after the finance ministers’ meeting.
The Outcome Documents named Russia and China as the two nations that had objected to Paras 3 and 4. It’s noteworthy that Delhi, despite its close ties with Moscow and its repeated abstentions at the UN on resolutions against Russia, chose not to sit on the fence.
India has, thus far, deftly walked the diplomatic tight-rope between Russia and the West. Both Russia and China were part of the consensus on the Bali Declaration. But since then, the battle-lines have become even sharper, and both sides have dug in their heels, as was evident in Bengaluru and Delhi.
India has also raised the expectations of the Global South, having assured it during a virtual ‘Voice of the Global South Summit’ in January that its voice will be heard at the G-20 forum.
Having chosen the theme of ‘Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam’ (One Earth, One Family, One Future’) for its G-20 presidency, India is undoubtedly looking to burnish its credentials as a world leader. A lot, therefore, hinges on the outcome of the G-20 summit.
As India makes its diplomatic manoeuvres in the coming months, its leadership may well draw a leaf out of Indonesian President Joko Widodo’s book. His quiet and effective outreach during Indonesia’s G-20 presidency in 2022 to both Russia and Ukraine – he made trips to both Moscow and Kyiv to invite both President Vladimir Putin and President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – as well as other countries, earned him widespread praise. And the Bali Declaration came through even though the Ukraine war had already driven a deep wedge among G-20 members.
India will need to redouble its diplomatic efforts to ensure a consensus during the G-20 summit in Delhi. The road ahead is a tricky one to negotiate.
(The writer is a senior New Delhi-based journalist)