Military action against Pakistan may have to wait

The diplomatic steps taken by India against Pakistan’s sponsorship of terror in Kashmir, are temporary and ad hoc.

There is speculation about impending military action against Pakistan such as yet another ‘surgical strike’ or worse as in Uri in 2016 or Balakot in 2019.

Even as the government considers its response to the Pahalgam terrorist strike, some crucial questions remain unanswered. Why did the government get carried away with its own rhetoric on having defeated terrorism? Why did it not anticipate a terrorist strike despite straws in the wind?

In fact, the terrorist strikes in Jammu & Kashmir were a long time coming. It may be tempting to link the Pahalgam attack with United States Vice President J D Vance’s visit. Comparisons are being made with the Chittisinghpura Sikh massacre that took place in March 2000 on the eve of the then US President Bill Clinton’s visit. But the similarities are superficial.

The identity of the perpetrators of the Chittisinghpora massacre remains unclear. The Pahalgam massacre was ‘typical’ with victims being identified by their ability to recite the ‘Kalma’ — the oath of allegiance, affirming faith in one god and the prophet, Muhammad.

Nor is it correct to see it as a riposte to Union Home Minister Amit Shah’s claim that the terrorist ecosystem had been crippled when he visited the Union Territory two weeks ago. This is political rhetoric that the Narendra Modi government has repeated since 2019 to rationalise its abrogation of Article 370.

In fact, several developments were coalescing to reach a critical mass for the revival of terrorist activity.

India’s approach to Pakistan had changed. It had shrunk diplomatic links to the bare minimum, discontinued trade and transport linkages, and visa denial was the norm.

Another development has been the targeted killings of terrorists and militants — both Kashmir and Sikhs, that Pakistan alleges have been initiated by Indian intelligence agencies after the Pulwama terrorist strike in 2019 when 40 paramilitary personnel were killed. India was allegedly inspired to undertake extra-judicial killings on foreign soil, from the example of Russia’s KGB, Israel’s Mossad, and the assassination of dissident journalist Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi Arabia.

Since 2020, about 20 killings were allegedly carried out by unknown gunmen within Pakistan for which it blames India. There was a similar killing in Canada, and another botched up one in the US.

These actions were interpreted in a certain way because of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s rhetoric of a ‘new India’ that pulled them out of their homes to punish them.

However, behind the victorious chest-thumping by the government on the abrogation of the special status of J&K, back-channel talks on Kashmir were also being held with Pakistan. They were overseen by then Pakistani Army Chief, General Qamar Javed Bajwa, and Indian National Security Adviser, Ajit Doval. According to media reports, Doval also met Moeed W Yusuf, then Prime Minister Imran Khan's special assistant on National Security Division and Strategic Policy Planning.

These talks held in third countries, apparently facilitated by the United Arab Emirates, resulted in the Directors General of Military Operations of the two countries agreeing to a ceasefire along the Line of Control. If the quid pro quo was that elections will be held in J&K and its statehood restored, then India clearly has not kept up its part of the bargain fully.

The proximate reason for Pakistan opening the tap on terrorism in J&K, however, seems to be the hijacking of the Jaffar Express train — linking Quetta, Peshawar, Lahore, and Islamabad — on March 11. The hijacking by the Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), according to Pakistani official sources, led to a 36-hour standoff with the army and resulted in 64 deaths, including 33 militants and 18 security personnel on-board the train though estimates of the latter may be much higher.

Pakistan has long accused India of backing the BLA. The BLA has claimed responsibility for six major attacks in Balochistan since the beginning of 2025, including the train hijacking.

Within two days of the tragic Jaffar Express hijack, Pakistan claimed that even though the militants responsible for the hijack were communicating with ‘handlers in Afghanistan’, India was its mastermind. India rejected these as a ‘baseless allegation’.

That did not stop army spokesman Lt General Ahmad Sharif from warning somewhat ambiguously, that “the train attack has changed the rule of the game”. Perhaps this was a clear signal that civilians would be fair game in what Pakistan saw as a facilitating country.

Pakistan’s green signal to target India after the Jaffar Express hijack did not go unnoticed in India. The usual suspects who do defence related programmes on air discussed Sharif’s remarks extensively.

The next clear signal came from Pakistan Army Chief General Asim Munir describing Kashmir as the country’s “jugular vein”. He declared that Pakistan “will never leave” its Kashmiri brothers in their “heroic struggle”. This was also taken note of in India but did not seem to have set alarm bells ringing.

How will India react now to what it believes to be Pakistan-sponsored terrorism? The bravado about punishing every terrorist act with greater-than-expected force is not going to be easy to put in action. Geopolitical circumstances have changed since 2019. Public sentiment cannot be the sole basis of military strikes. Thankfully, no crucial election is in the offing where assuaging public emotions becomes an issue.

India will also have to provide proof to the world that Pakistan was indeed involved. This would require the arrest and questioning of the terrorists involved. That may take time.

Only the tacit approval of the US can ensure that a strike against Pakistan does not spin out of control.

Trump has, however, come on the platform of ending wars — in Gaza and in Ukraine — and cannot be seen to encourage one between two nuclear-armed neighbours. Moreover, with the domestic consequences of his trade war against the world heating up, Trump may have little time for holding the hand of his ‘friend’ India.

India, therefore, is in a tough spot. It does not want to land in a full-scale military engagement whose outcome is unpredictable. It will also bracket India and Pakistan and their de-hyphenation will end. The diplomatic measures taken so far show that for the time being at least all reactions will be symbolic.

(Bharat Bhushan is a New Delhi-based journalist.)

Disclaimer: The views expressed above are the author's own. They do not necessarily reflect the views of DH.