Outreach or overreach?

India is raising many issues to embarrass Pakistan - GB, Balochistan, river water sharing - without consistently pursing any of them.

India is not only reluctant to join the multinational transport and infrastructure corridors sponsored by China, but has also questioned the propriety of the construction of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) through its territory occupied by Pakistan.
This is the immediate context for Pakistan’s reported plans to include Gilgit-Baltistan (GB) as its fifth province. India has rightly raised objections against the possible merger of GB with Pakistan, wh­ich will fundamentally alter the nature of the Kashmir dispute. In recent years, India has also highlighted human rights violations in GB and questioned Pakis­tan’s authority to conduct elections there.

The territorial dispute between India and Pakistan over Jammu and Kashmir is generally referred to as the Kashmir dispute. This has cast a shadow over GB, formerly Northern Areas. The territory occupied by Pakistan consists of GB and Azad Jammu & Kashmir (AJK), which includes parts of Kashmir and Jammu.

The GB is more than five times larger than AJK and consists of two ethno-geographically distinct territories: Baltistan, which was part of Ladakh, and Gilgit. In 1963, Pakistan ceded a part of GB to China without consulting the local people.

The people of Baltistan speak Balti, which is perhaps the only Tibeto-Burman language of Pakistan. The people of Gilgit speak Dardic languages, among others. In both regions, indigenous people are mostly Shia. Being religious and linguistic minorities based in an economically-stagnant region whose constitutional status is not yet settled has meant that the people of GB are doubly disadvantaged and also lack legal safeguards to shield them from the army’s excesses.

Pakistan’s Kashmir-centric rhetoric notwithstanding, GB holds greater importance for it: GB is vital for its water, food and energy security. Before entering Pakistan, the Indus river passes through GB. Important glaciers that feed Pakistan’s rivers are located in GB.

Acquiring land for building dams and other projects is easier in GB as it is sparsely populated, differs from the rest of Pakistan in terms of ethnicity and faith, and is largely isolated from the media. Moreover, land rights are imprecisely defined in GB that makes acquisition easier. Pakistan’s dependence on GB will only grow because of climate change and the continued dependence of a large part of its growing population on agriculture.

GB also holds immense strategic importance. Three points are worth noting. First, GB insulates Pakistan’s restive Pashtun province (Khyber-Pakhtun­khwa, formerly NWFP) from India (Incidentally, while it is widely believed that India abandoned NWFP to Pakistan in 1947, the loss of GB meant that NWFP was not contiguous with India).

Second, AJK alone does not pose a serious threat to Jammu and Kashmir’s security. In fact, without control over GB, Pakistan will find it difficult to defend AJK. Third, control over GB allows Pakistan an overland access to China, while denying India access to Afghanistan via Wakhan corridor.

Pakistan relies upon outside settlers, military-intelligence agencies, and Sunni sectarian organisations to control GB. Just as in Balochistan, it also welcomes greater Chinese investment in GB to bolster its presence in a region where its legitimacy is moot.
Over the years, China has also acqui­red interests in GB. Development of GB is crucial for China to access the Arabian Sea and mineral-rich Afghanistan and Balochistan and also to shield Xinjiang from the volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border. However, GB’s unsettled constitutional status has allowed India to raise objections against the CPEC, which adds to the risks faced by Chinese investors.

So, Pakistan’s reported attempt to absorb GB as a province reflects the growing convergence of the interests of Pakistan and China. While Pakistan’s domestic and international compulsions are understandable, the muted response of the partisans of J&K’s independence to the possible merger of GB with Pakistan is intriguing.

Longstanding policy
The interests of Pakistan and China in GB are not coterminous though. Even if political and economic problems at home force China to withdraw from the CPEC (and GB), Pakistan will not abandon its longstanding policy of annexing GB. In fact, Pakistan’s attempts to merge GB predate the CPEC’s launch. Gilgit-Baltistan (Empowerment and Self-Governance) Order, 2009 is a case in point.

Unfortunately, India’s policy regarding GB is not clear. Initially, it seemed that the Centre’s seemingly assertive stand on GB was part of a combination of sub-military and non-military strategies to deal with Pakistan. However, even mon­ths after the prime minister drew the world’s attention to GB, there is no clarity about the broad policy objectives. So, it is not clear if the government is merely using the issue to collect brownie points at home, divert attention away from the deepening crisis in the Kashmir Valley, or bargain with Pakistan and/or China?

There is even lesser clarity about the Centre’s capacity to effectively intervene in GB. In any case, even if it is assumed that diplomatic demarches will force Pakistan out of GB (and AJK), it is not unlikely that the people might subsequently demand freedom from India as well.

Even otherwise, India will have to deal with extremist organisations and Punjabi settlers left behind by Pakistan in GB. India will also face an entirely new set of challenges as after the return of GB, we will share a border with Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa and Afghanistan. So, not only the feasibility, but also the desirability of greater involvement in GB need careful assessment.

Right now it seems India is raising a variety of issues to embarrass Pakistan – GB, Balochistan, river water sharing etc – without consistently pursing any of them either due to incapacity or lack of political will. This will not only fail to corner Pakistan, but also reduce India’s long-term bargaining power vis-à-vis Pakistan by debasing the diplomatic value of these issues. It might even hurt the intended beneficiaries of India’s intervention. More specifically, a half-baked engagement with GB will neither solve our Kashmir problem, nor help the people of GB.

(The writer teaches at Azim Premji University, Bengaluru)