<p>The Israeli move to capture Mount Hermon amidst the vacuum of post-Assad Syria shows a fundamental logic of mountain warfare: the preemptive seizure of dominant features remains an irrefutable strategy.</p>.<p>This logic is equally evident in the Himalayas, where the need to create opportunities for oneself while denying them to the adversary remains acute. Unsurprisingly, the India-China standoff along the line of actual control (LAC) endured as long as it did—opportunities once gained are rarely relinquished without compelling reasons.</p>.<p>Nevertheless, with its economy in a more precarious state, India refusing to de-link the border issue from economic ties, and the Indian Army (IA) stalemating the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) through mirror deployments leading to deployment-related attrition with no further gains, and a rising threat of inadvertent escalation, Beijing agreed to disengage from the residual friction points in Eastern Ladakh. While the completion of disengagement is heralded as a major success, it represents the bare minimum for a return to normalcy. China’s creeping incursions into Bhutan and the creation of fresh outposts opposite sensitive areas in Arunachal Pradesh belie any genuine shift away from its aggressive forward policy since the summer of 2020.</p>.<p>In fact, the altered ground realities along the LAC suggest that complete de-escalation—let alone ‘de-induction’—is unlikely. For the foreseeable future, stability will hinge on an uneasy armed peace sustained <br>by India’s reinforced deterrence posture. </p>.<p>Sustaining a PLAGF soldier in Tibet reportedly costs four times as much as it does in China’s plains. Thus, Beijing has agreed to explore a cheaper equilibrium along the LAC, with the PLA plausibly accepting that it has secured all it can for now. The buffer zones created since 2021, which facilitated disengagement, are primarily on territory India considers its own. Reports of India restituting PLAGF patrolling rights along sections of the LAC in the Asaphila and Yangste sectors in Arunachal as part of the disengagement package further underline this dynamic.</p>.<p>At a time of rising commitments on the Taiwan front and economic challenges, including the export sector potentially threatened by Trump’s tariffs, Beijing has decided to dial down the military tensions with India. This shift offers an opportunity to enhance trade and investment ties amid geoeconomic flux, a prospect welcomed by segments of Indian industry. Some large conglomerates, eager to leverage China’s ascendancy in key industrial sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs), are exploring cross-border joint ventures. However, there are limits to the coincidence of business interests between Indian and Chinese majors. For instance, a major Indian conglomerate negotiating with Chinese EV firms recently criticised China’s dumping of steel in India. And while some workarounds may be found in the event of direct export restrictions, as was the case with the roundabout import of Chinese machine tools via Dubai, India has to inescapably reduce industrial dependence on China in a concerted manner over time.</p>.<p>As such, shared economic interests will not really serve to temper Chinese territorial ambitions. The new diplomatic opening notwithstanding, China continues to consolidate its heightened military posture—and, by extension, claims—along the LAC via the construction of dual-use ‘Xiaokang’ villages. Reminiscent of the ‘Tuntian’ policy of past Chinese empires, which involved the settlement of frontier military-agricultural colonies, China is also encroaching into Bhutanese territory, while recent commercial satellite imagery reveals new PLAGF posts opposite the Tawang Sector. Having learnt from recent entanglements with the IA, the PLAGF’s construction activities can cater to both holding scenarios if the balloon goes up in Taiwan or for future escalation, if necessary. </p>.<p>Given this situation, New Delhi must accelerate its own ‘Vibrant Villages’ programme. China’s large dam projects have been spawning discontentment on the Tibetan side due to displacement and inadequate compensation. India can tap into this for grey zone opportunities provided its own border populations receive credible developmental support. Naturally, substantive rehabilitation of those displaced by India’s own hydro projects in Arunachal assumes great importance. </p>.<p>Ultimately, the bedrock of border instability, wherein the power to the north of the Himalayas must exude influence to the south of the range and vice versa, persists. And while China does not need to show its strength in the same way as it did during the pandemic and may want to hedge a bit given Trump’s caprice, the LAC could again become hot rather quickly. Especially since the issue of a successor to the 14th Dalai Lama is now at hand. </p>.<p><em>(The writer is director, Delhi Defence Review)</em></p>
<p>The Israeli move to capture Mount Hermon amidst the vacuum of post-Assad Syria shows a fundamental logic of mountain warfare: the preemptive seizure of dominant features remains an irrefutable strategy.</p>.<p>This logic is equally evident in the Himalayas, where the need to create opportunities for oneself while denying them to the adversary remains acute. Unsurprisingly, the India-China standoff along the line of actual control (LAC) endured as long as it did—opportunities once gained are rarely relinquished without compelling reasons.</p>.<p>Nevertheless, with its economy in a more precarious state, India refusing to de-link the border issue from economic ties, and the Indian Army (IA) stalemating the People’s Liberation Army Ground Force (PLAGF) through mirror deployments leading to deployment-related attrition with no further gains, and a rising threat of inadvertent escalation, Beijing agreed to disengage from the residual friction points in Eastern Ladakh. While the completion of disengagement is heralded as a major success, it represents the bare minimum for a return to normalcy. China’s creeping incursions into Bhutan and the creation of fresh outposts opposite sensitive areas in Arunachal Pradesh belie any genuine shift away from its aggressive forward policy since the summer of 2020.</p>.<p>In fact, the altered ground realities along the LAC suggest that complete de-escalation—let alone ‘de-induction’—is unlikely. For the foreseeable future, stability will hinge on an uneasy armed peace sustained <br>by India’s reinforced deterrence posture. </p>.<p>Sustaining a PLAGF soldier in Tibet reportedly costs four times as much as it does in China’s plains. Thus, Beijing has agreed to explore a cheaper equilibrium along the LAC, with the PLA plausibly accepting that it has secured all it can for now. The buffer zones created since 2021, which facilitated disengagement, are primarily on territory India considers its own. Reports of India restituting PLAGF patrolling rights along sections of the LAC in the Asaphila and Yangste sectors in Arunachal as part of the disengagement package further underline this dynamic.</p>.<p>At a time of rising commitments on the Taiwan front and economic challenges, including the export sector potentially threatened by Trump’s tariffs, Beijing has decided to dial down the military tensions with India. This shift offers an opportunity to enhance trade and investment ties amid geoeconomic flux, a prospect welcomed by segments of Indian industry. Some large conglomerates, eager to leverage China’s ascendancy in key industrial sectors such as electric vehicles (EVs), are exploring cross-border joint ventures. However, there are limits to the coincidence of business interests between Indian and Chinese majors. For instance, a major Indian conglomerate negotiating with Chinese EV firms recently criticised China’s dumping of steel in India. And while some workarounds may be found in the event of direct export restrictions, as was the case with the roundabout import of Chinese machine tools via Dubai, India has to inescapably reduce industrial dependence on China in a concerted manner over time.</p>.<p>As such, shared economic interests will not really serve to temper Chinese territorial ambitions. The new diplomatic opening notwithstanding, China continues to consolidate its heightened military posture—and, by extension, claims—along the LAC via the construction of dual-use ‘Xiaokang’ villages. Reminiscent of the ‘Tuntian’ policy of past Chinese empires, which involved the settlement of frontier military-agricultural colonies, China is also encroaching into Bhutanese territory, while recent commercial satellite imagery reveals new PLAGF posts opposite the Tawang Sector. Having learnt from recent entanglements with the IA, the PLAGF’s construction activities can cater to both holding scenarios if the balloon goes up in Taiwan or for future escalation, if necessary. </p>.<p>Given this situation, New Delhi must accelerate its own ‘Vibrant Villages’ programme. China’s large dam projects have been spawning discontentment on the Tibetan side due to displacement and inadequate compensation. India can tap into this for grey zone opportunities provided its own border populations receive credible developmental support. Naturally, substantive rehabilitation of those displaced by India’s own hydro projects in Arunachal assumes great importance. </p>.<p>Ultimately, the bedrock of border instability, wherein the power to the north of the Himalayas must exude influence to the south of the range and vice versa, persists. And while China does not need to show its strength in the same way as it did during the pandemic and may want to hedge a bit given Trump’s caprice, the LAC could again become hot rather quickly. Especially since the issue of a successor to the 14th Dalai Lama is now at hand. </p>.<p><em>(The writer is director, Delhi Defence Review)</em></p>
